Я был разочарован тем, что Харди ускользнул со своей армией, но в целом у нас были причины быть довольными осязаемыми плодами победы. Выяснилось, что река Саванна сильно загромождена торпедами и бревенчатыми сваями, протянутыми поперек фарватера ниже города; эти сваи были забиты булыжным камнем, которым некогда мостились улицы. Адмирал Далгрен проявлял крайнюю активность, неоднократно навещал меня в городе, в то время как его флот продолжал наблюдать за Чарлстоном и всеми путями прорыва блокады, кишевшими на побережье и по общему признанию принадлежавшими англичанам и управлявшимися ими, причем в качестве своего рода перевалочного пункта они использовали остров Нью-Провиденс (Нассау). Одно из таких небольших судов прорыва блокады зашло в Саванну уже после того, как мы полностью овладели городом, и шкипер не осознавал своей ошибки до тех пор, пока не сошел на берег, чтобы заглянуть на таможню. Разумеется, его судно досталось флоту в качестве приза. Были немедленно начаты масштабные работы по удалению торпед и препятствий на главном фарватере реки, и с того момента Саванна стала главной базой снабжения для войск, действовавших в том районе.
Тем временем 15 и 16 декабря перед Нэшвиллом разыгрались великие сражения, в которых генерал Томас столь достойно выполнил свое обещание сокрушить Худа; подробности этих боев во всех деталях изложены в его собственных официальных отчетах, опубликованных уже давно. Слухи об этих великих победах доходили до нас в Саванну урывками, но его официальный отчет прибыл 24 декабря вместе с письмом от генерала Гранта, в общих чертах описывавшим события вплоть до 18-го числа, и я немедленно написал через своего начальника штаба, генерала Вебстера, генералу Томасу, выразив ему высочайшую похвалу. Его блестящая победа под Нэшвиллом была необходима для завершения моей победы под Саванной в единое целое, и этот факт прекрасно понимал мистер Линкольн, который всесторонне признал его в своем личном письме от 26 декабря, приведенном выше полностью, а также заявил об этом в то время в моем Специальном полевом приказе № 6 от 8 января 1865 года, который приводится здесь:
(Special Field Order No. 6.)
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, January 8, 1864.
The general commanding announces to the troops composing the Military Division of the Mississippi that he has received from the President of the United States, and from Lieutenant-General Grant, letters conveying their high sense and appreciation of the campaign just closed, resulting in the capture of Savannah and the defeat of Hood's army in Tennessee.
In order that all may understand the importance of events, it is proper to revert to the situation of affairs in September last. We held Atlanta, a city of little value to us, but so important to the enemy that Mr. Davis, the head of the rebellious faction in the South, visited his army near Palmetto, and commanded it to regain the place and also to ruin and destroy us, by a series of measures which he thought would be effectual. That army, by a rapid march, gained our railroad near Big Shanty, and afterward about Dalton. We pursued it, but it moved so rapidly that we could not overtake it, and General Hood led his army successfully far over toward Mississippi, in hope to decoy us out of Georgia. But we were not thus to be led away by him, and preferred to lead and control events ourselves. Generals Thomas and Schofield, commanding the departments to our rear, returned to their posts and prepared to decoy General Hood into their meshes, while we came on to complete the original journey. We quietly and deliberately destroyed Atlanta, and all the railroads which the enemy had used to carry on war against us, occupied his State capital, and then captured his commercial capital, which had been so strongly fortified from the sea as to defy approach from that quarter. Almost at the moment of our victorious entry into Savannah came the welcome and expected news that our comrades in Tennessee had also fulfilled nobly and well their part, had decoyed General Hood to Nashville and then turned on him, defeating his army thoroughly, capturing all his artillery, great numbers of prisoners, and were still pursuing the fragments down in Alabama. So complete success in military operations, extending over half a continent, is an achievement that entitles it to a place in the military history of the world. The armies serving in Georgia and Tennessee, as well as the local garrisons of Decatur, Bridgeport, Chattanooga, and Murfreesboro', are alike entitled to the common honors, and each regiment may inscribe on its colors, at pleasure, the word "Savannah" or "Nashville." The general commanding embraces, in the same general success, the operations of the cavalry under Generals Stoneman, Burbridge, and Gillem, that penetrated into Southwest Virginia, and paralyzed the efforts of the enemy to disturb the peace and safety of East Tennessee. Instead of being put on the defensive, we have at all points assumed the bold offensive, and have completely thwarted the designs of the enemies of our country.
By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman,
L. M. DAYTON, Aide-de-Camp.
На этом завершился «Марш к морю», и я лишь добавлю несколько писем, выбранных из множества других, чтобы проиллюстрировать царившее тогда по всей стране общее чувство ликования. Я рассматривал марш от Атланты до Саванны лишь как «смену базы», как переброску сильной армии, не имевшей противника и завершившей свою на тот момент задачу, из внутренних районов в точку на морском побережье, откуда она могла бы добиться других важных результатов. Я считал этот марш средством для достижения цели, а не самостоятельным актом войны. Тем не менее тогда, как и теперь, марш к морю обычно расценивался как нечто из ряда вон выходящее, нечто аномальное, выбивающееся из обычного порядка вещей; в то время как на самом деле я просто совершил переход из Атланты в Саванну как один из шагов в направлении Ричмонда — движение, которое необходимо было встретить и разгромить, иначе война неизбежно подошла бы к концу.
Если бы мне пришлось выразить меру относительной важности марша к морю и похода из Саванны на север, я бы оценил первый единицей, а второй — десяткой, то есть максимумом.
Теперь я завершаю эту длинную главу приведением табличной ведомости потерь за время марша и количества захваченных пленных. Захваченное имущество исчислялось тысячами лошадей и мулов, а также огромными массами продовольственных припасов, которые в совокупности составляют весьма значительную величину, но могут быть оценены с достаточной точностью из расчета, что шестьдесят пять тысяч человек были обеспечены обильным продовольствием примерно на сорок дней, а тридцать пять тысяч животных кормились в течение такого же срока, благодаря чему прибыли в Саванну в прекрасной упитанности и кондиции. Я также прилагаю несколько наиболее важных писем, которыми обменялись генералы Грант, Халлек и я, иллюстрирующих наши взгляды на том этапе войны:
ВЕДОМОСТЬ ПОТЕРЬ И ЗАХВАЧЕННЫХ ПЛЕННЫХ ДЕЙСТВУЮЩЕЙ АРМИЕЙ В ХОДЕ КАМПАНИИ В ДЖОРДЖИИ.
Killed Wounded Missing Captured
Officers Men Officers Men Officers Men Officers Men
10 93 24 404 1 277 77 1,261
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 16, 1864
Major-General SHERMAN (via Hilton Head).
GENERAL: Lieutenant-General Grant informs me that, in his last dispatch sent to you, he suggested the transfer of your infantry to Richmond. He now wishes me to say that you will retain your entire force, at least for the present, and, with such assistance as may be given you by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren, operate from such base as you may establish on the coast. General Foster will obey such instructions as may be given by you.
Should you have captured Savannah, it is thought that by transferring the water-batteries to the land side that place may be made a good depot and base of operations on Augusta, Branchville, or Charleston. If Savannah should not be captured, or if captured and not deemed suitable for this purpose, perhaps Beaufort would serve as a depot. As the rebels have probably removed their most valuable property from Augusta, perhaps Branchville would be the most important point at which to strike in order to sever all connection between Virginia and the Southwestern Railroad.
General Grant's wishes, however, are, that this whole matter of your future actions should be entirely left to your discretion.
We can send you from here a number of complete batteries of field-artillery, with or without horses, as you may desire; also, as soon as General Thomas can spare them, all the fragments, convalescents, and furloughed men of your army. It is reported that Thomas defeated Hood yesterday, near Nashville, but we have no particulars nor official reports, telegraphic communication being interrupted by a heavy storm.
Our last advises from you was General Howard's note, announcing his approach to Savannah. Yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah (via Hilton Head).
My DEAR GENERAL: Yours of the 13th, by Major Anderson, is just received. I congratulate you on your splendid success, and shall very soon expect to hear of the crowning work of your campaign--the capture of Savannah. Your march will stand out prominently as the great one of this great war. When Savannah falls, then for another wide swath through the centre of the Confederacy. But I will not anticipate. General Grant is expected here this morning, and will probably write you his own views.
I do not learn from your letter, or from Major Anderson, that you are in want of any thing which we have not provided at Hilton Head. Thinking it probable that you might want more field-artillery, I had prepared several batteries, but the great difficulty of foraging horses on the sea-coast will prevent our sending any unless you actually need them. The hay-crop this year is short, and the Quartermaster's Department has great difficulty in procuring a supply for our animals.
General Thomas has defeated Hood, near Nashville, and it is hoped that he will completely, crush his army. Breckenridge, at last accounts, was trying to form a junction near Murfreesboro', but, as Thomas is between them, Breckenridge must either retreat or be defeated.
General Rosecrans made very bad work of it in Missouri, allowing Price with a small force to overrun the State and destroy millions of property.
Orders have been issued for all officers and detachments having three months or more to serve, to rejoin your army via Savannah. Those having less than three months to serve, will be retained by General Thomas.
Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by some accident the place may be destroyed, and, if a little salt should be sown upon its site, it may prevent the growth of future crops of nullification and secession. Yours truly,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief-of-Staff.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, December 18, 1864.
To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.
My DEAR GENERAL: I have just received and read, I need not tell you with how mush gratification, your letter to General Halleck. I congratulate you and the brave officers and men under your command on the successful termination of your most brilliant campaign. I never had a doubt of the result. When apprehensions for your safety were expressed by the President, I assured him with the army you had, and you in command of it, there was no danger but you would strike bottom on salt-water some place; that I would not feel the same security--in fact, would not have intrusted the expedition to any other living commander.
It has been very hard work to get Thomas to attack Hood. I gave him the most peremptory order, and had started to go there myself, before he got off. He has done magnificently, however, since he started. Up to last night, five thousand prisoners and forty-nine pieces of captured artillery, besides many wagons and innumerable small-arms, had been received in Nashville. This is exclusive of the enemy's loss at Franklin, which amounted to thirteen general officers killed, wounded, and captured. The enemy probably lost five thousand men at Franklin, and ten thousand in the last three days' operations. Breckenridge is said to be making for Murfreesboro'.
I think he is in a most excellent place. Stoneman has nearly wiped out John Morgan's old command, and five days ago entered Bristol. I did think the best thing to do was to bring the greater part of your army here, and wipe out Lee. The turn affairs now seem to be taking has shaken me in that opinion. I doubt whether you may not accomplish more toward that result where you are than if brought here, especially as I am informed, since my arrival in the city, that it would take about two months to get you here with all the other calls there are for ocean transportation.
I want to get your views about what ought to be done, and what can be done. If you capture the garrison of Savannah, it certainly will compel Lee to detach from Richmond, or give us nearly the whole South. My own opinion is that Lee is averse to going out of Virginia, and if the cause of the South is lost he wants Richmond to be the last place surrendered. If he has such views, it may be well to indulge him until we get every thing else in our hands.
Congratulating you and the army again upon the splendid results of your campaign, the like of which is not read of in past history, I subscribe myself, more than ever, if possible, your friend,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, December 26, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, Savannah, Georgia.
GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 22d inst., brought by Major Grey of General Foster's staff; is fast at hand. As the major starts back at once, I can do no more at present than simply acknowledge its receipt. The capture of Savannah, with all its immense stores, must tell upon the people of the South. All well here.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, December 24, 1864.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.
GENERAL: Your letter of December 18th is just received. I feel very much gratified at receiving the handsome commendation you pay my army. I will, in general orders, convey to the officers and men the substance of your note.
I am also pleased that you have modified your former orders, for I feared that the transportation by sea would very much disturb the unity and morale of my army, now so perfect.
The occupation of Savannah, which I have heretofore reported, completes the first part of our game, and fulfills a great part of your instructions; and we are now engaged in dismantling the rebel forts which bear upon the sea-channels, and transferring the heavy ordnance and ammunition to Fort Pulaski and Hilton Head, where they can be more easily guarded than if left in the city.
The rebel inner lines are well adapted to our purpose, and with slight modifications can be held by a comparatively small force; and in about ten days I expect to be ready to sally forth again. I feel no doubt whatever as to our future plans. I have thought them over so long and well that they appear as clear as daylight. I left Augusta untouched on purpose, because the enemy will be in doubt as to my objective point, after we cross the Savannah River, whether it be Augusta or Charleston, and will naturally divide his forces. I will then move either on Branchville or Colombia, by any curved line that gives us the best supplies, breaking up in our course as much railroad as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and Augusta both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there long enough to observe the effect. I would then strike for the Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible, communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren (whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, accommodating himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would favor an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking. Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out. Still, I am aware that, historically and politically, much importance is attached to the place, and it may be that, apart from its military importance, both you and the Administration may prefer I should give it more attention; and it would be well for you to give me some general idea on that subject, for otherwise I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of little importance, after all its railroads leading into the interior have been destroyed or occupied by us. But, on the hypothesis of ignoring Charleston and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and fights me; in which case I should reckon on your being on his heels. Now that Hood is used up by Thomas, I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as quick as possible. I feel confident that I can break up the whole railroad system of South Carolina and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time spring fairly opens; and, if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that I can handle him in the open country.
One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this: that I believe Hardee will reduce the garrison to a small force, with plenty of provisions; I know that the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege operations.
I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and, if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all detachments, convalescents, etc., belonging to these four corps, sent forward at once. I do not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations as all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for supplies.