Генерал Джонстон в своем «Повествовании» (стр. 392) утверждает, что его общие силы при Бентонвилле, если не считать кавалерию Уиллера и Батлера, составляли всего четырнадцать тысяч сто пехотинцев и артиллеристов; а на странице 393 он приводит следующие свои потери: 2343 человека В этих цифрах существуют крупные расхождения: например, генерал Слокем отчитывается о 338 захваченных пленных, а генерал Говард — о 1287, что в сумме дает 1625 человек против 653 у Джонстона — разница составляет 872 человека. Я всегда отдавал должное генералу Джонстону за смелость при нападении на наш уязвимый фланг под Бентонвиллем, однако считаю, что он занижает свои силы, и сомневаюсь, что в то время у него были точные ведомости по его разношерстной армии, собранной из частей Хока, Брэгга, Харди, Ли и др. После первой атаки на дивизию Карлина я сомневаюсь, что бои носили столь отчаянный характер, как описано им на странице 385 и далее. Я находился в непосредственной близости от Пятнадцатого корпуса 20-го и 21-го чисел, расценивал те стычки как рядовые перестрелки и знаю, что имел приказ избегать генерального сражения до тех пор, пока мы не будем уверены в Голдсборо и в создании новой базы снабжения. Обладая нынешними знаниями о его малочисленных силах, я, конечно, совершил ошибку, не разгромив армию Джонстона 21 марта 1865 года. Но тогда я был доволен и тем, что позволил ему уйти, и 22 марта выехал к Когс-Бриджу, где встретился с генералом Терри и его двумя дивизиями Десятого корпуса; а на следующий день мы въехали в Голдсборо, где я обнаружил генерала Скофилда с Двадцать третьим корпусом, осуществив тем самым идеальное соединение всей армии в этой точке, как и предполагалось изначально. В течение 23-го и 24-го чисел вся армия собралась в Голдсборо; две дивизии генерала Терри расположились лагерем на Фейсонс-Депо к югу от него, а кавалерия генерала Килпатрика — на станции Маунт-Олив неподалеку, и там мы все отдыхали, в то время как я сосредоточил особое внимание на пополнении припасов армии для следующего и заключительного этапа кампании. Полковник В. В. Райт проявил такую неутомимость, что Ньюбернская железная дорога была восстановлена, и 25 марта в Голдсборо прибыл первый паровоз. Так завершился один из самых протяженных и важных маршей, когда-либо совершенных организованной армией в цивилизованной стране. Расстояние от Саванны до Голдсборо составляет четыреста двадцать пять миль, а пройденный маршрут охватывал пять крупных судоходных рек, а именно: Эдисто, Брод, Катоба, Пиди и Кейп-Фир, на любой из которых относительно небольшие, но умелые силы должны были сделать переправу чрезвычайно трудной, если не невозможной. Местность в целом находилась в первозданном состоянии, изобиловала бесчисленными болотами и располагала лишь грунтовыми дорогами, почти каждый милю которых приходилось покрывать лежневым настилом. На нашем пути мы захватили Колумбию, Черо и Фейетвилл — важные города и склады снабжения, принудили к эвакуации город и гавань Чарлстона, полностью разрушили все железные дороги Южной Каролины и потребил колоссальное количество продовольствия и фуража, необходимых противнику для содержания собственных армий. Мы совершили весь путь в четыреста двадцать пять миль в разгар зимы за пятьдесят дней, преодолевая в среднем по десять миль в день с учетом десяти дневок, и прибыли в Голдсборо с армией в великолепном состоянии и с обозами, сохранившимися почти так же свежо, как при нашем выступлении из Атланты. Для меня было очевидно, что мы сможем возобновить марш и войти в театр оперативных действий генерала Гранта в течение всего апреля, и что в природе не существовало сил, способных задержать наше продвижение, если только генералу Ли не удастся ускользнуть от генерала Гранта под Петерсбергом, соединиться с генералом Джонстоном и в таком составе встретить меня в одиночку; и теперь, когда мы соединились с генералами Терри и Скофилдом, я не опасался даже этого исхода. По прибытии в Голдсборо я узнал от генерала Скофилда все подробности его операций под Уилмингтоном и Ньюберном, а также о стычке Двадцать третьего корпуса под Кинстоном с генералом Брэггом. Я также обнаружил ожидавшего меня лейтенанта Данна из штаба генерала Гранта с письмом генерала от 7 февраля, содержащим инструкции генералам Скофилду и Томасу, и его письмом от 16 марта в ответ на мое от 12-го числа из Фейетвилла. Все они приводятся здесь для разъяснения полных причин событий шедшей тогда войны, дополненных двумя-тремя моими собственными письмами для полноты картины.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, February 7, 1865
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi
GENERAL: Without much expectation of it reaching you in time to be of any service, I have mailed to you copies of instructions to Schofield and Thomas. I had informed Schofield by telegraph of the departure of Mahone's division, south from the Petersburg front. These troops marched down the Weldon road, and, as they apparently went without baggage, it is doubtful whether they have not returned. I was absent from here when they left. Just returned yesterday morning from Cape Fear River. I went there to determine where Schofield's corps had better go to operate against Wilmington and Goldsboro'. The instructions with this will inform you of the conclusion arrived at.
Schofield was with me, and the plan of the movement against Wilmington fully determined before we started back; hence the absence of more detailed instructions to him. He will land one division at Smithville, and move rapidly up the south side of the river, and secure the Wilmington & Charlotte Railroad, and with his pontoon train cross over to the island south of the city, if he can. With the aid of the gunboats, there is no doubt but this move will drive the enemy from their position eight miles east of the city, either back to their line or away altogether. There will be a large force on the north bank of Cape Fear River, ready to follow up and invest the garrison, if they should go inside.
The railroads of North Carolina are four feet eight and one-half inches. gauge. I have sent large parties of railroad-men there to build them up, and have ordered stock to run them. We have abundance of it idle from the non-use of the Virginia roads. I have taken every precaution to have supplies ready for you wherever you may turn up. I did this before when you left Atlanta, and regret that they did not reach you promptly when you reached salt-water....
Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now at my headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr. Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace. The peace feeling within the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly. This, however, should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate us to greater activity.
I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you would decline, or are opposed to, promotion. No one world be more pleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed in my position, and I put subordinate, it would not change our personal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to support you that you have ever done to support me, and would do all in my power to make our cause win.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.
Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland.
GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. At the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the depletion of your command by my orders. It will, be impossible at present for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force of infantry indicated. General Slocum is advised before this of the changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General Stoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by Sherman's forces. He might also be able to return to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing home our prisoners of war in rebel hands.
Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have to be the judge, making up his mind from information obtained while executing the first part of his instructions. Sherman's movements will attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect, thus facilitating the execution of this.
Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. This probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without taking any now under General Wilson. It would require, though, the reorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, which Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern Virginia.
It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and the mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson.
You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copy of this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations without loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you as to these preparations.
As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but to avoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing like equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go as light as possible. Stoneman's experience, in raiding will teach him in this matter better than he can be directed.
Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and keep me advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.
Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding army of the Ohio.
GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes, North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed in command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders. Of course, you will receive orders from me direct until such time as General Sherman gets within communicating distance of you. This obviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informed you would meet you at Fortress Monroe. If the order referred to should not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, you will read these instructions as your authority to assume command of all the troops in North Carolina, dating all official communications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio." Your headquarters will be in the field, and with the portion of the army where you feel yourself most needed. In the first move you will go to Cape Fear River.
Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movement through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be obtained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on the line of his march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy.
I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions directly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance-stores will also be necessary.
Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.
The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required by your own command.
The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior, to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February. This limits your time very materially.
If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad-men has already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding military Division of the Mississippi.
GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just received. I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but I have felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing. I knew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you, you would come out safely somewhere.
To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of the greatest importance. Butler came near losing that prize to us. But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I do not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for the country as the capture of Fort Fisher. Butler may not see it in that light.
Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have been attempting to get something done in the West, both to cooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness there--to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so that he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior. With all I have said, he has not moved at last advices. Canby was sending a cavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg toward Selma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the same point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February as possible. He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date. He has not yet started, or had not at last advices. I ordered him to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina, to be there about the time you would reach Columbia. He would either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would have succeeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material, which you could not reach. At that time the Richmond papers were full of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts of movements in West North Carolina. I supposed all the time it was Stoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that Stoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops in North Carolina were Kirk's forces! In order that Stoneman might get off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men would be sufficient for him to take. In the mean time I had directed Sheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in the mountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on and destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal. Time advanced, until he set the 28th of February for starting. I informed Thomas, and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg, to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as possible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the 12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he (Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon as possible.
Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as heard. I am looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since about the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited from publishing accounts of army movements. We are left to our own resources, therefore, for information. You will see from the papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bears this will tell you all.
Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of none going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but I think no division or brigade. The determination seems to be to hold Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient to leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), and move out with plenty to whip his whole army. But the roads are entirely impassable. Until they improve, I shall content myself with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts to evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over--think I will--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are the last avenues left to the enemy.
Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. I have stopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, except those from Illinois.
Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, and afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I have ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and to fortify there, and to hold out to the Virginia line, if he can. He has accumulated a large amount of supplies in Knoxville, and has been ordered not to destroy any of the railroad west of the Virginia Hue. I told him to get ready for a campaign toward Lynchburg, if it became necessary. He never can make one there or elsewhere; but the steps taken will prepare for any one else to take his troops and come east or go toward Rome, whichever may be necessary. I do not believe either will.