ADMIRAL PORTER'S ACCOUNT OF THE INTERVIEW WITH Mr. LINCOLN.
The day of General Sherman's arrival at City Point (I think the 27th of March, 1866), I accompanied him and General Grant on board the President's flagship, the Queen, where the President received us in the upper saloon, no one but ourselves being present.
The President was in an exceedingly pleasant mood, and delighted to meet General Sherman, whom he cordially greeted.
It seems that this was the first time he had met Sherman, to remember him, since the beginning of the war, and did not remember when he had seen him before, until the general reminded him of the circumstances of their first meeting.
This was rather singular on the part of Mr. Lincoln, who was, I think, remarkable for remembering people, having that kingly quality in an eminent degree. Indeed, such was the power of his memory, that he seemed never to forget the most minute circumstance.
The conversation soon turned on the events of Sherman's campaign through the South, with every movement of which the President seemed familiar.
He laughed over some of the stories Sherman told of his "bummers," and told others in return, which illustrated in a striking manner the ideas he wanted to convey. For example, he would often express his wishes by telling an apt story, which was quite a habit with him, and one that I think he adopted to prevent his committing himself seriously.
The interview between the two generals and the President lasted about an hour and a half, and, as it was a remarkable one, I jotted down what I remembered of the conversation, as I have made a practice of doing during the rebellion, when any thing interesting occurred.
I don't regret having done so, as circumstances afterward occurred (Stanton's ill conduct toward Sherman) which tended to cast odium on General Sherman for allowing such liberal terms to Jos. Johnston.
Could the conversation that occurred on board the Queen, between the President and General Sherman, have been known, Sherman would not, and could not, have been censored. Mr. Lincoln, had he lived, would have acquitted the general of any blame, for he was only carrying out the President's wishes.
My opinion is, that Mr. Lincoln came down to City Point with the most liberal views toward the rebels. He felt confident that we would be successful, and was willing that the enemy should capitulate on the most favorable terms.
I don't know what the President would have done had he been left to himself, and had our army been unsuccessful, but he was than wrought up to a high state of excitement. He wanted peace on almost any terms, and there is no knowing what proposals he might have been willing to listen to. His heart was tenderness throughout, and, as long as the rebels laid down their arms, he did not care how it was done. I do not know how far he was influenced by General Grant, but I presume, from their long conferences, that they must have understood each other perfectly, and that the terms given to Lee after his surrender were authorized by Mr. Lincoln. I know that the latter was delighted when he heard that they had been given, and exclaimed, a dozen times, "Good!" "All right!" "Exactly the thing!" and other similar expressions. Indeed, the President more than once told me what he supposed the terms would be: if Lee and Johnston surrendered, he considered the war ended, and that all the other rebel forces world lay down their arms at once.
In this he proved to be right. Grant and Sherman were both of the same opinion, and so was everyone else who knew anything about the matter.
What signified the terms to them, so long as we obtained the actual surrender of people who only wanted a good opportunity to give up gracefully? The rebels had fought "to the last ditch," and all that they had left them was the hope of being handed down in history as having received honorable terms.
After hearing General Sherman's account of his own position, and that of Johnston, at that time, the President expressed fears that the rebel general would escape south again by the railroads, and that General Sherman would have to chase him anew, over the same ground; but the general pronounced this to be impracticable. He remarked: "I have him where he cannot move without breaking up his army, which, once disbanded, can never again be got together; and I have destroyed the Southern railroads, so that they cannot be used again for a long time." General Grant remarked, "What is to prevent their laying the rails again?" "Why," said General Sherman, "my bummers don't do things by halves. Every rail, after having been placed over a hot fire, has been twisted as crooked as a ram's-horn, and they never can be used again."
This was the only remark made by General Grant during the interview, as he sat smoking a short distance from the President, intent, no doubt, on his own plans, which were being brought to a successful termination.
The conversation between the President and General Sherman, about the terms of surrender to be allowed Jos. Johnston, continued. Sherman energetically insisted that he could command his own terms, and that Johnston would have to yield to his demands; but the President was very decided about the matter, and insisted that the surrender of Johnston's army most be obtained on any terms.
General Grant was evidently of the same way of thinking, for, although he did not join in the conversation to any extent, yet he made no objections, and I presume had made up his mind to allow the best terms himself.
He was also anxious that Johnston should not be driven into Richmond, to reenforce the rebels there, who, from behind their strong intrenchments, would have given us incalculable trouble.
Sherman, as a subordinate officer, yielded his views to those of the President, and the terms of capitulation between himself and Johnston were exactly in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's wishes. He could not have done any thing which would have pleased the President better.
Mr. Lincoln did, in fact, arrange the (so considered) liberal terms offered General Jos. Johnston, and, whatever may have been General Sherman's private views, I feel sure that he yielded to the wishes of the President in every respect. It was Mr. Lincoln's policy that was carried out, and, had he lived long enough, he would have been but too glad to have acknowledged it. Had Mr. Lincoln lived, Secretary Stanton would have issued no false telegraphic dispatches, in the hope of killing off another general in the regular army, one who by his success had placed himself in the way of his own succession.
The disbanding of Jos. Johnston's army was so complete, that the pens and ink used in the discussion of the matter were all wasted.
It was asserted, by the rabid ones, that General Sherman had given up all that we had been fighting for, had conceded every thing to Jos. Johnston, and had, as the boys say, "knocked the fat into the fire;" but sober reflection soon overruled these harsh expressions, and, with those who knew General Sherman, and appreciated him, he was still the great soldier, patriot, and gentleman. In future times this matter will be looked at more calmly and dispassionately. The bitter animosities that have been engendered during the rebellion will have died out for want of food on which to live, and the very course Grant, Sherman, and others pursued, in granting liberal terms to the defeated rebels, will be applauded. The fact is, they met an old beggar in the road, whose crutches had broken from under him: they let him have only the broken crutches to get home with!
I sent General Sherman back to Newbern, North Carolina, in the steamer Bat.
While he was absent from his command he was losing no time, for be was getting his army fully equipped with stores and clothing; and, when he returned, he had a rested and regenerated army, ready to swallow up Jos. Johnston and all his ragamuffins.
Johnston was cornered, could not move without leaving every thing behind him, and could not go to Richmond without bringing on a famine in that destitute city.
I was with Mr. Lincoln all the time he was at City Point, and until be left for Washington. He was more than delighted with the surrender of Lee, and with the terms Grant gave the rebel general; and would have given Jos. Johnston twice as much, had the latter asked for it, and could he have been certain that the rebel world have surrendered without a fight. I again repeat that, had Mr. Lincoln lived, he would have shouldered all the responsibility.
One thing is certain: had Jos. Johnston escaped and got into Richmond, and caused a larger list of killed and wounded than we had, General Sherman would have been blamed. Then why not give him the full credit of capturing on the best terms the enemy's last important army and its best general, and putting an end to the rebellion
It was a finale worthy of Sherman's great march through the swamps and deserts of the South, a march not excelled by any thing we read of in modern military history.
D. D. PORTER, Vice-Admiral.
(Written by the admiral in 1866, at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., and mailed to General Sherman at St. Louis, Mo.)
Как только представилась возможность, я согласовал с генералом Грантом определенные изменения в организации моей армии; генерал также взялся направить в Северную Каролину несколько буксиров и барж для доставки припасов из Ньюберна до Кинстона, откуда их можно было доставлять в наши лагеря гужевым транспортом, разгрузив тем самым наши железные дороги в соответствующей степени. Я взял на себя обязательство быть готовым выступить на север к 10 апреля, после чего поднялся на борт парохода «Бэт» под командованием капитана Барнса и направился в Северную Каролину. Мы спустились вниз по реке Джеймс и в Олд-Пойнт-Комфорт приняли на борту моего брата, сенатора Шермана, и мистера Эдвина Стентона, сына военного министра, после чего незамедлительно проследовали к месту назначения. По пути вниз по реке капитан Барнс выразил мне крайнюю признательность за реквизицию его судна, поскольку это избавило его от мучительнейшей дилеммы. Он пояснил, что был выделен адмиралом Портером для эскортирования невооруженного судна президента «Ривер Куин», в каковом качестве его прямой обязанностью являлась забота о миссис Линкольн. За день до моего прибытия в Сити-Пойнт состоялся грандиозный смотр части Армии Джеймса, которой тогда командовал генерал Орд. Президент выехал из Сити-Пойнт вместе с генералом Грантом верхом в сопровождении многочисленного штаба, включая капитана Барнса и миссис Орд; однако миссис Линкольн и миссис Грант следовали в экипаже. Кавалькада достигла смотровой площадки милях в пяти или шести от Сити-Пойнт, обнаружила войска полностью готовыми, выстроенными в линию, и после традиционного представления оружия президент и его свита, за которыми следовали миссис Орд и капитан Барнс верхом, объехали линии и вернулись к смотровой трибуне, к которой тем временем добрались миссис Линкольн и миссис Грант в своем экипаже, задержанном из-за того, что кучер свернул не на ту дорогу. Миссис Линкольн, увидев миссис Орд и капитана Барнса, ехавших со свитой, и вообразив, будто миссис Орд выдавала себя за нее, набросилась на капитана Барнса и устроила ему страшный нагоняй, а заодно позволила себе весьма резкие упреки в адрес миссис Орд. Это сделало положение Барнса крайне неприятным, так что он почувствовал огромное облегчение, когда его отправили со мной в Северную Каролину. «Бэт» шел очень быстро, и утром 29-го числа мы находились возле мыса Хаттерас; капитан Барнс, заметив выходящий из пролива Хаттерас винтовой пароход, заставил его развернуться и провести нас внутрь. Мы благополучно вошли, поднялись по Памлико-Саунд в реку Ньюс, а на следующее утро — из-за некоторой неполадки в механизмах — встали на якорь примерно в семи милях ниже Ньюберна, откуда поднялись на барже капитана Барнса. По прибытии в Ньюберн я телеграфировал генералу Скофилду в Голдсборо о факте своего возвращения и о том, что согласовал с генералом Грантом изменения, необходимые при реорганизации армии, а также суда, требующиеся для доставки необходимых нам продовольствия и припасов перед возобновлением нашего марша на север. Эти изменения сводились к преобразованию левого крыла в отдельную армию под наименованием «Армия Джорджии» под командованием генерала Слокема с двумя его корпусами под началом генерала Джеффа. К. Дэвиса и генерала Джозефа А. Моуэра; Десятый и Двадцать третий корпуса уже образовывали другую армию — «Армию Огайо» под командованием генерал-майора Скофилда, а два его корпуса находились под началом генералов Дж. Д. Кокса и А. Х. Терри. Эти изменения были необходимы потому, что только армейские командующие могли назначать военно-полевые суды, предоставлять отпуска и выполнять множество других дисциплинарных и административных процедур, без которых было не обойтись; но моей главной целью являлась подготовка всей армии к тому, что казалось одним из вероятных сценариев того времени — сражению против объединенных армий Ли и Джонстона в случае, если их соединение успеет оформиться до того, как генерал Грант сможет преследовать Ли в Северной Каролине. Генерал Джордж Х. Томас, остававшийся в Нэшвилле, остался недоволен этими переменами, поскольку два корпуса при генерале Слокеме, а именно Четырнадцатый и Двадцатый, до того момента технически оставались частью его «Армии Камберленда»; однако он находился слишком далеко, и я был вынужден действовать наилучшим образом с теми войсками и генералами, которые фактически присутствовали на месте. Я особо просил о назначении генерала Моуэра командиром Двадцатого корпуса, поскольку считал его одним из дерзчайших и лучших генералов-бойцов во всей армии. Его предшественник, генерал А. С. Уильямс, старший из присутствовавших командиров дивизий, отлично командовал корпусом от Атланты до Голдсборо, и замена его в тот самый момент могла показаться несправедливой; однако я был полон решимости подготовиться к отчаяннейшему и, как тогда ожидалось, финальному сражению, если оно выпадет на мою долю. Я вернулся в Голдсборо из Ньюберна по железной дороге вечером 30 марта и незамедлительно приступил к реорганизации и пополнению запасов снабжения, дабы быть готовым к маршу к 10 апреля — дате, согласованной с генералом Грантом. Армия была разделена на три традиционные части: правое и левое крылья, а также центр. Прилагаемые табличные ведомости отражают точный состав этих отдельных армий, которые к 10 апреля обладали следующей боеспособностью:
Infantry 80,968 Artillery 2,448 Cavalry 5,587 Aggregate 88,948 Total number of guns 91
Железные дороги в нашем тылу также были восстановлены, так что припасы прибывали весьма быстро как из Морхед-Сити, так и из Уилмингтона. Местность была настолько равнинной, что один паровоз мог везти в составе поезда двадцать пять и тридцать вагонов вместо всего десяти, как это было в Теннесси и Верхней Джорджии. К 5 апреля был достигнут такой прогресс, что я издал Специальный полевой приказ № 48, определяющий время и порядок следующего марша.
[Special Field Orders, No. 48.]
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, GOLDSBORO', NORTH CAROLINA, April 5, 1865.
Confidential to Army Commanders, Corps Commanders, and Chiefs of Staff Departments:
The next grand objective is to place this army (with its full equipment) north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base for supplies at Norfolk, and at Winton or Murfreesboro' on the Chowan, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, about Petersburg; and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible en route:
1. To accomplish this result the following general plan will be followed, or modified only by written orders from these headquarters, should events require a change:
(1.) On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed to be complete, and the outlying detachments will be called in, or given directions to meet on the next march. All preparations will also be complete to place the railroad-stock back of Kinston on the one road, and below the Northeast Branch on the other.
(2.) On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their lines of march, say, about seven miles, and close up.
(3.) On Wednesday the march will begin in earnest, and will be kept up at the rate, say, of about twelve miles a day, or according to the amount of resistance. All the columns will dress to the left (which is the exposed flank), and commanders will study always to find roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general left wheel, the wagons to be escorted to some place of security on the direct route of march. Foraging and other details may continue as heretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed; and foragers should not go in advance of the advance-guard, but look more to our right rear for corn, bacon, and meal.
2. The left wing (Major-General Slocum commanding) will aim straight for the railroad-bridge near Smithfield; thence along up the Neuse River to the railroad-bridge over Neuse River, northeast of Raleigh (Powell's); thence to Warrenton, the general point of concentration.
The centre (Major-General Schofield commanding) will move to Whitley's Mill, ready to support the left until it is past Smithfield, when it will follow up (substantially) Little River to about Rolesville, ready at all times to move to the support of the left; after passing Tar River, to move to Warrenton.
The right wing (Major-General Howard commanding), preceded by the cavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Nahunta, then swing across to Bulah to Folk's Bridge, ready to make junction with the other armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse River, about Smithfield; thence, in case of no serious opposition on the left, will work up toward Earpsboro', Andrews, B--—, and Warrenton.
The cavalry (General Kilpatrick commanding), leaving its encumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight for Weldon, until the enemy is across Tar River, and that bridge burned; then it will deflect toward Nashville and Warrenton, keeping up communication with general headquarters.