«Юриспруденция»

on sovereignty, 473.

Burlamaqui, on natural law, 8.

By-laws, a form of special law, 30;

void if unreasonable, 146.

Cain v. Moon, 257.

Calvin’s case, 278, 295.

Canon law, a form of positive law, 3, n.;

on immemorial custom and prescription, 150–152;

on the distinction between jus commune and consuetudines, 151.

Cartwright v. Green, 248.

Castro v. R., 163.

Cessante ratione legis, &c., 475.

Chancery, precedents in, 162.

См. Право справедливости.

Charge, a form of lien, contrasted with mortgage, 406.

Chattel, meanings of the term, 395.

Chisholm v. Doulton, 367, 374.

Chose in action, a kind of incorporeal thing, 226;

nature of, 423;

history of the term, 423.

Christian Thomasius, on law of nature, 46, 494.

Cicero, on subjection to the law as the means of freedom, 22;

on jus and aequitas, 30, 39, n.;

on the law of nature, 45.

Citizens’ Life Assurance v. Brown, 289.

Citizenship, one form of state-membership, 99;

distinction between citizens and subjects, 100, n.;

distinction between citizens and aliens, 100;

privileges and liabilities of citizens, 101;

diminishing importance of, 101;

modes of acquiring, 101;

relation between citizenship and nationality, 103.

Civil law, the subject-matter of civil jurisprudence, 1;

the term partly superseded by positive law, 3;

different meanings of the term, 3, n., 483.

См. Право.

Гражданские правонарушения. См. Правонарушения, Юридическая ответственность.

Clark, In re, 394.

Cochrane v. Moore, 413.

Code of Justinian, 488.

Codification, 136.

Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur, 345, 475.

Coke, on customary law, 152, n.;

on the distinction between custom and prescription, 157;

on the personality of unborn children, 277;

on corporations aggregate and sole, 281;

on the ownership of the space above the surface of land, 390.

Colonial Bank v. Whinney, 286, 424.

Commissioners of Stamps v. Hope, 394.

Common law, opposed to special law, 33;

different uses of the term, 33, 57;

opposed to equity, 34–38;

history of the term, 33.

См. Общее право (jus commune).

Communis error facit jus, 166, 168, 475.

Compensation, one of the objects of civil justice, 85, 86.

См. Карательное восстановление прав.

Compossessio, 256.

Conditions precedent and subsequent, 234.

См. Условная собственность.

Conservatism of the law, 24.

Consideration, required in simple contracts, 313;

its nature, 313;

valuable, 314;

not valuable, 315;

rational grounds of the doctrine, 316;

compared with the causa of Roman and French law, 316.

Consolidated Co. v. Curtis, 370.

Constitution of the state, 105–110;

nature of, 105;

rigid and flexible constitutions, 107;

law and practice of, 107;

extra-legal origin of, 108;

possibility of legally unchangeable, 473.

Constitutional law, nature of, 106;

its relation to constitutional fact, 107–110.

Constitutum possessorium, 257.

Constructive delivery, 257.

Constructive intention, 361.

Constructive possession, 237.

Contingent ownership, 232;

distinguished from vested, 232;

distinguished from contingent existence of the right owned, 233;

distinguished from spes acquisitionis, 233;

distinguished from determinable ownership, 234.

Договоры. См. Соглашения.

Conventional law, created by agreement, 31, 54, 120, 124;

reasons for allowance of, 121, 122.

Co-ownership, 226.

Coppin v. Coppin, 278.

Copyright, its subject-matter, 189;

nature and kinds of, 396.

Cornford v. Carlton Bank, 288, 289.

Corporation of Bradford v. Pickles, 342.

Corporations, nature of, 281, ff.;

aggregate and sole, 287;

fictitious nature of, 282;

may survive their members, 283, 293;

realistic theory of, 284;

act through agents, 285;

exist on behalf of beneficiaries, 285;

membership of, 286;

may be members of other corporations, 287;

authority of agents of, 287;

liability of, 287–289;

purposes of incorporation, 289–293;

creation and extinction of, 293;

foreign, recognised by English law, 294, n.;

the state not a corporation aggregate, 294–298;

the king a corporation sole, 295.

Corporeal possession, 239.

Corporeal property, 221, 225, 386, 396, n.

Corporeal things, 225, 396, n.

Corpus possessionis, essential to possession, 241;

its nature, 244–251.

Солидарные обязательства (correality). См. Солидарные обязательства.

Coughlin v. Gillison, 355.

Court of Appeal, absolutely bound by its own decisions, 165.

Cowan v. O’Connor, 331.

Преступления. См. Правонарушения. Юридическая ответственность.

Crouch v. Crédit Foncier, 150.

Crown of England, claims against, heard in courts of law, 90;

not a legal person, 296;

the supreme executive, 468.

Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum, 390, 475.

Culpa, lata, and levis, 358.

Cundy v. Lindsay, 312.

Custody distinguished from possession, 237.

Custom, local, a source of special law, 29;

mercantile, a source of special law, 29;

grounds of the operation of, 120–122, 144–146;

its relation to prescription, 124, 157;

all unenacted law deemed customary in earlier English theory, 129, 144;

importance of, gradually diminishing, 143;

its continued recognition, 144;

historical relation between law and custom, 144–145;

general and particular customs, 148;

invalid if unreasonable, 146;

invalid if contrary to statute law, 147;

unless general must be immemorial, 148

(см. Памятная давность);

mercantile need not be immemorial, 148, 150 n.;

unless immemorial, must conform to the common law, 152;

reasons for gradual disappearance of, as a source of law, 153;

conventional customs, 153;

theories of the operation of custom, 154–157;

has no legal validity apart from the will of the state, 155;

a material not a formal source of law, 156;

Austin’s theory of, 156;

the relation of custom to prescription, 157;

local and personal customs, 157.

Customary law, 55.

См. Обычай.

Убытки, размер убытков 383.

Damnum sine injuria, 329.

«Дэнюбиан сахар фэкториз» против Комиссаров внутренних доходов 394.

«Дарли мейн колльери ко.» против Митчелла. 331.

De Falbe, In re, 392.

De minimis non curat lex, 25, 475.

De mortuis nil nisi bonum, 276.

Dead bodies, not subjects of ownership, 275;

indignities offered to, a criminal offence, 276.

Dean, In re, 274, 276.

Судебные решения. См. Прецеденты.

Delivery of possession, actual and constructive, 257;

traditio brevi manu, 257;

constitutum possessorium, 257;

attornment, 258;

a mode of transferring ownership, 406.

Deodans, 373.

Dependent states, 111–113.

Dernburg, on proprietary rights, 208, n.;

on possession, 245, n.;

his Pandekten, 489.

Derry v. Peek, 354.

Detention, distinguished from possession, 237.

Determinable ownership, distinguished from contingent, 234.

Dicta, judicial, their nature and authority, 163, 174.

Digest of Justinian, 489.

Dike, dikaion, meanings and derivation of the terms, 461.

Diligence, archaic use of the term to mean care, 349, n.

Diogenes Laertius, anecdote of Solon, 81, n.

Disability, defined, and distinguished from liability and duty, 194.

Divestitive facts, their nature and kinds, 300, 301.

Dolus, meaning of the term, 341;

its relation to culpa lata, 359.

Доминирующие права. См. Обременяющие права.

Dominium, its significance in Roman law, 207.

Doom, early legal uses of the term, 464.

Doorman v. Jenkins, 359.

Droit, distinguished from loi, 10;

ethical and juridical significations of, 52;

different uses of term, 465;

derivation of term, 459.

Droit de suite, 416, n.

Duress, 313.

Dutch West India Co. v. Van Moses, 294.

Duties, defined, 180;

moral and legal, 180;

of imperfect obligation, 180, 197, 198;

correlation of rights and duties, 184;

alleged distinction between absolute and relative duties, 184;

distinguished from liabilities and disabilities, 194;

personal and proprietary, 209.

Земельные сервитуты (easements). См. Сервитуты.

Edelstein v. Schuler, 29, 150.

Edie v. East India Co., 29, 153.

Edmundson v. Render, 331.

Electricity, deemed a chattel in law, 395, n.

Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., 273, 372, 391.

Elmore v. Stone, 254, 255, 258.

Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co., 249, 250.

Emphyteusis, 400, n.

Employer’s liability, 374–376.

Enacted law, distinguished from unenacted, 128.

См. Статутное право.

Encumbrances, 212–216;

distinguished from ownership, 221;

termed jura in re aliena by the civilians, 212;

distinguished from the natural limits of rights, 213;

are concurrent with the property encumbered, 214;

not necessarily rights in rem, 215;

classes of, 216;

often accessory to other rights, 217;

always incorporeal property, 223.

Encyclopædia, juridicial, a branch of German legal literature, 7.

Equitable rights, distinguished from legal, 217;

distinction not abolished by the Judicature Act, 217;

present importance of distinction, 218;

destroyed by conflict with legal rights, 218, 415.

Equitable ownership, 231;

distinguished from legal, 231;

distinguished from equitable rights, 231;

distinguished from beneficial ownership, 231.

Equity, different meanings of the term, 34–38, 460;

origin of jurisdiction of Chancery, 34, 37;

fusion of law and equity by Judicature Act, 35;

equity in the courts of common law, 36;

compared with jus praetorium, 38.

Equity of a statute, 39, n.

Equity of redemption, 403.

Error, effect of, on agreements, 312;

essential and unessential, 312.

Estate, distinguished from status or personal condition, 208, 209.

См. Имущественные права.

Evidence, nature of, 440;

judicial and extrajudicial, 441;

personal and real, 442;

primary and secondary, 442;

direct and circumstantial, 443;

valuation of, 444–449;

conclusive, 439, 445;

presumptive, 446;

insufficient, 447;

exclusive, 439, 447;

inadmissible, 448;

of accused persons, 449;

policy of law of evidence considered, 27, 452.

Ex facto oritur jus, 172, 409.

Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio, 314, 476.

Ex turpi causa non oritur actio, 476.

Exall v. Partridge, 433.

Executors, 417.

См. Наследование.

Expedit reipublicae ut sit finis litium, 170.

Expiation, as the end of punishment, 83.

Extinctive facts, 300.

Fact, distinguished from law, 15–18.

Fas, distinguished from jus, 461.

Fay v. Prentice, 391.

Federal states, their nature, 115;

distinguished from unitary states, 115;

distinguished from imperial states, 115.

Fiducia, 405.

Filburn v. Aquarium Co., 372.

Finding, as a title of right, 248–250.

Fixtures, 391.

Flexibility of the law, advantages of, 27.

Flitcroft’s case, 282.

Fookes v. Beer, 167.

Forbearance, distinguished from omission, 324.

Foreign law, recognition of, in English courts, 30;

a form of special law, 30;

no judicial notice of, 31.

Formalism of the law, 25.

Foster v. Dodd, 276.

Fraud, in law and in fact, 18;

meanings of the term, 341;

distinguished from force and malice, 341;

its relation to gross negligence, 359–361.

Freeman v. Pope, 366.

French law, on time of memory, 152;

precedents in, 159, n.;

on possession, 264, n.;

on requirement of cause in a contract, 316;

possession vaut titre, 416;

jurisprudence, 8.

Gaius, on natural law, 46;

his Institutiones, 489.

Gautret v. Egerton, 355.

George and Richard, The, 277.

German law, as to immemorial prescription, 152;

as to precedents, 159, n.;

as to mediate possession, 252, n.;

as to malicious exercise of rights, 342, n.;

as to criminal attempts, 344;

as to the jus necessitatis, 349, n.

Gierke, on the nature of corporations, 285, n.

Glanville, on equity, 37, n.

Good-will, a form of immaterial property, 397.

Goodwin v. Robarts, 150, 152.

Gorgier v. Mieville, 150.

Grant, distinguished from assignment, 308.

Grant v. Easton, 432, 433.

Great Eastern Ry. Co. v. Turner, 282.

Green v. London General Omnibus Co., 289.

Greenwell v. Low Beechburn Colliery, 332.

Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., 349, 359.

Grotius, De Jure Belli, 490.

Haig v. West, 254.

Hale, on customary law, 143;

on precedents, 161;

on subjects and aliens, 100, n.

Hall v. Duke of Norfolk, 331.

Hallett, In re, 162, 173.

Hammack v. White, 357.

Heineccius, on natural law, 8.

Hereditas jacens, 186, 275.

Hill, Ex parte, 340.

Hinton v. Dibbin, 359.

Hoare v. Osborne, 276.

Hobbes, his definition of law, 48;

men and arms make the force of the laws, 49;

on the law of nature and nations, 59;

bellum omnium contra omnes, 65;

on the swords of war and justice, 94;

on the jus necessitatis, 347;

his use of the term property, 386;

his definition of an oath, 451;

his theory of sovereignty, 467;

относительно ограничений суверенитета. 469.

Holmes, on the sources of judicial principles, 176;

his definition of an act, 320;

his definition of intention, 335, n.

Hooker, on laws as the voices of right reason, 19;

his definition of law, 40, 43;

on the law of nature, 43, 46;

on the impartiality of the law, 22;

his Ecclesiastical Polity, 490.

House of Lords, absolutely bound by its own decisions, 164;

formerly a supreme judicature, 469.

Hypotheca, 405.

Ignorantia juris neminem excusat, 368, 476.

Ihering, on the imperative theory of law, 54;

his definition of a right, 182;

on possession, 247, n., 264, 264, n., 266, n.;

on Savigny’s theory of possession, 259, n.

Illegality, a ground of invalidity of agreements, 311.

Immaterial property, 189, 395–397.

Immovables, their nature, 390–392;

rights classed as, 392, 393.

Immunities, distinguished from rights, liberties, and powers, 194, n.

Imperative theory of law, 47–54;

historical argument against, 49;

answer to this argument, 49–51;

defects of imperative theory, 51–54;

no recognition of idea of justice, 51;

no recognition of non-imperative rules, 52.

Imperfect rights, 184, 197–199;

their nature, 197;

imperfect nature of rights against the state, 199–201;

may serve as a defence, 199;

sufficient to support security, 199;

may become perfect, 199.

Imperial states, 115.

Imperitia culpae adnumeratur, 353.

Impossibilium nulla obligatio est, 476.

Inadvertence, not identical with negligence, 349, 361–363.

Incorporeal ownership and property, 221–224, 387.

Incorporeal possession, 239, 261–264.

См. Владение.

Incorporeal things, 225;

classed as movable or immovable, 392;

local situation of, 393.

Informality, a ground of invalidity in agreements, 310.

Inheritance, 416–419;

heritable and uninheritable rights, 416;

the representatives of a deceased person, 417;

the beneficiaries of a deceased person, 417;

testamentary and intestate succession, 418;

limits of testamentary power, 418.

Вред. См. Правонарушения, Юридическая ответственность.

Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Muller & Co.’s Margarine, 331, 393, 394.

Innominate obligations, 435.

Intention, nature of, 324, 335–338;

distinguished from expectation, 336;

extends to means and necessary concomitants of the end desired, 337;

immediate and ulterior, 338;

distinguished from motive, 338;

actual and constructive, 360.

Inter arma leges silent, 96, 477.

International law, 56–64;

its influence in maintaining peace, 22;

has its source in international agreement, 57;

definition of, 57;

conventional and customary law of nations, 57;

common and particular law of nations, 58;

different views as to nature of, 58;

viewed as a form of national law, 59, 60;

viewed as a form of customary law, 60, 61;

viewed as a form of imperative law, 61–64;

distinguished from international morality, 63;

private international law, 31, 482.

Interpretation of contracts, 141, n.

Interpretation of enacted law, 137–142;

grammatical and logical, 138;

litera legis and sententia legis, 138;

when logical interpretation allowable, 139;

strict and equitable interpretation, 139;

extensive and restrictive interpretation, 139.

Intestacy, ownership of property of intestate, 186, 275.

См. Наследование.

Investitive facts, 300.

Invito beneficium non datur, 305, 477.

Italian Civil Code definition of possession, 264, n.

Jefferys v. Boosey, 100.

Jewish law, lex talionis, 83;

as to the offences of beasts, 273, 373;

as to vicarious liability, 374.

Совместные обязательства. См. Солидарные обязательства.

Judicial notice, nature of, 28;

test of distinction between common and special law, 28, 32.

Judicium Dei, 69, 445, 451.

Juris praecepta, 477.

Jurisprudence, 1–8;

the science of law in general, 1;

civil, the science of civil law, 3;

systematic, 3;

historical, 3;

critical, 3;

theoretical, 4–7;

foreign, compared with English, 7, 8.

Juristic law, produced by professional opinion, 120.

Jury, questions of fact to be answered by, 17, 176.

Jus, distinguished from lex, 10, 132, 457;

ethical and legal meanings of, 52, 457;

different senses of, 460;

derivation of, 461;

disappearance of term from modern languages, 463.

Jus ad rem, 206.

Jus accrescendi, 227, 416.

Jus civile, 3, n., 39.

Jus commune, history of the term, 33;

different meanings of the term, 33, 34;

in Roman law, 33, n.;

in the Canon law, 33;

adopted by the English from Canon law, 33;

in the sense of natural law, 44.

Jus edicendi, the legislative power of the Roman praetor, 134.

Jus gentium, 44, 46.

Jus in re aliena, 212–216.

См. Обременяющие права.

Jus in re propria, 212–216.

См. Собственность.

Jus in rem and in personam, significance of the terms, 202–207;

origin of the terms, 207.

См. Вещные права.

Естественное право (jus naturale). См. Естественное право.

Право крайней необходимости (jus necessitatis). См. Крайняя необходимость.

Позитивное право (jus positivum). См. Позитивное право.

Jus possessionis, 241, n.

Jus possidendi, 241, n.

Jus praetorium, 38, 134.

Jus publicum, 311, 482.

Jus scriptum and jus non scriptum, 44, 129.

Особое право (jus singulare). 33, прим.

Jus strictum, opposed to aequitas, 35.

Jus tertii, defence of, 269, 408.

Justice, natural and positive, 43, 44;

an essential element in the idea of law, 51.

См. Отправление правосудия и Естественное право.

Justinian, on law of nature, 46.

Kant, on retributive punishment, 82;

his Rechtslehre, 491.

Kettlewell v. Watson, 349, 360.

King, the source of justice, 37, 294;

a corporation sole, 295.

King’s peace, 70, n.

King v. Smith, 312.

Land, nature of, in law, 390–392;

ownership of, 389.

Lavy v. L.C.C., 165.

Law, definition of, 9;

abstract and concrete senses of the term, 9;

relation of, to the administration of justice, 12–14;

law and fact, 15–18;

advantages of fixed rules of law, 19–22;

defects of the law, 23–27;

contrasted with equity, 34–39;

imperative theory of, 48–54;

includes rules governing the secondary functions of courts of justice, 91;

источники (см. Источники права);

origin of the term, 464.

Морское и торговое право (law, merchant). См. Торговый обычай.

Право народов. См. Международное право.

Закон природы. См. Естественное право.

Lawrence v. Hitch, 150.

Law reports, mode of citation of, 491.

Leases, nature of, 216, 397–400;

subject-matter of, 398;

may be perpetual, 399.

Leask v. Scott, 163.

Legal ownership, distinguished from equitable, 231.

Legal rights, distinguished from equitable, 217.

Legislation, its efficiency as an instrument of legal reform, 25;

private legislation a source of special law, 30;

nature of, 127;

various senses of the term, 127, 128;

direct and indirect, 128;

supreme and subordinate, 129;

colonial, 129;

executive, 130;

judicial, 130;

municipal, 130;

autonomous, 130;

not necessarily the act of the state, 130;

late development of the conception of, 132;

merits and defects of statute law, 133–136;

codification, 136;

interpretation of statute law, 137–142;

subordinate legislation sometimes invalid if unreasonable, 146;

legal limitations of the power of the legislature, 471–473.

Le Lievre v. Gould, 354, 360.

Lex, distinguished from jus, 10, 132, 457;

different meanings of term, 462;

derivation of, 465.

Lex aeterna, 42.

Lex posterior derogat priori, 148.

Lex talionis, 82.

Liability, civil and criminal, 70, 319;

penal and remedial, 88, 321;

distinction between penal and criminal liability, 89;

distinguished from duty and disability, 194;

remedial, theory of, 320;

penal, theory of, 321;

absolute, 332, 366–368;

vicarious, 374–377;

employer’s, 375;

survival of, 376;

measure of criminal, 377

(см. Наказание);

measure of civil, 382.

Libel, on dead person, 276.

Liberties, classed as rights in a wide sense, 190;

distinguished from rights in strict sense, 190;

distinguished from powers, 193.

Licence, revocation, of, 193, n.

Lien, distinguished from mortgage, 402;

classes of, 406.

Lightly v. Clouston, 434.

Lilley, on expiation as the purpose of punishment, 83.

Limitation of actions, at common law, 149, n.;

by the Statute of Westminster, 49, n.

См. Приобретательная давность.

Limited liability, of shareholders, 292.

Littleton on customary law, 152, n.

Locke, on the necessity of fixed principles of law, 21;

his classification of laws, 48, n.;

on the state of nature, 68;

his use of the term property, 386.

London and Midland Bank v. Mitchell, 199.

London Street Tramways Co. v. L.C.C., 165.

Lorimer, his Institutes of Law, 2.

Low v. Routledge, 100.

Macarthy v. Young, 355.

Magna Carta, the prohibition of extrajudicial force, 96, n.

Maine, Sir H. S., his influence on English jurisprudence, 492.

Maitland, on corporations sole, 282, n.;

on the nature of corporations, 285, n.

Malice, meanings of the term, 340;

when a ground of liability, 342–346, 478.

Marais, Ex parte, 96.

Marvin v. Wallace, 254, 258.

Maxims, legal, their nature and uses, 474;

list of, 474–480.

Mediate possession, 252–256.

Mens rea, a condition of penal liability, 322, 332;

its two forms, intention and negligence, 322, 332;

exceptions to requirement of, 332, 366.

Mercantile custom, a source of special law, 29;

judicial notice of, when once proved, 29;

possesses no abrogative power, 124;

need not be immemorial, 150, n.

Mercer, Ex parte, 360.

Merger, nature of, 279.

Merkel, on negligence, 250, n., 252, n.

Merry v. Green, 244, 248.

Metropolitan Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 357.

Middleton v. Pollock, 304.

Midland Ry. Co. v. Wright, 392.

Mills v. Jennings, 165.

Mistake, effect of, on agreements, 312.

Mistake of fact, a defence in criminal law, 370;

no defence in civil law, 370;

origin of the rule, 370;

distinguished from accident, 371.

Mistake of law, no defence, 368;

reasons for the rule, 368.

Modus et conventio vincunt legem, 31, 124, 307, 311, 477.

Mogul, SS. v. McGregor, 341.

Monti v. Barnes, 391, 392.

Moral law, 43, 48, n.

См. Естественное право.

Morris v. Robinson, 427.

Mortgage, distinguished from liens, 402;

not necessarily a transfer of the property, 402;

involves equity of redemption, 403;

what may be mortgaged, 404;

complexity of, as compared with liens, 405.

Moses v. Macferlan, 433.

Motives, nature of, 338;

distinguished from intention, 338;

concurrent, 339;

relevance of, in law, 341.

Moult v. Halliday, 29.

Muller and Co’s Margarine v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 331, 393, 394.

Musgrove v. Toy, 192.

Nasciturus pro jam nato habetur, 277.

Nation, its relation to the state, 103.

Nationality, its relation to citizenship, 103.

Natural law, the subject-matter of natural jurisprudence, 1, 7;

opposed to positive law, 3. n., 44;

in the sense of physical law, 41;

in the sense of moral law, 43–47;

synonyms of, 44;

various definitions of, 45, 46;

relation of, to jus gentium, 46, 47;

relation of, to international law, 59.

Natural rights, 182;

denial of, by Bentham and others, 182.

Nature, state of, transition from, to civil state, 68.

Necessitas non habet legem, 347, 478.

Necessity, a ground of justification, 347;

limited recognition of, by English law, 348.

Negligence, subjective and objective uses of the term, 349;

opposed to intention, 349, 351;

not necessarily inadvertent, 349, 362;

consists essentially in indifference, 350;

defined, 350;

Merkel’s definition of, 350, n.;

a sufficient ground of liability, 351;

simple and wilful, 351;

want of skill is negligence, 353;

culpable only when carefulness is a legal duty, 354;

the standard of care, 355–358;

in law and in fact, 357;

no degrees of negligence in English law, 358;

equivalence of gross negligence and intention, 359;

negligence and constructive intent, 360;

negligence distinguished from inadvertence, 362;

objective theory of negligence, 363.

Negotiable instruments, 29, 415.

Nemo plus juris, &c., 414, 478.

Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare, 449, 478.

Newby v. Van Oppen, 294.

Nomos, different uses of the term, 464.

Non dat qui non habet, 415, 478.

Northey Stone Co. v. Gidney, 331.

Noxal actions, 373.

Oath, form of judicial, 13;

сущность 451;

utility of, 451.

Object of a right, its nature, 185;

different uses of the term, 185;

an essential element in every right, 187;

classes of objects, 187–190;

sometimes identified with the right by metonymy, 222–224.

Obligatio, significance of the term in Roman law, 207, 422.

Obligations, law of, 422, 484;

obligations defined, 422;

solidary, 424

(см. Солидарные обязательства);

contractual, 427

(см. Соглашения);

delictal, 428;

quasi-contractual, 432

(см. Квазидоговор);

innominate, 435.

Occupatio, 407.

Omission, meaning of the term, 323.

Opinio necessitatis, one of the requisites of a valid custom, 147.

Ordeal, theory of, 450.

Osborne v. Rowlett, 173.

Ownership, no rights without owners, 186;

rights owned by incertae personae, 186;

defined, 220;

contrasted with possession, 220, 264–267;

contrasted with encumbrances, 221;

kinds of, 221;

corporeal and incorporeal, 221;

corporeal ownership a figure of speech, 222;

the right of ownership and the ownership of rights, 224;

defined by Sir F. Pollock, 224. n.;

co-ownership, 226;

trust and beneficial ownership, 227;

direct ownership, 228, n.;

legal and equitable, 231;

vested and contingent, 232.

Ownership of material things, 221, 387–390.

Ownership of immaterial things, 395–397.

Pandektenrecht, nature of, 7.

Parker v. Alder, 374.

Parliament, Imperial, its supreme authority, 129, 472.

Parsons, In re, 163.

Patent rights, 189, 396.

Penal actions, nature of, 86;

pertain to civil justice, 86.

Penal proceedings, distinguished from remedial, 88.

Penal redress, 87, 88;

not justified except as punishment of defendant, 366;

merits and defects of the system, 383.

См. Юридическая ответственность.

Штраф. См. Наказание.

Perry v. Clissold, 408.

Personal property, distinguished from real, 394;

origin of the distinction, 394.

Personal rights, ambiguity of the term, 208, n.;

в противовес вещным правам — См. Вещные права;

в противовес имущественным правам — См. Имущественные права.

Persons, the subjects of rights and duties, 185;

rights of unborn, 186, 277;

the objects of rights, 189;

not capable of being owned, 190;

nature of, 272;

natural and legal, 273;

animals are not persons, 273;

dead men are not persons, 275;

double personality, 278, 417;

legal persons the product of personification, 279;

kinds of legal persons, 280.

См. Корпорации.

Persons, law of, 211.

Petitions of right, their nature, 90;

a secondary function of courts of law, 90.

Petitorium opposed to possessorium, 267.

Phillips v. Homfray, 434.

Philo Judaeus, on law of nature, 46.

Physical law, 41.

Pickard v. Smith, 372.

Plato, on the offences of animals, 373;

on vicarious liability, 374.

Pledge v. Carr, 165.

Pluckwell v. Wilson, 358.

Plures eandem rem possidere non possunt, 256.

Pollock, Sir F., on the sources of law, 49, n.;

his definition of ownership, 224, n.;

on acts in the law, 302, n.;

his use of the terms contract and agreement, 303, n.

Pollock and Wright, on possession, 245, 246.

Positive law, origin of the term, 3, n.;

improperly used to signify civil law exclusively, 3, n.

Possession, distinguished from ownership, 224, 264–267;

difficulty of the conception, 236;

consequences of, 236;

possession in fact and law, 237;

constructive, 237;

possession and detention, 237;

possession and seisin, 238;

corporeal and incorporeal, 239;

a matter of fact, not of right, 240;

corporeal possession defined, 241;

its two elements, animus and corpus, 241;

animus possidendi (q.v.), 242;

corpus possessionis, 244–251;

possession of land not necessarily that of chattels thereon, 247;

mediate and immediate possession, 252–256;

concurrent possession, 256;

acquisition of possession, 256–258;

Savigny’s theory of, 258–261;

incorporeal, 261–264;

generic nature of possession, 264;

possession and ownership, 264–267;

possessory remedies, 267–270;

possessory titles, 407;

possession a title of ownership, 407;

delivery of, required for transfer of property, 413;

modes of delivery, 257, 258;

constructive delivery, 257.

Possessorium, opposed to petitorium, 267.

Possessory ownership, 407.

Possessory remedies, nature of, 267;

origin of, 267;

reasons for, 268;

rejection of, by English law, 269.

Pothier, his definition of a contract, 303, n.;

his works, 492.

Power, political, 110;

legislative, judicial, and executive, 110;

sovereign and subordinate, 111.

См. Суверенитет.

Powers, classed as rights in wide sense, 192;

distinguished from rights in strict sense, 192;

distinguished from liberties, 193.

Practical law, 56.

Precedents, reasons for their operation as a source of law, 121, 170;

possess no abrogative power, 123, 168;

their relation to codified law, 136;

not originally regarded as a source of law, 143;

their importance in English law, 159;

declaratory and original, 160;

declaratory theory of, 161;

their operation in Chancery, 162;

authoritative and persuasive, 163;

classes of persuasive precedents, 163;

absolute and conditional authority of precedents, 164;

disregard of, when justified, 165;

effect of lapse of time on, 167;

distinction between overruling and refusing to follow, 168;

retrospective operation of the overruling of, 166, 169;

transform questions of fact into questions of law, 171;

rationes decidendi, 173;

the sources of judicial principles, 174;

respective functions of judges and juries with reference to, 176.

Prescription, its relation to immemorial custom, 124, 157;

periods of, in Roman law, 151;

in Canon law, 151;

in English law, 152;

in Continental law, 152;

operation of, in case of mediate possession, 254, 255;

origin of term, 408, n.;

nature of, 408;

positive and negative, 408;

rational basis of, 410;

what rights subject to, 411;

perfect and imperfect, 412.

Presumptio juris, 445, n.

Presumptions, conclusive, 445;

rebuttable, 446.

Primary rights, opposed to sanctioning, 84.

Principal rights, distinguished from accessory, 216.

Principle, contrasted with authority, 173.

Private war, its gradual exclusion by public justice, 69, 70.

Privy Council decisions of, not authoritative in England, 163.

Probative force, 440.

См. Доказательства.

Procedure, distinguished from substantive law, 437;

occasional equivalence of procedural and substantive rules, 439.

Proceedings, civil and criminal, 70–75;

specific and sanctional enforcement of rights, 84;

forms of sanctional enforcement, 85–87;

a table of legal proceedings, 88;

penal and remedial, 88;

secondary functions of courts of law, 89–91;

petitions of right, 90;

declarations of right, 90;

judicial administration of property, 91;

secondary functions included in civil justice, 91.

Professional opinion, as a source of law, 120, 121.

Proof, nature of, 441;

conclusive and presumptive, 445–447;

modes of, in early law, 450.

Property, material, 387–390;

immaterial, 395–397;

corporeal and incorporeal, 221–224, 386;

different meanings of the term, 385–387, 491;

movable and immovable, 390–393;

real and personal, 394.

Proprietary rights, distinguished from personal, 207–212;

constitute a person’s property or estate, 208;

may be either real or personal, 208;

subject-matter of the law of things, 211;

not necessarily transferable, 210.

Protectorates, 113.

Puchta, his theory of customary law, 154;

his Institutionen, 492.

Pufendorf, his treatise on Natural Law, 2, 492;

his relation to modern English jurisprudence, 8;

his definition of law, 47.

Pugh v. Golden Valley Ry. Co., 167.

Punishment, purposes of, 75–84;

deterrent, 75;

preventive, 75;

reformative, 76–80;

retributive, 80–84;

expiative, 83;

measure of, 377–382.

Quasi-contracts, 432–435;

their nature, 432;

instances of, 433, 434;

reasons for recognition of, 434.

Quasi possessio, 239.

Questions of fact, distinguished from questions of law, 15–18;

examples of, 15;

mixed questions of law and fact, 16;

answered by jury, 17;

but sometimes by the judge, 17, 177;

transformation of, into questions of law by judicial decision, 18, n., 171–173;

sometimes treated fictitiously as questions of law, 178.

Questions of law, distinguished from questions of fact, 15–18;

examples of, 15;

wrongly regarded as including all questions answered by judges instead of juries, 18, n.

Qui prior est tempore potior est jure, 218, 269, 479.

Quod fieri non debet factum valet, 169, 479.

R. v. Armstrong, 330.

R. v. Birmingham and Gloucester Ry. Co., 288.

R. v. Brown, 345.

R. v. Collins, 345.

R. v. Coombes, 330.

R. v. Dudley, 348.

R. v. Edwards, 167.

R. v. Ellis, 331.

R. v. Great North of England Ry. Co., 288.

R. v. Harvey, 360.

R. v. Joliffe, 150.

R. v. Keyn, 57, 330.

R. v. Labouchere, 276.

R. v. Moore, 248.

R. v. Mucklow, 243, 249.

R. v. Price, 276.

R. v. Prince, 367, 370.

R. v. Raynes, 276.

R. v. Ring, 345.

R. v. Roberts, 345.

R. v. Senior, 277.

R. v. Stewart, 276.

R. v. Tolson, 367.

R. v. West, 277.

Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 312.

Rationes decidendi, their nature, 173;

their sources, 174.

Real property, distinguished from personal, 394;

personal, 394;

origin of the distinction, 394.

Real rights, 202–207;

distinguished from personal, 202–207;

always negative, 203;

distinction between real and personal rights not strictly exhaustive, 205;

significance of the terms real and personal, 205;

origin of terms in rem and in personam, 207;

significance of term jus ad rem, 206.

Recht, different meanings of the term, 459;

derivation of, 459;

subjective and objective, 460.

Восстановление прав. См. Карательное восстановление прав.

Reformation, one of the ends of punishment, 76–80.

Release, 308, 309.

Remedial proceedings distinguished from penal, 88.

Средства судебной защиты. См. Судопроизводство.

Remoteness of damage, 476.

Reputation, the object of a right 188;

of the dead, 276.

Res, meaning of the term in Roman law, 211;

corporalis and incorporalis, 225, 226.

Res judicata pro veritate accipitur, 121, 171, 446, 479.

Respondeat superior, 375, 479.

Ответственность. См. Юридическая ответственность.

Retribution, one of the purposes of punishment, 80;

Kant’s opinion as to, 82.

Revenge, its transformation into criminal justice, 81, 83.

Reynolds v. Ashby, 392.

Richer v. Voyer, 257.

Ridsdale v. Clifton, 167.

Rights, enforcement of, the object of civil justice, 70, 84;

primary and sanctioning, 84;

specific and sanctional enforcement of, 85–87;

defined, 181–185;

of animals, 181, n.;

natural and legal, 182;

denial of natural rights by Bentham, 182;

correlation of rights and duties, 184;

alleged distinction between relative and absolute duties, 184;

elements of legal rights, 185;

the subjects of, 186;

the contents of, 185;

the objects of, 187;

the titles of, 185, 299;

rights over one’s own person, 187;

right of reputation, 188;

rights in respect of domestic relations, 188;

rights in respect of other rights, 188;

rights over immaterial property, 189;

wide and narrow use of the term right, 190;

rights in wide sense defined, 190;

rights distinguished from liberties, powers, and immunities, 190–194;

perfect and imperfect rights, 184, 197–199;

rights against the state, 199;

positive and negative rights, 201;

real and personal, 202–207;

in rem and in personam, 202–207;

ad rem, 206;

proprietary and personal, 207–212;

rights of ownership and encumbrances, 212–216;

dominant and servient, 212;

principal and accessory, 216;

legal and equitable, 217;

local situation of, 393;

in re propria and in re aliena, 212.

Rigidity of the law, 23.

Rigor juris, opposed to aequitas, 35.

Roman law, jus civile, 3, n.;

jus commune, 33, n.;

jus singulare, 33, n.;

aequitas and strictum jus, 36;

jus praetorium, 38;

actio furti, 86, n.;

professional opinion as a source of, 121;

jus scriptum and non scriptum, 129;

relation between custom and enacted law, 147;

dominium, 207;

obligatio, 207, 422;

actio in rem, 207;

res corporales and incorporates, 226, n.;

traditio brevi manu, 257;

constitutum possessorium, 257;

malicious exercise of rights, 342, n.;

noxal actions, 373;

emphyteusis, 400, n.;

traditio as a title to property, 413;

culpa and dolus, 359.

Rylands v. Fletcher, 372.

Sadler v. Great Western Ry. Co., 427.

Saga of Burnt Njal, 70.

Salomon v. Salomon & Co., 282.

Sanctional enforcement of rights, 84–87.

Sanctioning rights, 84, 85.

Sanctions, nature and kinds of, 11.

Savigny, his system of modern Roman law, 8;

on the relation between enacted and customary law, 148;

his theory of customary law, 154;

his theory of possession, 258–261.

Scaramanga v. Stamp, 163.

Scientific law, 41.

Scottish law, on the relation between enacted and customary law, 148, n.

Securities, 402–406;

nature of, 216, 402;

mortgages and liens, 403.

См. Ипотека.

Seisin, its nature and importance in early law, 238.

Semi-sovereign states, 113.

Sententia legis, contrasted with litera legis, 138.

См. Толкование.

Servient rights, 212.

См. Обременяющие права.

Servitudes, nature of, 216, 400;

distinguished from leases, 400;

public and private, 401;

appurtenant and in gross, 401;

easements, 402, n.

Shares in companies, nature of, 286, n.

Sharp v. Jackson, 304.

Sheddon v. Goodrich, 167.

Sheil, Ex parte, 199.

Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, 214, 479.

Simpson v. Wells, 150.

Sloman v. Government of New Zealand, 296.

Smelting Co. of Australia v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, 394.

Smith v. Baker, 434.

Smith v. Hughes, 313.

Smith v. Keal, 167.

Solidary obligations, 424–427;

their nature, 424;

their kinds, 425–427.

Solon, on making men just, 81, n.

Sources of the law, formal and material, 117;

legal and historical, 117–120;

list of legal sources, 120;

grounds of the authority of these sources, 120–123;

constitutive and abrogative operation of, 123, 124;

sources of law and sources of rights, 124;

ultimate legal principles without legal sources, 125;

literary sources of the law, 120, n.

South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, 249.

Sovereignty, nature of, 111, 467–473;

essential in a state, 467;

divisibility of, 468, 469;

limitations of, 469–473.

Space, ownership of, 390, 395, n.

Special law, contrasted with common law, 28;

kinds of, 29–32;

local customs, 29;

mercantile customs, 29;

private legislation, 30;

foreign law, 30;

conventional law, 31.

Specific enforcement of rights, 85;

the general rule, 320;

not always possible, 321;

not always expedient, 321.

Spencer, H., on the essential functions of the state, 94, n.;

on the gradual differentiation of these functions, 98, n.;

on natural rights, 182.

Spinoza, on the rule of reason and of force, 11.

Starey v. Graham, 192.

State, its will the sole source of law, 49, 117, 155;

its nature, 93–98;

defined, 99;

its essential functions, war and the administration of justice, 93–98;

generic identity of these two functions, 94;

their specific difference, 95;

secondary differences, 96–98;

secondary functions of the state, 98;

its territory, 99;

non-territorial states, 99;

membership of the state, 99;

citizens and aliens, 100;

personal and territorial idea of the state, 102;

its constitution, 105–110;

its government, 110;

independent and dependent states, 111–114;

different meanings of the term state, 113, n.;

fully sovereign and semi-sovereign states, 113;

unitary and composite states, 114;

imperial and federal states, 115;

rights against the state, 199;

legal personality of the state, 294–298.

Status distinguished from estate, 208–212;

different uses of the term, 210;

subject-matter of the law of persons, 211;

the law of, 484.

Statute law, the typical form of law in modern times, 132;

compared with case-law, their relative merits and defects, 133–136;

interpretation of, 137–142.

См. Толкование.

Statutes referred to: Interpretation Act, 30;

Judicature Act, 34, 217, 231;

Statute of Marlborough, 70;

Westminster I., 149;

Prescription Act, 158;

Magna Carta, 96;

Sale of Goods Act, 258;

Lord Campbell’s Act, 277;

Statute of Uses, 413;

Factors Act, 416;

Statute of Frauds, 447;

Parliament Act, 469.

Stephen, Sir J. F., his definition of criminal attempts, 344.

Suarez, his distinction between lex positiva and lex naturalis, 3, n.;

on opinio necessitatis in customary law, 147, n.;

on time immemorial, 152;

his treatise De Legibus, 493.

Subject of a right, different uses of the term, 185;

no rights without subjects, 186.

Подданные. См. Гражданство.

Substantive law, distinguished from procedure, 437.

Subtilty of law and lawyers, 26.

Succession, 416.

См. Наследование.

Summum jus opposed to aequitas, 35.

Summum jus summa injuria, 24, 36, 479.

Suretyship, 402, n.

Suzerainty, 113.

Sydney v. The Commonwealth, 298.

Taylor, Jeremy, on the uncertainty of natural justice, 21;

on men and wolves, 65.

Taylor, Ex parte, 340.

Territory, of a state, 99.

Terry, analysis of rights, 194, n.

Text-books, authority of, 164, n.

Tharsis Sulphur Co. v. Loftus, 355.

Themis, meanings and derivation of the term, 462.

Things, different senses of the term, 225;

material and immaterial, 225, 387;

corporeal and incorporeal, 225, 387;

law of, 211;

in action and in possession, 423.

Things, law of, 211.

Thomasius, on the law of nature, 46;

his distinction between jurisprudence and ethics, 494.

Thompson v. London County Council, 427.

Tillett v. Ward, 357.

Time immemorial, a requisite of particular customs, 148–152;

rule derived from canon, through civil law, 149, 150;

original meaning of rule, 149;

how affected by Statute of Westminster, 149;

reason for requirement of immemorial antiquity in custom, 150.

Titles, their nature, 185, 299;

original and derivative, 299, 301;

origin of term, 300, n.

Torts, their nature, 428–432;

waiver of, 434.

Trade-marks, a form of immaterial property, 397.

Traditio brevi manu, 257.

Transfer of rights, 299, 300, 301, 414.

Судебный поединок. См. Поединок.

Trusts, a kind of encumbrance, 216;

their nature, 227–231;

their purposes, 228, 291;

distinguished from contracts, 229;

distinguished from agency, 230;

how created and destroyed, 230;

distinguished from the relation between legal and equitable ownership, 232;

not recognised at common law, 232;

for animals, 274;

for maintenance of tombs, 276.

Turquand, Ex parte, 29.

Ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem jus, 479.

Ubi jus ibi remedium, 198, 480.

Ultimate rules of law, without legal sources, 125.

Unitary states, 114.

United States v. Davis, 330.

Universitas, use of the term in Roman law, 283, n.

Unus homo plures personas sustinet, 278.

Vaughan, In re, 276.

Vera, Cruz, The, 165.

Vested ownership, 232–235.

Vestitive facts, 299–301.

Vigilantibus non dormientibus, jura subveniunt, 411, 480.

Volenti non fit injuria, 480.

Waiver of torts, 434.

Walker v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 277.

Wallis, In re, 167.

Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telegraph Co., 391.

War, an essential function of the state, 93–98;

compared with the administration of justice, 93–98;

not governed by law, 96;

private, 70, n.

Ward v. National Bank, 426.

West Rand Co. v. Rex, 57.

Williams v. Howarth, 296.

Williams v. Williams, 275, 276.

Wilson v. Brett, 359.

Windscheid, on the relation between enacted and customary law, 148;

his theory of customary law, 155;

on the nature of rights, 182;

on proprietary rights, 208, n.;

on ownership, 224, n.;

on the possession of rights, 266, n.;

his Pandektenrecht, 494.

Winter v. Winter, 257.

Witnesses, exclusion of, in early law, 27, 448

Wood v. Leadbitter, 193.

Woolsey, on retribution as the essential end of punishment, 82, n.

Written and unwritten law, 128.

Wrongs, civil and criminal, 71;

private and public, 72;

these distinctions not equivalent, 73;

historical relation between public wrongs and crimes, 74;

definition of, 179;

moral and legal, 179.

См. Юридическая ответственность.

Year books, 494.

1. См. по этому вопросу: «Философские труды» Рида, Эссе об активных способностях, V. 3. (О системах естественной юриспруденции.) А также «Труды» Дугальда Стюарта, VII. 256 (ред. Гамильтона).

2. Термин «гражданское право» (civil law), хотя некогда и употреблявшийся повсеместно для обозначения законов данной страны, в последнее время был частично вытеснен ненадлежащим эквивалентом — позитивное право. Термин «jus positivum» был придуман средневековыми юристами для обозначения права, созданного или установленного (positum) человеческой властью, в противовес тому jus naturale, которое было несотворенным и неизменным. Именно из этого противопоставления данный термин извлекает весь свой смысл и значение. Следовательно, недопустимо ограничивать позитивное право лишь законами отдельной страны. Позитивным является всё то, что не является естественным. Международное и каноническое право, например, представляют собой разновидности jus positivum в не меньшей степени, чем само гражданское право. См. Аквинский, Сумма теологии, 2. 2. q. 57 (De Jure) art. 2. Utrum jus convenienter dividatur in jus naturale et jus positivum. См. также Суарес, О законах, I. 3. 13: (Lex) positiva dicta est, quasi addita naturali legi.

Термин «гражданское право» имеет и другие значения, которые, однако, вряд ли способны вызвать какую-либо путаницу. Он часто обозначает римское право (corpus juris civilis), особенно в противовес каноническому праву (corpus juris canonici) — двум великим системам, которыми в Средние века управлялись соответственно Государство и Церковь. В других случаях он используется для обозначения не всего законодательства страны, а лишь его остатка после вычета какой-либо конкретной части, имеющей собственное особое наименование. Так, гражданское право противопоставляется уголовному праву, церковному праву, военному праву и так далее.

Термин «гражданское право» происходит от jus civile римлян. «То право, которое каждый народ установил для себя сам, является его собственным правом и называется гражданским правом, как бы собственным правом самого государства» (Quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit, id ipsius proprium civitatis est vocaturque jus civile, quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis). Юстиниан. Институции. I. 2. 1.

3. Следует понимать, что этот перечень не претендует на исчерпывающее изложение надлежащего содержания труда по абстрактной юриспруденции, но лишь служит иллюстрацией тех видов вопросов, которыми эта отрасль юридических знаний по праву занимается.

4. Остин, стр. 1077.

5. Арндтс, Юридическая энциклопедия и методология (Juristische Encyklopädie und Methodologie), стр. 5. 9-е изд. 1895. См. также Энциклопедию Пухты, представляющую собой вводную часть его «Курса институций», в переводе Хасти («Очерки юриспруденции», 1887). Термин «общая юриспруденция» (allgemeine Rechtslehre) периодически применяется к этому направлению литературы. См. Энциклопедию правоведения Гольцендорфа, 5-е изд. 1890 («Элементы общего учения о праве» Меркеля).

6. Jurisprudentia universalis или generalis изначально являлись лишь синонимами jurisprudence naturalis.

7. Термин «юриспруденция» используется французскими юристами в качестве эквивалента того, что английские юристы называют прецедентным правом (case-law) — развитие права посредством судебных решений. «Jurisprudence — la manière dont un tribunal juge habituellement telle ou telle question» (Литтре). Юриспруденция в этом смысле противопоставляется доктрине, то есть внесудебной юридической литературе.

8. О разграничении права в конкретном и права в абстрактном смыслах см. «Юриспруденцию» Поллока, стр. 15–19, и «Принципы» Бентама, стр. 324, прим. (Труды, т. I, стр. 148, прим.).

9. Политический трактат (Tractatus Politicus), I. 5.

10. Термин «санкция» происходит из римского права. Sanctio изначально была той частью закона, которая устанавливала наказание или иное положение на случай несоблюдения его предписаний. D. 48. 19. 41. Путем простого перехода значений этот термин стал обозначать само наказание.

11. Следует отметить, таким образом, что различие между правом и фактом зависит не от того, кем именно, а от того, каким образом определяется вопрос. Тем не менее, несмотря на это, нелогичное и небрежное словоупотребление иногда относит к вопросам права все те вопросы, которые подлежат решению судей, независимо от наличия или отсутствия правовых принципов для их разрешения.

Стоит отметить, что вопросы факта, оставляемые на усмотрение судей, в силу действия судебного прецедента имеют тенденцию превращаться в вопросы права. В руках судей решения по фактам порождают принципы права, тогда как решения присяжных не обладают такой правообразующей силой. Этот вопрос мы подробно рассмотрим в связи с теорией прецедента.

Различие между правом и фактом, применительно к суду присяжных, весьма подробно рассматривается Тейером в его «Предварительном трактате об уении о доказательствах» (Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence), стр. 183–262. См. также «Руководящие принципы англо-американского права» Терри, стр. 53–62.

12. Ductor Dubitantium (Works XII. 209. Изд. Хебера).

13. Treatise of Government, II. 11. 136.

14. Pro Cluentio, 53. 146.

15. Ecclesiastical Polity, I. 10. 7.

16. Rhetoric, I. 15. См. также Бэкон, De Augmentis, Lib. 8, Aph. 58: Neminem oportere legibus esse sapientiorem.

17. Бэкон, De Augmentis, Lib. 8, Aph. 46; Аристотель, «Риторика», I. 1.

18. Edie v. East India Co., 2 Burr 1226; Barnet v. Brandao, 6 M. & G. на стр. 665; Moult v. Halliday, (1898) 1 Q. B. 125; Ex parte Turquand, 14 Q. B. D. 636; Edelstein v. Schuler, (1902) 2 K. B. 144.

19. Согласно Закону о толковании 1889 года, разд. 9, установлено, что «каждый Акт, принятый после 1850 года... является публичным Актом и подлежит судебному уведомлению как таковой, если иное прямо не предусмотрено самим Актом».

20. О праве справедливости см. следующий раздел.

21. Термин jus commune встречается также в гражданском праве, но в значениях, не связанных с тем, которое нас здесь интересует. Иногда он означает jus naturale в противоположность jus civile (D. 1. 1. 6. pr.), в то время как в других случаях он противопоставляется jus singulare, то есть аномальным нормам права, несовместимым с общими юридическими принципами, но установленным utilitatis causa для удовлетворения какой-либо особой потребности или случая. D. 28. 6. 15. D. 1. 3. 16.

22. Y. B. 20 & 21 Ed. I. 329. См. Pollock and Maitland’s History of English Law, I. 155.

23. Y. B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 213.

24. Y. B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 458.

25. Y. B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 55.

26. Bracton, 48 b.

27. «Никомахова этика», V. 10. 3. Греки знали право справедливости под названием epieikeia.

28. «Риторика», I. 13. 19.

29. De Officiis I. 10. 33. См. также Pro Caecina 23. 65: Ex aequo et bono, non ex callido versutoque jure rem judicari oportere. De Oratore I. 56. 240: Multa pro aequitate contra jus dicere. De Officiis III. 16. 67.

30. In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, aequitas spectanda est. D. 50. 17. 90. Placuit in omnibus rebus praecipuam esse justitiae aequitatisque, quam stricti juris rationem. C. 3. 1. 8. Haec aequitas suggerit, etsi jure deficiamur. D. 39. 3. 2. 5. Однако конституция Константина, включенная в Кодекс Юстиниана, запрещает всем нижестоящим судам подменять строгое право правом справедливости и закрепляет за императором исключительное право отступать от строгости jus scriptum: Inter aequitatem jusque interpositam interpretationem nobis solis et oportet et licet inspicere. C. 1. 14. 1.

31. Summa Theologiae 2. 2. q. 120. art. 1. De epieikeia seu aequitate: — In his ergo et similibus casibus malum est sequi legem positam; bonum autem est praetermissis verbis legis, sequi id quod poscit justitiae ratio et communis utilitas. Et ad hoc ordinatur epieikeia, quae apud nos dicitur aequitas.

32. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, I. 168; Glanville VII. 1.: Aliquando tamen super hoc ultimo casu in curia domini Regis de consilio curiao ita ex aequitate consideratum est. Брактон, обсуждая различные значения jus, говорит (f. 3. a.): — Quandoque pro rigore juris, ut cum dividitur inter jus et aequitatem. Следуя Ацо, который в свою очередь следует Цицерону (Topica IV. 23), он говорит: — Aequitas autem est rerum convenientia, quae in paribus causis paria desiderat jura (f. 3. a). См. также f. 12. b. и f. 23. b. Aequitas tamen sibi locum vindicat in hac parte. См. также Y. B. 30 and 31 Ed. I. 121: — Et hoc plus de rigore quam de aequitate.

33. Цитируется в Spence’s Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, I. 408, примечание (a).

34. D. 1. 1. 7. 1.

35. Особое применение английскими юристами термина «право справедливости» (equity) в его первоначальном смысле, в противоположность strictum jus, можно увидеть в выражении «право справедливости статута» (the equity of a statute). Под этим понимается дух закона в противоположность его букве. Говорят, что вопрос подпадает под действие права справедливости статута, когда он охватывается смыслом статута, хотя из-за дефектной юридической техники он не охватывается его буквальными формулировками. «Valeat aequitas», — говорит Цицерон, — «quae paribus in causis paria jura desiderat». Topica IV. 23.

36. Ecc. Pol. I. 3. 1.

37. Comm. I. 38.

38. Притчи, 8. 29.

39. Иов, 28. 26.

40. Summa, 1. 2. q. 91. art. 1.

41. Summa, 1. 2. q. 93. art. 1.

42. Естественное право, lex naturae, представляет собой либо (1) закон человеческой природы, т.е. моральный закон, либо (2) закон природы в смысле мироздания, т.е. физический закон.

43. Ecc. Pol. I. 3. 2.

44. Ecc. Pol. I. 16. 8.

45. «Риторика», I. 10.

46. «Риторика», I. 13.

47. De Rep. III. 22. 23.

48. Works, III. 516 (Bohn’s Ecc. Library). О том, что добродетельный также является свободным.

49. Институции, I. 1.

50. Институции, I. 2. 11.

51. Ecc. Pol. I. 1. 10. 1.

52. Inst. Jurisp. Div. I. 2. 97.

53. См. Nettleship, Contributions to Latin Lexicography, sub. voc. jus gentium; Burle, Essai historique sur le développement de la notion du droit naturel dans l’antiquité grecque; Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, vol. I. ch. 3; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, I. pp. 112–171; Pollock, Journ. Compar. Legisl. 1900, p. 418; 1901, p. 204; Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, ch. 13.

54. De Officio Hominis et Civis, I. 2. 2.

55. I. 96.

56. «Моральный закон есть провозглашение воли Божьей человечеству, направляющее и обязывающее каждого... к послушанию ему... в исполнении всех тех обязанностей святости и праведности, которые он должен Богу и человеку: обещая жизнь при исполнении и угрожая смертью при его нарушении». Большой катехизис Вестминстерской ассамблеи богословов, вопрос 93.

57. «Законы, к которым люди обычно относят свои действия, чтобы судить об их правильности или неправильности, представляются мне следующими тремя: 1. Божественный закон; 2. Гражданский закон; 3. Закон мнения или репутации, если я могу его так назвать. По их отношению к первому из них люди судят, являются ли их действия грехами или обязанностями; по второму — являются ли они преступными или невинными; по третьему — являются ли они добродетелями или пороками». Локк, «Опыт о человеческом разумении», кн. II, гл. 28, § 7.

58. Eng. Wks. II. 185.

59. Principles of Morals and Legislation, p. 330 (Cl. Press ed.), Works, I. 151.

60. I. 86.

61. «Левиафан», гл. 46.

62. См., например, Bryce’s Studies in History and Jurisprudence, vol. ii. pp. 44 and 249: «В широком смысле, в каждом сообществе есть две власти, которые могут создавать право: Государство, т.е. правящая и направляющая сила, чем бы она ни была, в которой сосредоточено управление сообществом, и Народ, то есть весь состав сообщества, рассматриваемый не как инкорпорированный в государство, а как просто совокупность лиц, имеющих коммерческие и социальные отношения друг с другом... Право не всегда и не везде может быть творением государства, поскольку можно привести примеры, когда право существовало в сообществе до того, как появилось какое-либо государство». См. также Pollock’s First Book of Jurisprudence, p. 24: «Тот императивный характер права, который в нашем современном опыте является его постоянным атрибутом, отсутствует в обществах, которые было бы опрометчиво называть варварскими, а ложно — беззаконными... Не только право, но и право с изрядной долей формальности существовало до того, как у государства появились какие-либо адекватные средства принуждения к его соблюдению, и, по сути, до того, как вообще появился какой-либо регулярный процесс обеспечения исполнения». См. также Maine’s Early History of Institutions, Lect. 12, p. 364, and Lect. 13, p. 380; Walker’s Science of International Law, pp. 11–21.