Уильям Т. Шерман

«Мемуары генерала Уильяма Шермана. Том 1»

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I will have a long talk with Colonel Porter, and tell him every thing that may occur to me of interest to you.

In the mean time, know that I admire your dogged perseverance and pluck more than ever. If you can whip Lee and I can march to the Atlantic, I think Uncle Abe will give us a twenty days' leave of absence to see the young folks.

Yours as ever,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1864.

General W. T. SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

My DEAR GENERAL: Your very interesting letter of the 4th is just received. Its perusal has given me the greatest pleasure. I have not written before to congratulate you on the capture of Atlanta, the objective point of your brilliant campaign, for the reason that I have been suffering from my annual attack of "coryza," or hay-cold. It affects my eyes so much that I can scarcely see to write. As you suppose, I have watched your movements most attentively and critically, and I do not hesitate to say that your campaign has been the most brilliant of the war. Its results are less striking and less complete than those of General Grant at Vicksburg, but then you have had greater difficulties to encounter, a longer line of communications to keep up, and a longer and more continuous strain upon yourself and upon your army.

You must have been very considerably annoyed by the State negro recruiting-agents. Your letter was a capital one, and did much good. The law was a ridiculous one; it was opposed by the War Department, but passed through the influence of Eastern manufacturers, who hoped to escape the draft in that way. They were making immense fortunes out of the war, and could well afford to purchase negro recruits, and thus save their employees at home.

I fully agree with you in regard to the policy of a stringent draft; but, unfortunately, political influences are against us, and I fear it will not amount to much. Mr. Seward's speech at Auburn, again prophesying, for the twentieth time, that the rebellion would be crushed in a few months, and saying that there would be no draft, as we now had enough soldiers to end the war, etc., has done much harm, in a military point of view. I have seen enough of politics here to last me for life. You are right in avoiding them. McClellan may possibly reach the White House, but he will lose the respect of all honest, high-minded patriots, by his affiliation with such traitors and Copperheads as B—-, V—-, W—-, S—-, & Co. He would not stand upon the traitorous Chicago platform, but he had not the manliness to oppose it. A major-general in the United States Army, and yet not one word to utter against rebels or the rebellion! I had much respect for McClellan before he became a politician, but very little after reading his letter accepting the nomination.

Hooker certainly made a mistake in leaving before the capture of Atlanta. I understand that, when here, he said that you would fail; your army was discouraged and dissatisfied, etc., etc. He is most unmeasured in his abuse of me. I inclose you a specimen of what he publishes in Northern papers, wherever he goes. They are dictated by himself and written by W. B. and such worthies. The funny part of the business is, that I had nothing whatever to do with his being relieved on either occasion. Moreover, I have never said any thing to the President or Secretary of War to injure him in the slightest degree, and he knows that perfectly well. His animosity arises from another source. He is aware that I know some things about his character and conduct in California, and, fearing that I may use that information against him, he seeks to ward off its effect by making it appear that I am his personal enemy, am jealous of him, etc. I know of no other reason for his hostility to me. He is welcome to abuse me as much as he pleases; I don't think it will do him much good, or me much harm. I know very little of General Howard, but believe him to be a true, honorable man. Thomas is also a noble old war-horse. It is true, as you say, that he is slow, but he is always sure.

I have not seen General Grant since the fall of Atlanta, and do not know what instructions he has sent you. I fear that Canby has not the means to do much by way of Mobile. The military effects of Banks's disaster are now showing themselves by the threatened operations of Price & Co. toward Missouri, thus keeping in check our armies west of the Mississippi.

With many thanks for your kind letter, and wishes for your future success, yours truly,

H. W. HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 20, 1864.

Major General HALLECK, Chief of Staff, Washington D.C.

GENERAL: I have the honor herewith to submit copies of a correspondence between General Hood, of the Confederate Army, the Mayor of Atlanta, and myself, touching the removal of the inhabitants of Atlanta.

In explanation of the tone which marks some of these letters, I will only call your attention to the fact that, after I had announced my determination, General Hood took upon himself to question my motives. I could not tamely submit to such impertinence; and I have also seen that, in violation of all official usage, he has published in the Macon newspapers such parts of the correspondence as suited his purpose. This could have had no other object than to create a feeling on the part of the people; but if he expects to resort to such artifices, I think I can meet him there too.

It is sufficient for my Government to know that the removal of the inhabitants has been made with liberality and fairness, that it has been attended with no force, and that no women or children have suffered, unless for want of provisions by their natural protectors and friends.

My real reasons for this step were:

We want all the houses of Atlanta for military storage and occupation.

We want to contract the lines of defense, so as to diminish the garrison to the limit necessary to defend its narrow and vital parts, instead of embracing, as the lines now do, the vast suburbs. This contraction of the lines, with the necessary citadels and redoubts, will make it necessary to destroy the very houses used by families as residences.

Atlanta is a fortified town, was stubbornly defended, and fairly captured. As captors, we have a right to it.

The residence here of a poor population would compel us, sooner or later, to feed them or to see them starve under our eyes.

The residence here of the families of our enemies would be a temptation and a means to keep up a correspondence dangerous and hurtful to our cause; a civil population calls for provost-guards, and absorbs the attention of officers in listening to everlasting complaints and special grievances that are not military.

These are my reasons; and, if satisfactory to the Government of the United States, it makes no difference whether it pleases General Hood and his people or not. I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 7, 1864.

General HOOD, commanding Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have deemed it to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove, those who prefer it to go south, and the rest north. For the latter I can provide food and transportation to points of their election in Tennessee, Kentucky, or farther north. For the former I can provide transportation by cars as far as Rough and Ready, and also wagons; but, that their removal may be made with as little discomfort as possible, it will be necessary for you to help the families from Rough and Ready to the care at Lovejoy's. If you consent, I will undertake to remove all the families in Atlanta who prefer to go south to Rough and Ready, with all their movable effects, viz., clothing, trunks, reasonable furniture, bedding, etc., with their servants, white and black, with the proviso that no force shall be used toward the blacks, one way or the other. If they want to go with their masters or mistresses, they may do so; otherwise they will be sent away, unless they be men, when they may be employed by our quartermaster. Atlanta is no place for families or non-combatants, and I have no desire to send them north if you will assist in conveying them south. If this proposition meets your views, I will consent to a truce in the neighborhood of Rough and Ready, stipulating that any wagons, horses, animals, or persons sent there for the purposes herein stated, shall in no manner be harmed or molested; you in your turn agreeing that any care, wagons, or carriages, persons or animals sent to the same point, shall not be interfered with. Each of us might send a guard of, say, one hundred men, to maintain order, and limit the truce to, say, two days after a certain time appointed.

I have authorized the mayor to choose two citizens to convey to you this letter, with such documents as the mayor may forward in explanation, and shall await your reply. I have the honor to be your obedient servant.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding United States Forces in Georgia

GENERAL: Your letter of yesterday's date, borne by James M. Ball and James R. Crew, citizens of Atlanta, is received. You say therein, "I deem it to be to the interest of the United States that the citizens now residing in Atlanta should remove," etc. I do not consider that I have any alternative in this matter. I therefore accept your proposition to declare a truce of two days, or such time as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose mentioned, and shall render all assistance in my power to expedite the transportation of citizens in this direction. I suggest that a staff-officer be appointed by you to superintend the removal from the city to Rough and Ready, while I appoint a like officer to control their removal farther south; that a guard of one hundred men be sent by either party as you propose, to maintain order at that place, and that the removal begin on Monday next.

And now, sir, permit me to say that the unprecedented measure you propose transcends, in studied and ingenious cruelty, all acts ever before brought to my attention in the dark history of war.

In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing that you will find that you are expelling from their homes and firesides the wives and children of a brave people. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly.

You style the measures proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented; for General Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourself burned dwelling-houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-shots from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro, and General Johnston did the same, last summer, at Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a "brave people."

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, at once, from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark history.

In the name of common-sense, I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner. You who, in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war—dark and cruel war—who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of peaceful ordnance-sergeants, seized and made "prisoners of war" the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any overt act was committed by the (to you) hated Lincoln Government; tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion, spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana; turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared, by an act of your Congress, the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received! Talk thus to the marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner among you! If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in arch hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it be more humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our back or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE September 12, 1864

Major-General W. T, SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th inst., with its inclosure in reference to the women, children, and others, whom you have thought proper to expel from their homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let the matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close this correspondence, and, without your expressing it in words, would have been willing to believe that, while "the interests of the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have dropped the subject; but you have chosen to indulge in statements which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as acquiescence.

I see nothing in your communication which induces me to modify the language of condemnation with which I characterized your order. It but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "preeminent in the dark history of war for studied and ingenious cruelty." Your original order was stripped of all pretenses; you announced the edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of the United States." This alone you offered to us and the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God and man. You say that "General Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down." It is due to that gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded aspersions upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, nor towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile. He offered and extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens who desired to flee from your fraternal embraces. You are equally unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in the defense of Jonesboro, by General Hardee, or of Atlanta, by myself. General Hardee defended his position in front of Jonesboro at the expense of injury to the houses; an ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlanta at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case, it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war among civilized nations. No inhabitant was expelled from his home and fireside by the orders of General Hardee or myself, and therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of either of us. I feel no other emotion other than pain in reading that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling Atlanta without notice under pretense that I defended Atlanta upon a line so close to town that every cannon-shot and many musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. I made no complaint of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper. I make none now, but there are a hundred thousand witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far above and miles beyond my line of defense. I have too good an opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill of your artillerists, to credit the insinuation that they for several weeks unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

The residue of your letter is rather discussion. It opens a wide field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are committed to me. I am only a general of one of the armies of the Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field, under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called upon to discuss with you the causes of the present war, or the political questions which led to or resulted from it. These grave and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust conclusion which might be drawn from my silence. You charge my country with "daring and badgering you to battle." The truth is, we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful separation, before the first gun was fired on either aide. You say we insulted your flag. The truth is, we fired upon it, and those who fought under it, when you came to our doors upon the mission of subjugation. You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes and Indians. The truth is, we, by force of arms, drove out insolent intruders and took possession of our own forts and arsenals, to resist your claims to dominion over masters, slaves, and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with a unanimity unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to force Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. The truth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to leave it to the unbiased will of these States, and all others, to determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and labors daily, by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say we falsified the vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only separated herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of her people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed or admiration for heroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your unarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our country, and swept the seas, in defiance of your navy, around the whole circumference of the globe. You say we have expelled Union families by thousands. The truth is, not a single family has been expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of; but, on the contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies and well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my Government, by acts of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goods sold and delivered." The truth is, our Congress gave due and ample time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestrated the property of our enemies in retaliation for their acts—declaring us traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power extended, either in their country or our own. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts known of all men to be true.

You order into exile the whole population of a city; drive men, women and children from their homes at the point of the bayonet, under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and on the claim that it is "an act of kindness to these families of Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a punishment. You issue a sweeping edict, covering all the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the defenseless by assuming that you have done them a kindness. This you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner." And, because I characterize what you call as kindness as being real cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God; and you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save our women and children from what you call kindness, is a "sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

You came into our country with your army, avowedly for the purpose of subjugating free white men, women, and children, and not only intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever attained by that race, in any country, in all time. I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to sacrifice every thing for the peace and honor of the South, and refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between myself, my country, and my God.

You say, "Let us fight it out like men." To this my reply is—for myself, and I believe for all the free men, ay, and women and children, in my country—we will fight you to the death! Better die a thousand deaths than submit to live under you or your Government and your negro allies!

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the 9th of September, I close this correspondence with you; and, notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his almighty aid in defense of justice and right. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD, General.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11, 1864

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN.

Sir: We the undersigned, Mayor and two of the Council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly but respectfully to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta.

At first view, it struck us that the measure world involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of the people, and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve in the aggregate consequences appalling and heart-rending.

Many poor women are in advanced state of pregnancy, others now having young children, and whose husbands for the greater part are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say: "I have such a one sick at my house; who will wait on them when I am gone?" Others say: "What are we to do? We have no house to go to, and no means to buy, build, or rent any; no parents, relatives, or friends, to go to." Another says: "I will try and take this or that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much." We reply to them: "General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General Hood will take it thence on." And they will reply to that: "But I want to leave the railroad at such a place, and cannot get conveyance from there on."

We only refer to a few facts, to try to illustrate in part how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of this fell back; and before your arrival here, a large portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without houses enough to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other out-buildings.

This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find any shelter? And how can they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter or subsistence, in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them much, if they were willing to do so?

This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horrors, and the suffering, cannot be described by words; imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration.

We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to this matter, but thought it might be that you had not considered this subject in all of its awful consequences, and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred—surely never in the United States—and what has this helpless people done, that they should be driven from their homes, to wander strangers and outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

We do not know as yet the number of people still here; of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.

In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home, and enjoy what little means they have.

Respectfully submitted

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

E. E. RAWSON, Councilman.

S. C. Warns, Councilman.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 12, 1864.

JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor, E. E. RAWSON and S. C. Wares, representing City Council of Atlanta.

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned, and yet shall not revoke my orders, because they were not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this, we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must defeat the rebel armies which are arrayed against the laws and Constitution that all must respect and obey. To defeat those armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose. Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter; and, therefore, deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here, for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer,—instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past months. Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here until the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what we propose to do, but I assert that our military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible.

You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war into our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on until we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority, wherever it once had power; for, if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I believe that such is the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of Union. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the national Government, and, instead of devoting your houses and streets and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion, such as swept the South into rebellion, but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a government, and those who insist on war and its desolation.

You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop the war, which can only be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride.

We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your lands, or any thing you have, but we do want and will have a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and, if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it.

You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement; and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better. I repeat then that, by the original compact of Government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now that war comes home to you; you feel very different. You deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot, to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, to desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the Government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through union and war, and I will ever conduct war with a view to perfect and early success.

But, my dear sirs, when peace does come, you may call on me for any thing. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from every quarter.

Now you must go, and take with you the old and feeble, feed and nurse them, and build for them, in more quiet places, proper habitations to shield them against the weather until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle over your old homes at Atlanta. Yours in haste,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 14, 1864.

General J. B. HOOD, commanding Army of the Tennessee, Confederate Army.

GENERAL: Yours of September 12th is received, and has been carefully perused. I agree with you that this discussion by two soldiers is out of place, and profitless; but you must admit that you began the controversy by characterizing an official act of mine in unfair and improper terms. I reiterate my former answer, and to the only new matter contained in your rejoinder add: We have no "negro allies" in this army; not a single negro soldier left Chattanooga with this army, or is with it now. There are a few guarding Chattanooga, which General Steedman sent at one time to drive Wheeler out of Dalton.

I was not bound by the laws of war to give notice of the shelling of Atlanta, a "fortified town, with magazines, arsenals, founderies, and public stores;" you were bound to take notice. See the books.

This is the conclusion of our correspondence, which I did not begin, and terminate with satisfaction. I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General commanding.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1864,

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta, Georgia.

GENERAL: Your communications of the 20th in regard to the removal of families from Atlanta, and the exchange of prisoners, and also the official report of your campaign, are just received. I have not had time as yet to examine your report. The course which you have pursued in removing rebel families from Atlanta, and in the exchange of prisoners, is fully approved by the War Department. Not only are you justified by the laws and usages of war in removing these people, but I think it was your duty to your own army to do so. Moreover, I am fully of opinion that the nature of your position, the character of the war, the conduct of the enemy (and especially of non-combatants and women of the territory which we have heretofore conquered and occupied), will justify you in gathering up all the forage and provisions which your army may require, both for a siege of Atlanta and for your supply in your march farther into the enemy's country. Let the disloyal families of the country, thus stripped, go to their husbands, fathers, and natural protectors, in the rebel ranks; we have tried three years of conciliation and kindness without any reciprocation; on the contrary, those thus treated have acted as spies and guerrillas in our rear and within our lines. The safety of our armies, and a proper regard for the lives of our soldiers, require that we apply to our inexorable foes the severe rules of war. We certainly are not required to treat the so-called non-combatant rebels better than they themselves treat each other. Even herein Virginia, within fifty miles of Washington, they strip their own families of provisions, leaving them, as our army advances, to be fed by us, or to starve within our lines. We have fed this class of people long enough. Let them go with their husbands and fathers in the rebel ranks; and if they won't go, we must send them to their friends and natural protectors. I would destroy every mill and factory within reach which I did not want for my own use. This the rebels have done, not only in Maryland and Pennsylvania, but also in Virginia and other rebel States, when compelled to fall back before our armies. In many sections of the country they have not left a mill to grind grain for their own suffering families, lest we might use them to supply our armies. We most do the same.

I have endeavored to impress these views upon our commanders for the last two years. You are almost the only one who has properly applied them. I do not approve of General Hunter's course in burning private homes or uselessly destroying private property. That is barbarous. But I approve of taking or destroying whatever may serve as supplies to us or to the enemy's army.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General, Chief of Staff

Для осуществления обмена пленными, облегчения исхода жителей Атланты и поддержания беспрепятственной связи с Югом мы учредили нейтральный лагерь на железнодорожной станции к югу от Атланты, известной как «Рафф-энд-Риди», и в этот пункт я направил подполковника Уилларда Уорнера из состава моего штаба с охраной из ста человек, а генерал Худ прислал полковника Клера из своего штаба с аналогичной охраной; эти офицеры и солдаты прекрасно сработались и по завершении своей работы расстались добрыми друзьями. Тем временем я также произвел реконсципирование всех мятежных рубежей вокруг Атланты; они были хорошо укреплены, но явно слишком протяженны, чтобы их мог удерживать один корпус или дивизия войск, поэтому я поручил полковнику По, инженеру США из моего штаба, наметить внутреннюю, более короткую линию обороны, пригодную для удержания меньшим гарнизоном.

К середине сентября все эти вопросы находились в стадии реализации, отчеты о прошедшей кампании были составлены и отправлены в Вашингтон, а наши мысли начали обращаться к будущему. Адмирал Фаррагут смело и успешно прошел форты у входа в мобинский залив, что привело к взятию форта Морган, благодаря чему генералу Канби удалось начать регулярные операции против города Мобил с целью открыть реку Алабаму для судоходства. Сначала я думал согласовать с ним совместные действия либо через Монтгомери, штат Алабама, либо через Апалачиколу; однако столь протяженную линию, которую предполагалось использовать в качестве базы для дальнейших операций на восток, сочти нецелесообразной, и я решил дождаться инициативы противника, предполагая, что из-за поднятого на Юге шума по поводу тяжелой потери для них города Атланты он будет вынужден прибегнуть к какой-нибудь отчаянной кампании.

Генерал Томас занимал дом на Мариетта-стрит с верандой на высоких колоннах. Однажды вечером мы сидели там, беседуя о разных разностях, когда генерал Томас попросил разрешения отправить свои обозы обратно в Чаттанугу из соображений удобства и экономии фуража. Я спросил его, неужели он рассчитывает, что нам позволят долго отдыхать в Атланте, на что он ответил, что, по его мнению, позволят, или что во всяком случае для нас было бы неблагоразумно продвигаться вглубь Джорджии дальше из-за нашей и без того протяженной линии снабжения, а именно в триста миль от Нашвилла. Это было правдой; но мы находились именно там, и мы не могли позволить себе оставаться в обороне, просто удерживая Атланту и борясь за безопасность ее железной дороги. Я настоял на том, чтобы он оставил все обозы у себя и держал все свои дивизии готовыми к выступлению по первому сигналу. Вся армия, офицеры и солдаты, казалось, несколько расслабились и погрузились в состояние праздности. Генералу Шофилду было позволено отправиться в Ноксвилл, чтобы разобраться с делами в своем Департаменте Огайо; а генералы Блэр и Логан уехали домой, чтобы заняться политикой. Многие полки имели право на демобилизацию в связи с истечением срока службы и требовали ее; таким образом, победа и успех принесли с собой и множество причин для дезорганизации.

Мятежный генерал Уиллер все еще находился в Среднем Теннесси, угрожая нашим железным дорогам, и доходили слухи, что Форрест движется из Миссисипи на этот же театр военных действий с заявленной целью разрушить наши железные дороги и заставить нас отступить с завоеванных позиций. Чтобы подготовиться к этой или любой другой чрезвычайной ситуации, я приказал дивизии Ньютона из Четвертого корпуса вернуться в Чаттанугу, а дивизии Корса из Семнадцатого корпуса — в Рим, а также поручил генералу Руссо в Нашвилле, Грейнджеру в Декейтере и Стидману в Чаттануге принять самые активные меры для защиты и обеспечения безопасности наших дорог.

Худ по-прежнему оставался в районе станции Лавджой и до 15 сентября не подавал никаких признаков своих дальнейших планов; поэтому данной датой я завершаю кампанию в Атланте, приводя следующий обзор наших относительных потерь за августи сентябрь, а также сводку потерь за всю кампанию, начавшуюся 6 мая и завершившуюся 15 сентября 1864 года. Потери за август и сентябрь сложены вместе, чтобы учесть и те из них, что пришлись на район Джонсборо:

Killed and Missing Wounded Total

Grand Aggregate 1,408 3,731 5,139

Потери Худа, согласно отчету за тот же период на странице 577 «Повествования» Джонстона:

Killed Wounded Total

482 3,223 3,705

К чему следует добавить:

Prisoners captured by us: 3,738

Giving his total loss 7,440

При подсчете общих потерь каждой армии за всю кампанию с мая по сентябрь включительно мы получаем для союзной армии следующие данные (согласно прилагаемой таблице):

Killed 4,423

Wounded 22,822

Missing 4,442

Aggregate Loss 31,627

В южной армии, согласно отчетам хирурга Форда (стр. 576, 577 «Повествования» Джонстона):

Total killed 3,044

Total killed and wounded 21,996

Prisoners captured by us 12,983

Aggregate loss to the Southern Army 34,979

Приведенные выше цифры являются официальными и соответствуют действительности с минимальной погрешностью. Я не вижу поводов для неточностей, за исключением кавалерии, которая была сильно рассредоточена, и чьи отчеты гораздо менее надежны, чем отчеты пехоты и артиллерии; но поскольку таблицы хирурга Форда не охватывают кавалерийские дивизии Уиллера, Джексона и Мартина, я делаю вывод, что в отношении потерь кавалерии силы равны.

Я не сомневаюсь, что южные офицеры льстили себе надеждой, будто они вывели из строя и покалечили наших солдат в соотношении два к одному или даже шесть к одному, как утверждал Джонстон; но они просто заблуждались, и в подтверждение этого я прилагаю здесь официальные табличные данные, составленные на основе архивов военного министерства.

Я также распорядился составить на основе официальных записей из канцелярии генерал-адъютанта тщательную сводную таблицу, отражающую «эффективную численность» находившейся под моим командованием армии за каждый из месяцев — май, июнь, июль, август и сентябрь 1864 года, где учтен каждый военнослужащий (пехота, артиллерия и кавалерия), находившийся при исполнении служебных обязанностей. Итоговые данные наглядно показывают истинное положение дел. Мы начали кампанию, имея 98 797 (девяносто восемь тысяч семьсот девяносто семь) человек. Две дивизии Блэра присоединились к нам в начале июня, доведя численность до 112 819 (ста двенадцати тысяч восьмисот девятнадцати) человек, каковое число постепенно сократилось до 106 070 (ста шести тысяч семидесяти), 91 675 (девяноста одной тысячи шестисот семидесяти пяти) и 81 758 (восьмидесяти одной тысячи семисот пятидесяти восьми) человек к концу кампании. Это постепенное сокращение происходило не только из-за гибели и ранений, но также из-за истечения сроков службы или отправки отрядов в тыловые пункты.

ГЛАВА XX.

АТЛАНТА И ПОСЛЕДСТВИЯ — ПРЕСЛЕДОВАНИЕ ХУДА.

СЕНТЯБРЬ И ОКТЯБРЬ 1864 ГОДА.

К середине сентября обстановка в Атланте полностью нормализовалась, так что мы чувствовали себя там совершенно как дома. Телеграф и железные дороги были восстановлены, и у нас установилась бесперебойная связь с тылом. Поезда прибывали регулярно и оперативно, доставляя нам обильные припасы. Генерал Уиллер был выбит из Среднего Теннесси и ушел на юг, переправившись через Теннесси у Бейнбриджа; казалось, наступает период передышки.

Однажды в наши позиции в Декейтере прибыли двое гражданских лиц, господа Хилл и Фостер, и были направлены в мой штаб. Они представились бывшими членами Конгресса и близкими друзьями моего брата Джона Шермана; мистер Хилл сообщил, что его сын погиб в рядах мятежной армии, когда та отступала перед нами где-то в районе Кассвилла, и они хотели бы забрать его тело, узнав от сослуживца, где оно захоронено. Я дал им разрешение проехать по железной дороге в тыл, снабдив запиской для командира части, генерала Джона Эскота Смита в Картерсвилле, с требованием предоставить им для этой цели эскорт и санитарную машину. Я пригласил их пообедать с офицерами нашего штаба, и разговор естественным образом зашел в allgemeine русло политики, а также опустошения и разрушений, принесенных войной. Они видели часть той местности, через которую прошла армия, и могли легко экстраполировать масштабы ее разорения на остальную часть штата, если бы необходимость заставила нас двигаться вперед.

Мистер Хилл проживал в Мэдисоне, на главной дороге в Огасту, и, казалось, полностью осознавал опасность; он говорил, что дальнейшее сопротивление со стороны Юга было безумием, и выражал надежду, что губернатор Джорджии Браун объявит об этом официально и отведет свой народ от участия в мятеже в соответствии с так называемой политикой «самостоятельных действий штата». Я сказал ему: если он увидит губернатора Брауна, пусть во всех подробностях опишет ему то, что сам повидал, и передаст: если тот останется бездеятельным, я буду вынужден идти вперед, опустошая штат вдоль и поперек; что никаких достаточных сил, чтобы остановить нас, не существует и т. д.; но если он издаст прокламацию об отзыве своих ополченцев из армий Конфедерации, я пощажу штат и при прохождении через него ограничу передвижение войск главными дорогами, а кроме того, заплачу за весь овес и продовольствие, которые нам понадобятся. Я также сказал мистеру Хиллу, что он может от моего имени пригласить губернатора Брауна посетить Атланту; я гарантирую ему охранную грамоту, а если он захочет произнести речь, то я ручаюсь, что аудитория будет столь же многочисленной и почтенной, перед какой ему когда-либо доводилось выступать. Я полагаю, что мистер Хилл, вернувшись к себе домой в Мэдисон, отправился в Милледжвилл, столицу штата, и передал это послание губернатору Брауну. Я также отправил аналогичные послания через судью Райта из Рима, штат Джорджия, и мистера Кинга из Мариетты. 15 сентября я направил генералу Халлеку следующую телеграмму:

Мой отчет готов и будет отправлен, как только я получу еще несколько подчиненных донесений. Я жду курьера от генерала Гранта. Все в порядке; войска находятся в хороших, здоровых лагерях, припасы поступают отлично. Губернатор Браун распустил свое ополчение, чтобы собрать урожай кукурузы и сорго в штате. У меня есть основания полагать, что он и Стивенс хотят нанести мне визит, и я направил им сердечное приглашение. Я обменяю две тысячи пленных с Худом, но не более.

Действия губернатора Брауна в тот момент исчерпывающе объясняются следующим письмом, которое впоследствии было предано гласности, а тогда было известно нам лишь отчасти по слухам:

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA, September 10, 1864

General J. B. HOOD, commanding army of Tennessee.

GENERAL: As the militia of the State were called out for the defense of Atlanta during the campaign against it, which has terminated by the fall of the city into the hands of the enemy, and as many of these left their homes without preparation (expecting to be gone but a few weeks), who have remained in service over three months (most of the time in the trenches), justice requires that they be permitted, while the enemy are preparing for the winter campaign, to return to their homes, and look for a time after important interests, and prepare themselves for such service as may be required when another campaign commences against other important points in the State. I therefore hereby withdraw said organization from your command . . . .

JOSEPH C. BROWN

Это ополчение составляло дивизию под командованием генерал-майора Густавуса В. Смита и было распущено по домам для сбора кукурузы и сорго, которые тогда как раз созрели и были готовы к уборке.

17-го числа я получил по телеграфу от президента Линкольна следующее послание:

WASHINGTON, D.C., September 17, 1864

Major-General SHERMAN:

I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch, mentioning corn and sorghum, and the contemplated visit to you.

A. LINCOLN, President of the United States.

Я ответил незамедлительно:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 17, 1864.

President LINCOLN, Washington., D. C.:

I will keep the department fully advised of all developments connected with the subject in which you feel interested.

Mr. Wright, former member of Congress from Rome, Georgia, and Mr. King, of Marietta, are now going between Governor Brown and myself. I have said to them that some of the people of Georgia are engaged in rebellion, began in error and perpetuated in pride, but that Georgia can now save herself from the devastations of war preparing for her, only by withdrawing her quota out of the Confederate Army, and aiding me to expel Hood from the borders of the State; in which event, instead of desolating the land as we progress, I will keep our men to the high-roads and commons, and pay for the corn and meat we need and take.

I am fully conscious of the delicate nature of such assertions, but it would be a magnificent stroke of policy if we could, without surrendering principle or a foot of ground, arouse the latent enmity of Georgia against Davis.

The people do not hesitate to say that Mr. Stephens was and is a Union man at heart; and they say that Davis will not trust him or let him have a share in his Government.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

У меня не вызывает ни малейших сомнений то обстоятельство, что губернатор Браун в то время всерьез рассматривал это предложение; однако он едва ли чувствовал себя готовым к действиям и попросту предоставил ополчению отпуск, а также созвал чрезвычайную сессию легислатуры в Милледжвилле для обсуждения критического положения дел в штате.

20 сентября от генерала Гранта из Сити-Пойнта прибыл полковник Хорас Портер, доставивший мне письмо от 12 сентября с просьбой изложить мои общие соображения относительно дальнейших шагов. Он пробыл в Атланте несколько дней и по возвращении увез в Вашингтон мои полные отчеты о прошедшей кампании и мое письмо от 20 сентября генералу Гранту в ответ на его послание от 12-го числа.

Примерно в это время мы заметили признаки активности со стороны противника. 21-го числа Худ перебросил свою армию от дороги Мейсона у Лавджоя к дороге Уэст-Пойнт у станции Пальметто, а его кавалерия появилась на западном берегу Чаттахучи по направлению к Поудер-Спрингс; таким образом, он словно отступил в сторону, широко распахнув перед нами двери для вторжения в Центральную Джорджию. Однако я сделал вывод, что его истинной целью является переход в наступление против наших железных дорог, и 24-го числа крупные силы кавалерии из Миссисипи под командованием генерала Форреста появились в Афине, штат Алабама, и захватили ее гарнизон.

Дивизия генерала Ньютона (из Четвертого корпуса) и дивизия Корса (из Семнадцатого) были отправлены обратно по железной дороге: первая — в Чаттанугу, а вторая — в Рим. 25-го числа я направил телеграмму генералу Халлеку:

Худ, судя по всему, движется к границе Алабамы, оставляя открытой дорогу на Мейкон, а также на Огасту; однако его кавалерия проявляет активность на всех наших путях. По имеющимся данным, некая сила, численность которой оценивается до восьми тысяч человек, захватила Афину в Алабаме, а также посланный ей на помощь полк численностью в триста пятьдесят человек. Я отправил дивизию Ньютона по железной дороге в Чаттанугу и отправлю еще одну дивизию в Рим. Будь я уверен, что Саванна вскоре окажется в наших руках, у меня возникло бы искушение двинуться маршем на Милледжвилл и Огасту; но сперва я должен обезопасить то, что имею. Джефф. Дэвис находится в Мейконе.

На следующий день я отправил дополнительную телеграмму о том, что Джефф. Дэвис находился с Худом на станции Пальметто. Один из наших шпионов находился там в то время и, вернувшись следующей ночью, доложил мне содержание его речи перед солдатами. Это было повторение тех речей, которые он произносил в Колумбии (Южная Каролина) и Мейконе (Джорджия) по дороге сюда и которые я видел в газетах. Дэвис казался совершенно выбитым из колеи падением Атланты и потерял всякий здравый смысл и рассудок. Он заклеймил генерала Джозефа Джонстона и губернатора Брауна не иначе как предателями; возложил на них лично ответственность за многочисленные беды, постигшие их дело, и сообщил солдатам, что теперь ситуация кардинально изменится; что генерал Форрест уже действует на наших дорогах в Среднем Теннесси; и что армия Худа вскоре окажется там же. Он утверждал, что янки придется отступать или голодать, причем это отступление окажется еще более катастрофичным, чем отступление Наполеона из Москвы. Он пообещал своим солдатам из Теннесси и Кентукки, что их ноги вскоре снова ступят на «родную землю» и т. д. и т. п. Он не скрывал этих хвастливых заявлений и тем самым предоставил нам полный ключ к разгадке своих дальнейших замыслов. Предупрежден — значит вооружен, и я полагаю, что мы воспользовались этим моментом по полной программе.

26-го числа я получил следующую депешу.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA,September 26,1864-10 A.M.

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta It will be better to drive Forrest out of Middle Tennessee as a first step, and do any thing else you may feel your force sufficient for. When a movement is made on any part of the sea-coast, I will advise you. If Hood goes to the Alabama line, will it not be impossible for him to subsist his army? U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

Ответ:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 26, 1864.

GENERAL: I have your dispatch of to-day. I have already sent one division (Newton's) to Chattanooga, and another (Corse's) to Rome.

Our armies are much reduced, and if I send back any more, I will not be able to threaten Georgia much. There are men enough to the rear to whip Forrest, but they are necessarily scattered to defend the roads.

Can you expedite the sending to Nashville of the recruits that are in Indiana and Ohio? They could occupy the forts.

Hood is now on the West Point road, twenty-four miles south of this, and draws his supplies by that road. Jefferson Davis is there to-day, and superhuman efforts will be made to break my road.

Forrest is now lieutenant-general, and commands all the enemy's cavalry.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

Генерал Грант сначала посчитал, что я заблуждаюсь, полагая, будто Джефф. Дэвис находился в Мейконе и Пальметто, но 27-го числа я получил печатный экземпляр его речи, произнесенной в Мейконе 22-го числа, которая была настолько показательна, что я приказал отправить ее целиком телеграфом до Луивилла, а оттуда переслать почтой в Вашингтон; в тот же день я получил следующую депешу:

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 27, 1864-9 A.M.

Major-General SHERMAN, Atlanta: You say Jeff Davis is on a visit to General Hood. I judge that Brown and Stephens are the objects of his visit.

A. LINCOLN, President of the United States.

To which I replied:

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI

IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 28, 1864.

President LINCOLN, Washington, D. C.:

I have positive knowledge that Mr. Davis made a speech at Macon, on the 22d, which I mailed to General Halleck yesterday. It was bitter against General Jos. Johnston and Governor Brown. The militia are on furlough. Brown is at Milledgeville, trying to get a Legislature to meet next month, but he is afraid to act unless in concert with other Governors, Judge Wright, of Rome, has been here, and Messrs. Hill and Nelson, former members of Congress, are here now, and will go to meet Wright at Rome, and then go back to Madison and Milledgeville.

Great efforts are being made to reenforce Hood's army, and to break up my railroads, and I should have at once a good reserve force at Nashville. It would have a bad effect, if I were forced to send back any considerable part of my army to guard roads, so as to weaken me to an extent that I could not act offensively if the occasion calls for it.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.

Все это время мы с Худом вели вышеупомянутую переписку, касающуюся обмена пленными, эвакуации жителей Атланты и освобождения наших военнопленных в Андерсонвилле. Несмотря на всю суровость заключения, некоторым из этих людей удалось бежать из Андерсонвилля и добраться до меня в Атланте. Они описали свое плачевное состояние: более двадцати пяти тысяч узников содержались в частоколе, рассчитанном всего на десять тысяч; им было запрещено собирать дрова для строительства хижин; они были лишены достаточного и здорового питания, а небольшой ручей, протекавший через их тюремный загон, был отравлен и загрязнен отбросами с расположенных выше по течению кухонь и бойен. 22 сентября я написал генералу Худу, описав положение наших людей в Андерсонвилле и намеренно воздерживаясь от того, чтобы возлагать на него или его соратников вину за обращение с этими людьми, но попросив его разрешения получить от наших щедрых друзей на Севере необходимые им предметы одежды и обихода, а именно: нательное белье, мыло, гребни, ножницы — все то, что было необходимо для поддержания здоровья, — и отправить эти припасы с обозом и офицером для их выдачи. Генерал Худ 24 сентября незамедлительно дал свое согласие, и я телеграфировал своему другу мистеру Джеймсу Е. Йетману, вице-президенту Санитарной комиссии в Сент-Луисе, с просьбой прислать нам все нательное белье и мыло, какими он располагает, указав в заявке две тысячи гребней с частыми зубьями и четыреста пар ножниц для стрижки волос. Эти предметы красноречиво свидетельствуют о бедствии, которое больше всего досаждало нашим узникам в Андерсонвилле.

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