Между тем генерал Грант в Джексоне отправил бригадного генерала Макферсона с бригадой прямо к Коринту, куда тот прибыл уже после сражения, и, предвкушая победу, приказал ему немедленно преследовать неприятеля, уведомив его, что отдал распоряжение дивизиям Орда и Халбарта стремительно выдвинуться к Покахонтасу, чтобы ударить по флангу мятежников. Утром 5-го числа генерал Орд вышел к реке Хатчи у моста Дейвиса с четырьмя тысячами человек, переправился через нее и столкнулся с отступающей армией, захватил батарею и несколько сотен пленных, рассеяв авангард мятежников и заставив главную колонну сделать широкий крюк через юг для переправы через реку Хатчи. Если бы генерал Роузкранс преследовал противника без промедления и шел по пятам этой массы дезориентированных и разбитых людей, армия Ван Дорна несомненно была бы окончательно уничтожена; а так Ван Дорн добрался до Холли-Спрингс в несколько деморализованном состоянии.
Генерал Роузкранс начал преследование только на следующее утро, 5-го числа, и тогда было уже поздно. Генерал Грант снова остался им недоволен и так до конца и не примирился. Вскоре после этого генерал Роузкранс был освобожден от должности и переведен в Армию Камберленда в Теннесси, командование которой он впоследствии получил вместо смещенного генерала Бьюэлла.
Результаты битвы за Коринт оказались огромными. Это был поистине сокрушительный удар по делу Конфедерации в нашем секторе, изменивший весь ход дел в Западном Теннесси. От робкой обороны мы сразу же смогли перейти к дерзкому наступлению. В Мемфисе я мог наблюдать его влияние на горожан, которые открыто признавали, что их дело потерпело смертельный удар. Но мятежное правительство находилось тогда на пике своей мощи; Ван Дорн получил подкрепления, и вскоре прибыл генерал-лейтенант Дж. К. Пембертон, который принял командование, избрав своей рубежной линией реку Талахатчи с авангардом вдоль Коулдоутера и более мелкими передовыми отрядами в Гранд-Джанкшене и Эрнандо. Генерал Грант точно так же получил подкрепления в виде новых полков.
Из тех сил, что были выделены в мое распоряжение в Мемфисе, я сформировал две новые бригады и передал их под начало офицеров, приобретших навыки и опыт во время предыдущей кампании.
ГЛАВА XII.
ИЗ МЕМФИСА К ПОСТУ АРКАНЗАС.
JULY, 1882 TO JANUARY, 1883
Когда мы впервые вошли в Мемфис 21 июля 1862 года, я застал город мертвым: никакая торговля не велась, магазины были закрыты, церкви, школы и все остальное заперто. Все население в той или иной степени симпатизировало нашим врагам, и существовала большая вероятность того, что все гражданское население ляжет мертвым грузом на наши плечи. Поскольку река Миссисипи к тому времени находилась под нашим контролем к северу отсюда, и пароходы свободно курсировали с пассажирами и грузами, я приказал открыть все магазины, возобновить работу церквей, школ, театров и увеселительных заведений, и очень скоро Мемфис вернул себе вид оживленного, делового, процветающего места. Я также восстановил мэра (по фамилии Паркс) и городское самоуправление в отправлении их общественных функций, обязав их поддерживать надлежащую гражданскую полицию.
До того времени ни Конгресс, ни Президент не выработали никаких четких, определенных правил в отношении чернокожих рабов, и разные генералы издавали приказы сообразно собственным политическим взглядам. И генерал Халлек, генералы — поправка: и генерал Халлек, и генерал Грант считали раба по-прежнему рабом, с той лишь разницей, что труд раба принадлежал его хозяину, если тот был верен Союзу, либо Соединенным Штатам, если хозяин взял в руки оружие против Правительства или примкнул к мятежникам. Поэтому в Мемфисе мы принимали всех беглецов, заставляли их работать на укреплениях, обеспечивали пищей и одеждой, а вопрос о выплате жалованья оставляли на будущее. Ни в коем случае не дозволялось применять силу для возвращения беглого раба его хозяину; однако, если хозяин доказывал свою лояльность, ему обычно разрешалось повидаться со своим рабом, и если ему удавалось уговорить того вернуться домой, это допускалось. Хлопок также служил благодатной почвой для споров. Министр финансов г-н Чейз в тот самый период чрезвычайно стремился поощрять закупку хлопка, поскольку каждый тюк стоил в золотом исчислении около трехсот долларов и заменял звонковую монету в наших внешнеторговых расчетах. Поэтому он поощрял эту торговлю, так что сотни алчных спекулянтов хлынули вниз по Миссисипи и прибегали к всевозможным ухищрениям, чтобы заполучить хлопок из внутренних районов, часто покупая его у негров, которым он не принадлежал, но которые знали, где он спрятан. Весь этот бизнес был изъят из ведения военных и передан агентам казначейства, назначенным г-ном Чейзом.
Другие вопросы занимали внимание военачальников; в качестве иллюстрации я привожу здесь несколько писем из своей «записной книжки», содержащей сотни подобных сюжетов:
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION
Memphis, Tennessee, August 11, 1862
Hon. S. P. CHASE, Secretary of the Treasury.
Sir: Your letter of August 2d, just received, invites my discussion of the cotton question.
I will write plainly and slowly, because I know you have no time to listen to trifles. This is no trifle; when one nation is at war with another, all the people of the one are enemies of the other: then the rules are plain and easy of understanding. Most unfortunately, the war in which we are now engaged has been complicated with the belief on the one hand that all on the other are not enemies. It would have been better if, at the outset, this mistake had not been made, and it is wrong longer to be misled by it. The Government of the United States may now safely proceed on the proper rule that all in the South are enemies of all in the North; and not only are they unfriendly, but all who can procure arms now bear them as organized regiments, or as guerrillas. There is not a garrison in Tennessee where a man can go beyond the sight of the flag-staff without being shot or captured. It so happened that these people had cotton, and, whenever they apprehended our large armies would move, they destroyed the cotton in the belief that, of course, we world seize it, and convert it to our use. They did not and could not dream that we would pay money for it. It had been condemned to destruction by their own acknowledged government, and was therefore lost to their people; and could have been, without injustice, taken by us, and sent away, either as absolute prize of war, or for future compensation. But the commercial enterprise of the Jews soon discovered that ten cents would buy a pound of cotton behind our army; that four cents would take it to Boston, where they could receive thirty cents in gold. The bait was too tempting, and it spread like fire, when here they discovered that salt, bacon, powder, fire-arms, percussion-caps, etc., etc., were worth as much as gold; and, strange to say, this traffic was not only permitted, but encouraged. Before we in the interior could know it, hundreds, yea thousands of barrels of salt and millions of dollars had been disbursed; and I have no doubt that Bragg's army at Tupelo, and Van Dorn's at Vicksburg, received enough salt to make bacon, without which they could not have moved their armies in mass; and that from ten to twenty thousand fresh arms, and a due supply of cartridges, have also been got, I am equally satisfied. As soon as I got to Memphis, having seen the effect in the interior, I ordered (only as to my own command) that gold, silver, and Treasury notes, were contraband of war, and should not go into the interior, where all were hostile. It is idle to talk about Union men here: many want peace, and fear war and its results; but all prefer a Southern, independent government, and are fighting or working for it. Every gold dollar that was spent for cotton, was sent to the seaboard, to be exchanged for bank-notes and Confederate scrip, which will buy goods here, and are taken in ordinary transactions. I therefore required cotton to be paid for in such notes, by an obligation to pay at the end of the war, or by a deposit of the price in the hands of a trustee, viz., the United States Quartermaster. Under these rules cotton is being obtained about as fast as by any other process, and yet the enemy receives no "aid or comfort." Under the "gold" rule, the country people who had concealed their cotton from the burners, and who openly scorned our greenbacks, were willing enough to take Tennessee money, which will buy their groceries; but now that the trade is to be encouraged, and gold paid out, I admit that cotton will be sent in by our open enemies, who can make better use of gold than they can of their hidden bales of cotton.
I may not appreciate the foreign aspect of the question, but my views on this may be ventured. If England ever threatens war because we don't furnish her cotton, tell her plainly if she can't employ and feed her own people, to send them here, where they cannot only earn an honest living, but soon secure independence by moderate labor. We are not bound to furnish her cotton. She has more reason to fight the South for burning that cotton, than us for not shipping it. To aid the South on this ground would be hypocrisy which the world would detect at once. Let her make her ultimatum, and there are enough generous minds in Europe that will counteract her in the balance. Of course her motive is to cripple a power that rivals her in commerce and manufactures, that threatens even to usurp her history. In twenty more years of prosperity, it will require a close calculation to determine whether England, her laws and history, claim for a home the Continent of America or the Isle of Britain. Therefore, finding us in a death-struggle for existence, she seems to seek a quarrel to destroy both parts in detail.
Southern people know this full well, and will only accept the alliance of England in order to get arms and manufactures in exchange for their cotton. The Southern Confederacy will accept no other mediation, because she knows full well that in Old England her slaves and slavery will receive no more encouragement than in New England.
France certainly does not need our cotton enough to disturb her equilibrium, and her mediation would be entitled to a more respect consideration than on the part of her present ally. But I feel assured the French will not encourage rebellion and secession anywhere as a political doctrine. Certainly all the German states must be our ardent friends; and, in case of European intervention; they could not be kept down.
With great respect, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, Memphis, July 23, 1862
Dr. E. S. PLUMMER and others, Physician in Memphis, Signers to a Petition.
GENTLEMEN: I have this moment received your communication, and assure you that it grieves my heart thus to be the instrument of adding to the seeming cruelty and hardship of this unnatural war.
On my arrival here, I found my predecessor (General Hovey) had issued an order permitting the departure south of all persons subject to the conscript law of the Southern Confederacy. Many applications have been made to me to modify this order, but I regarded it as a condition precedent by which I was bound in honor, and therefore I have made no changes or modifications; nor shall I determine what action I shall adopt in relation to persons unfriendly to our cause who remain after the time limited by General Hovey's order had expired. It is now sunset, and all who have not availed themselves of General Hovey's authority, and who remain in Memphis, are supposed to be loyal and true men.
I will only say that I cannot allow the personal convenience of even a large class of ladies to influence me in my determination to make Memphis a safe place of operations for an army, and all people who are unfriendly should forthwith prepare to depart in such direction as I may hereafter indicate.
Surgeons are not liable to be made prisoners of war, but they should not reside within the lines of an army which they regard as hostile. The situation would be too delicate.
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS, MEMPHIS, July 24, 1862
SAMUEL SAWYER, Esq., Editor Union Appeal, Memphis.
DEAR SIR: It is well I should come to an understanding at once with the press as well as the people of Memphis, which I am ordered to command; which means, to control for the interest, welfare; and glory of the whole Government of the United States.
Personalities in a newspaper are wrong and criminal. Thus, though you meant to be complimentary in your sketch of my career, you make more than a dozen mistakes of fact, which I need not correct, as I don't desire my biography to be written till I am dead. It is enough for the world to know that I live and am a soldier, bound to obey the orders of my superiors, the laws of my country, and to venerate its Constitution; and that, when discretion is given me, I shall exercise it wisely and account to my superiors.
I regard your article headed "City Council—General Sherman and Colonel Slack," as highly indiscreet. Of course, no person who can jeopardize the safety of Memphis can remain here, much less exercise public authority; but I must take time, and be satisfied that injustice be not done.
If the parties named be the men you describe, the fact should not be published, to put them on their guard and thus to encourage their escape. The evidence should be carefully collected, authenticated, and then placed in my hands. But your statement of facts is entirely qualified; in my mind, and loses its force by your negligence of the very simple facts within your reach as to myself: I had been in the army six years in 1846; am not related by blood to any member of Lucas, Turner & Co.; was associated with them in business six years (instead of two); am not colonel of the Fifteenth Infantry, but of the Thirteenth. Your correction, this morning, of the acknowledged error as to General Denver and others, is still erroneous. General Morgan L. Smith did not belong to my command at the battle of Shiloh at all, but he was transferred to my division just before reaching Corinth. I mention these facts in kindness, to show you how wrong it is to speak of persons.
I will attend to the judge, mayor, Boards of Aldermen, and policemen, all in good time.
Use your influence to reestablish system, order, government. You may rest easy that no military commander is going to neglect internal safety, or to guard against external danger; but to do right requires time, and more patience than I usually possess. If I find the press of Memphis actuated by high principle and a sole devotion to their country, I will be their best friend; but, if I find them personal, abusive, dealing in innuendoes and hints at a blind venture, and looking to their own selfish aggrandizement and fame, then they had better look out; for I regard such persons as greater enemies to their country and to mankind than the men who, from a mistaken sense of State pride, have taken up muskets, and fight us about as hard as we care about. In haste, but in kindness, yours, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 27, 1882.
JOHN PARK, Mayor of Memphis, present.
Sir: Yours of July 24th is before me, and has received, as all similar papers ever will, my careful and most respectful consideration. I have the most unbounded respect for the civil law, courts, and authorities, and shall do all in my power to restore them to their proper use, viz., the protection of life, liberty, and property.
Unfortunately, at this time, civil war prevails in the land, and necessarily the military, for the time being, must be superior to the civil authority, but it does not therefore destroy it. Civil courts and executive officers should still exist and perform duties, without which civil or municipal bodies would soon pass into disrespect—an end to be avoided. I am glad to find in Memphis a mayor and municipal authorities not only in existence, but in the co-exercise of important functions, and I shall endeavor to restore one or more civil tribunals for the arbitration of contracts and punishment of crimes, which the military have neither time nor inclination to interfere with. Among these, first in importance is the maintenance of order, peace, and quiet, within the jurisdiction of Memphis. To insure this, I will keep a strong provost guard in the city, but will limit their duty to guarding public property held or claimed by the United States, and for the arrest and confinement of State prisoners and soldiers who are disorderly or improperly away from their regiments. This guard ought not to arrest citizens for disorder or minor crimes. This should be done by the city police. I understand that the city police is too weak in numbers to accomplish this perfectly, and I therefore recommend that the City Council at once take steps to increase this force to a number which, in their judgment, day and night can enforce your ordinances as to peace, quiet, and order; so that any change in our military dispositions will not have a tendency to leave your people unguarded. I am willing to instruct the provost guard to assist the police force when any combination is made too strong for them to overcome; but the city police should be strong enough for any probable contingency. The cost of maintaining this police force must necessarily fall upon all citizens equitably. I am not willing, nor do I think it good policy, for the city authorities to collect the taxes belonging to the State and County, as you recommend; for these would have to be refunded. Better meet the expenses at once by a new tax on all interested. Therefore, if you, on consultation with the proper municipal body, will frame a good bill for the increase of your police force, and for raising the necessary means for their support and maintenance, I will approve it and aid you in the collection of the tax. Of course, I cannot suggest how this tax should be laid, but I think that it should be made uniform on all interests, real estate, and personal property, including money, and merchandise.