In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, The Index had declared that slavery was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domestic institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, was evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipation edicts. The Index could not keep away from the subject. In March, quotations were given from the Reader, with adverse comments, upon a report of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper read before the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the author and the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the contempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and placed upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a fine controversy among the scientists which could only serve to emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the American War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duel with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North is justified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicate a system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the political freedom, or the economical progress of the American people [1201]...."
Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to many sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of The Index, acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented the carrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence and intended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By the end of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southern meetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief period in the fall just before the Presidential election in America [1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the whole period of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were almost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and religious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An analysis of those recorded in the files of The Liberator, and in the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following classification [1203]:
YEAR. NUMBER. CHARACTER.
ANTI-SLAVERY
AND RELIGIOUS WORKING-MEN.
1860 3 3 -
1861 7 7 -
1862 16 11 5
1863 82 26 56
1864 21 10 11
1865 5 4 1
Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or as speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing with frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, John Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A. Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and Mason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the great majority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturing districts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the old anti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most active speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to the moribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain [1204]. Thompson asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or city [1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others, not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective [1206]. Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament, rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern commerce [1207].
This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of resistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and was exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in opposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and France [1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He wrote to Lyons:
"I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to distract their attention from the arduous task they have so wantonly undertaken[1209]."
Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thought that the current of political opinion was running against the re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the "peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons strongly advised that "the quieter England and France were just at this moment the better [1210]." Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of military probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of warning as to the great power and high determination of the North.
But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theory of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the only hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leading British newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence in the South while at the same time putting much faith in the expected defeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for the few newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important daily professing strict neutrality--the Telegraph --the bulk of the metropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from the columns of the Times. This journal, while early assuming a position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in the war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent, Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the Times; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving its readers, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was coloured to create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance. Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situation throughout the war, the Times gave accurate reports for the earlier years but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in the West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta [1211]. The same ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to be printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond who wrote in contempt of Grant's army.
"I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines.... The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are contemplating an army which is at once republican and undisciplined[1212]."
At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leading paper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable to prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiers to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the Times was either ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentiment during the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power and determination in the war [1213], even though it was unquestioned that the earlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away [1214]. One element in the influence of the Times was its seeming impartiality accompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information and wisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as making this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a Times editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated for a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, The Index declared:
"Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and contending crowds. It is everybody's Times[1215]."
Yet The Index knew, and frequently so stated, that the Times was at bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the Morning Star, said: "There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacity of the war news supplied by the Times. Of course, its prophecies were in a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your double-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus in [1216]." In short, the Times became for the last year of the war the Bible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its preachments [1217].
There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if not greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly Army and Navy Gazette, and its editor, W.H. Russell, in 1861 war correspondent in America of the Times, but recalled shortly after his famous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained after the war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory of the North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was the real cause of his recall [1218]. He even claimed to have believed in Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations after the event are not borne out by the columns of the Gazette, for that journal was not far behind the Times in its delineation of incidents unfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern disaster. The Gazette had no wide circulation except among those in the service, but its dicta, owing to the established reputation of Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quite readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correct appreciation of man power and resources the Gazette did from time to time proclaim its faith in Northern victory [1219], but always in such terms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with the assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most definite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:
"The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by itself, without even a conference or an armistice to
aid it; and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that its component parts can never again be welded into a Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the action of force for that of free will, we think it will reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]...."
Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at the "Confederate partisanship" of the Times [1221] served to differentiate the Gazette from other journals, but when it came to description and estimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between them and consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus a fortnight before his "profession of faith," Russell could comment editorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta:
"The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North have so long been fixed promises to become a source of fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has eaten up all the supplies of the district.... All the enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]."
Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on the Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln's defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but the citations made in British papers emphasized especially Northern weariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printed in The Index, an extract from a New York paper, The New Nation, got frequent quotation:
"We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals override the laws, and the echo of the armed heel rings forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory, and we must have both[1223]."
It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have an important bearing on the election. The Times while expressing admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confident of his defeat:
"... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal general having ventured far from water communications. That Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]."
And W.H. Russell, in the Gazette, included Grant in the approaching disaster:
"The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman. Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful artillery as their own out of a position.... The Northerners have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]."
On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the Gazette the city of Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the Times having declared this impossible, now asserted that it was unimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and, two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the political struggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted, would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win [1226]. Russell, in the Gazette, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta:
"General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of Georgia[1227]."
Но ни один из этих военно-политических «экспертных» журналов не хотел признавать никакой выгоды, извлекаемой Линкольном из успехов Шермана. Иначе обстояло дело с Лайонсом, который держал своего руководителя в гораздо более курсе дела, чем было бы, если бы он верил британской прессе. Лайонс, у которого уже некоторое время ухудшалось здоровье, попытался спастись от летней жары Вашингтона поездкой в Монреаль. Теперь он писал, верно истолковывая большие перемены в настроениях Севера и вновь проявившуюся решимость упорствовать в войне до достижения воссоединения. Линкольн, по его мнению, скорее всего, будет переизбран:
"The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be publicly made[1228]."
«Таймс», постепенно убедившись в том, что Атланта окажет влияние на выборы, и, как всегда, более ловкая по сравнению со своими современниками в деликатном искусстве поворота на сто восемьдесят градусов ради сохранения своего престижа, к октябрю дошла до точки, когда смогла присоединиться к предсказаниям переизбрания Линкольна. Она сделала это, возложив вину на платформу Демократической партии, принятую на съезде партии в Чикаго, которая, как она утверждала, упустила прекрасную возможность добиться успеха, провозгласив сначала союз, а затем — мир. Поскольку съезд заседал в августе, это был запоздалый анализ; и, по сути дела, партийная платформа призывала к «прекращению кровопролития» и созыву съезда для восстановления мира — по сути, к перемирию. Но «Таймс»[1229] теперь временно приняла крайне морализаторскую и беспристрастную позу и умыла руки от дальнейшей ответственности; Линкольн, судя по всему, будет переизбран: