The people of all this region are represented in the Army of Virginia, at Charleston, Mobile, and Chattanooga. They have sons and relations in each of the rebel armies, and naturally are interested in their fate. Though we hold military possession of the key-points of their country, still they contend, and naturally, that should Lee succeed in Virginia, or Bragg at Chattanooga, a change will occur here also. We cannot for this reason attempt to reconstruct parts of the South as we conquer it, till all idea of the establishment of a Southern Confederacy is abandoned. We should avail ourselves of the present lull to secure the strategical points that will give us an advantage in the future military movements, and we should treat the idea of civil government as one in which we as a nation have a minor or subordinate interest. The opportunity is good to impress on the population the truth that they are more interested in civil government than we are; and that, to enjoy the protection of laws, they most not be passive observers of events, but must aid and sustain the constituted authorities in enforcing the laws; they must not only submit themselves, but should pay their share of taxes, and render personal services when called on.
It seems to me, in contemplating the history of the past two years, that all the people of our country, North, South, East, and West, have been undergoing a salutary political schooling, learning lessons which might have been acquired from the experience of other people; but we had all become so wise in our own conceit that we would only learn by actual experience of our own. The people even of small and unimportant localities, North as well as South, had reasoned themselves into the belief that their opinions were superior to the aggregated interest of the whole nation. Half our territorial nation rebelled, on a doctrine of secession that they themselves now scout; and a real numerical majority actually believed that a little State was endowed with such sovereignty that it could defeat the policy of the great whole. I think the present war has exploded that notion, and were this war to cease now, the experience gained, though dear, would be worth the expense.
Another great and important natural truth is still in contest, and can only be solved by war. Numerical majorities by vote have been our great arbiter. Heretofore all men have cheerfully submitted to it in questions left open, but numerical majorities are not necessarily physical majorities. The South, though numerically inferior, contend they can whip the Northern superiority of numbers, and therefore by natural law they contend that they are not bound to submit. This issue is the only real one, and in my judgment all else should be deferred to it. War alone can decide it, and it is the only question now left for us as a people to decide. Can we whip the South? If we can, our numerical majority has both the natural and constitutional right to govern them. If we cannot whip them, they contend for the natural right to select their own government, and they have the argument. Our armies must prevail over theirs; our officers, marshals, and courts, must penetrate into the innermost recesses of their land, before we have the natural right to demand their submission.
I would banish all minor questions, assert the broad doctrine that as a nation the United States has the right, and also the physical power, to penetrate to every part of our national domain, and that we will do it—that we will do it in our own time and in our own way; that it makes no difference whether it be in one year, or two, or ten, or twenty; that we will remove and destroy every obstacle, if need be, take every life, every acre of land, every particle of property, every thing that to us seems proper; that we will not cease till the end is attained; that all who do not aid us are enemies, and that we will not account to them for our acts. If the people of the South oppose, they do so at their peril; and if they stand by, mere lookers-on in this domestic tragedy, they have no right to immunity, protection, or share in the final results.
I even believe and contend further that, in the North, every member of the nation is bound by both natural and constitutional law to "maintain and defend the Government against all its enemies and opposers whomsoever." If they fail to do it they are derelict, and can be punished, or deprived of all advantages arising from the labors of those who do. If any man, North or South, withholds his share of taxes, or his physical assistance in this, the crisis of our history, he should be deprived of all voice in the future elections of this country, and might be banished, or reduced to the condition of a mere denizen of the land.
War is upon us, none can deny it. It is not the choice of the Government of the United States, but of a faction; the Government was forced to accept the issue, or to submit to a degradation fatal and disgraceful to all the inhabitants. In accepting war, it should be "pure and simple" as applied to the belligerents. I would keep it so, till all traces of the war are effaced; till those who appealed to it are sick and tired of it, and come to the emblem of our nation, and sue for peace. I would not coax them, or even meet them half-way, but make them so sick of war that generations would pass away before they would again appeal to it.
I know what I say when I repeat that the insurgents of the South sneer at all overtures looking to their interests. They scorn the alliance with the Copperheads; they tell me to my face that they respect Grant, McPherson, and our brave associates who fight manfully and well for a principle, but despise the Copperheads and sneaks at the North, who profess friendship for the South and opposition to the war, as mere covers for their knavery and poltroonery.
God knows that I deplore this fratricidal war as much as any man living, but it is upon us, a physical fact; and there is only one honorable issue from it. We must fight it out, army against army, and man against man; and I know, and you know, and civilians begin to realize the fact, that reconciliation and reconstruction will be easier through and by means of strong, well-equipped, and organized armies than through any species of conventions that can be framed. The issues are made, and all discussion is out of place and ridiculous. The section of thirty-pounder Parrott rifles now drilling before my tent is a more convincing argument than the largest Democratic meeting the State of New York can possibly assemble at Albany; and a simple order of the War Department to draft enough men to fill our skeleton regiments would be more convincing as to our national perpetuity than an humble pardon to Jeff. Davis and all his misled host.
The only government needed or deserved by the States of Louisiana, Arkansas, and Mississippi, now exists in Grant's army. This needs, simply, enough privates to fill its ranks; all else will follow in due season. This army has its well-defined code of laws and practice, and can adapt itself to the wants and necessities of a city, the country, the rivers, the sea, indeed to all parts of this land. It better subserves the interest and policy of the General Government, and the people here prefer it to any weak or servile combination that would at once, from force of habit, revive sad perpetuate local prejudices and passions. The people of this country have forfeited all right to a voice in the councils of the nation. They know it and feel it, and in after-years they will be the better citizens from the dear bought experience of the present crisis. Let them learn now, and learn it well, that good citizens must obey as well as command. Obedience to law, absolute—yea, even abject—is the lesson that this war, under Providence, will teach the free and enlightened American citizen. As a nation, we shall be the better for it.
I never have apprehended foreign interference in our family quarrel. Of coarse, governments founded on a different and it may be an antagonistic principle with ours naturally feel a pleasure at our complications, and, it may be, wish our downfall; but in the end England and France will join with us in jubilation at the triumph of constitutional government over faction. Even now the English manifest this. I do not profess to understand Napoleon's design in Mexico, and I do not, see that his taking military possession of Mexico concerns us. We have as much territory now as we want. The Mexicans have failed in self-government, and it was a question as to what nation she should fall a prey. That is now solved, and I don't see that we are damaged. We have the finest part of the North American Continent, all we can people and can take care of; and, if we can suppress rebellion in our own land, and compose the strife generated by it, we shall have enough people, resources, and wealth, if well combined, to defy interference from any and every quarter.
I therefore hope the Government of the United States will continue, as heretofore, to collect, in well-organized armies, the physical strength of the nation; applying it, as heretofore, in asserting the national authority; and in persevering, without relaxation, to the end. This, whether near or far off, is not for us to say; but, fortunately, we have no choice. We must succeed—no other choice is left us except degradation. The South must be ruled by us, or she will rule us. We must conquer them, or ourselves be conquered. There is no middle course. They ask, and will have, nothing else, and talk of compromise is bosh; for we know they would even scorn the offer.
I wish the war could have been deferred for twenty years, till the superabundant population of the North could flow in and replace the losses sustained by war; but this could not be, and we are forced to take things as they are.
All therefore I can now venture to advise is to raise the draft to its maximum, fill the present regiments to as large a standard as possible, and push the war, pure and simple. Great attention should be paid to the discipline of our armies, for on them may be founded the future stability of the Government.
The cost of the war is, of course, to be considered, but finances will adjust themselves to the actual state of affairs; and, even if we would, we could not change the cost. Indeed, the larger the cost now, the less will it be in the end; for the end must be attained somehow, regardless of loss of life and treasure, and is merely a question of time.
Excuse so long a letter. With great respect, etc.,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
Получив это письмо, генерал Халлек телеграфировал мне, что мистер Линкольн внимательно прочитал его и поручил ему получить мое согласие на публикацию. В то время я предпочитал не ввязываться ни в какие газетные полемики, о чем и написал генералу Халлеку; и вышеуказанное письмо, насколько мне известно, никогда не публиковалось, хотя мистер Линкольн не раз ссылался на него с одобрением.
HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS
CAMP ON BIG BLACK, September 17, 1863
Brigadier-General J. A. RAWLINS,
Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Vicksburg.
DEAR GENERAL: I inclose for your perusal, and for you to read to General Grant such parts as you deem interesting, letters received by me from Prof. Mahan and General Halleck, with my answers. After you have read my answer to General Halleck, I beg you to inclose it to its address, and return me the others.
I think Prof. Mahan's very marked encomium upon the campaign of Vicksburg is so flattering to General Grant, that you may offer to let him keep the letter, if he values such a testimonial. I have never written a word to General Halleck since my report of last December, after the affair at Chickasaw, except a short letter a few days ago, thanking him for the kind manner of his transmitting to me the appointment of brigadier-general. I know that in Washington I am incomprehensible, because at the outset of the war I would not go it blind and rush headlong into a war unprepared and with an utter ignorance of its extent and purpose. I was then construed unsound; and now that I insist on war pure and simple, with no admixture of civil compromises, I am supposed vindictive. You remember what Polonius said to his son Laertes: "Beware of entrance to a quarrel; but, being in, bear it, that the opposed may beware of thee." What is true of the single man, is equally true of a nation. Our leaders seemed at first to thirst for the quarrel, willing, even anxious, to array against us all possible elements of opposition; and now, being in, they would hasten to quit long before the "opposed" has received that lesson which he needs. I would make this war as severe as possible, and show no symptoms of tiring till the South begs for mercy; indeed, I know, and you know, that the end would be reached quicker by such a course than by any seeming yielding on our part. I don't want our Government to be bothered by patching up local governments, or by trying to reconcile any class of men. The South has done her worst, and now is the time for us to pile on our blows thick and fast.
Instead of postponing the draft till after the elections, we ought now to have our ranks full of drafted men; and, at best, if they come at all, they will reach us when we should be in motion.
I think General Halleck would like to have the honest, candid opinions of all of us, viz., Grant, McPherson, and Sherman. I have given mine, and would prefer, of course, that it should coincide with the others. Still, no matter what my opinion may be, I can easily adapt my conduct to the plane of others, and am only too happy when I find theirs better, than mine.
If no trouble, please show Halleck's letter to McPherson, and ask him to write also. I know his regiments are like mine (mere squads), and need filling up. Yours truly,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
ГЛАВА XIV.
ЧАТТАНУГА И НОКСВИЛЛ.
ИЮЛЬ — ДЕКАБРЬ 1863 ГОДА.
После падения Виксберга и его следствия — Порт-Хадсона — река Миссисипи целиком оказалась под контролем сил Союза, образовав идеальную разделительную линию на территории наших противников. Отныне они не могли переправляться через нее иначе как тайком, и военные действия на ее западном берегу потеряли значение. Армия Гранта, казалось, завершила свою долю ратного труда и оставалась некоторое время в бездействии. Сам генерал Грант отправился в Нью-Орлеан для совещания с генералом Бэнксом, и его победоносная армия была несколько рассредоточена. Корпус Парке (Девятый) вернулся в Кентукки и впоследствии вошел в состав Огайоской армии под началом генерала Бернсайда; корпус Орда (Тринадцатый) был направлен вниз по реке в Натчез и постепенно переместился в Нью-Орлеан и Техас; корпус Макферсона (Семнадцатый) оставался в Виксберге и его окрестностях; корпус Халбата (Шестнадцатый) дислоцировался в Мемфисе; а мой (Пятнадцатый) лагерем расположился вдоль Биг-Блэка, примерно в двадцати милях к востоку от Виксберга. Этот корпус состоял из четырех дивизий: дивизия Стила (Первая) стояла у железнодорожного моста и в его окрестностях; дивизия Блэра (Вторая) — следом за ней, возле пастора Фокса; Третья дивизия (Таттла) занимала хребет у истока ручья Бир-Крик; а Четвертая (Юинга) — у брода Мессинджера. Мой собственный штаб разместился в палатках в прекрасной роще вековых дубов близ дома пастора Фокса, а батальон 13-го регулярного полка нес штабную охрану.
Все лагеря были обустроены с расчетом на здоровье, комфорт, отдых и строевую подготовку. Стояла середина лета, мы не ждали никаких перемен до осенних месяцев и потому обустроили свой быт как можно удобнее. Действовала короткая железная дорога из Виксберга до моста через Биг-Блэк, откуда в наши лагеря в изобилии доставлялись припасы. Зная об этом, миссис Шерман приехала из Огайо с Минни, Лизи, Вилли и Томом навестить нас в лагере у пастора Фокса. Вилли тогда исполнилось девять лет, он был развит не по годам и проявлял жгучий интерес к делам армии. Он был всеобщим любимцем у солдат и сопровождал меня верхом во время многочисленных смотров и парадов того времени. Тогда у него были все шансы прожить столь же долгую жизнь, как и у любого из моих детей, и он проявлял к войне больший интерес, чем кто-либо из них. Его называли «сержантом» регулярного батальона, он выучил ружейные приемы и исправно посещал смотры и развод караула 13-го полка позади моего лагеря. Мы часто ездили в Виксберг и неизменно останавливались у генерала Макферсона, который занимал большой дом и столовался в семье (у миссис Эдвардс), где было несколько интересных молодых девушек. Генерал Грант тем летом занимал другой дом (миссис Лум) в Виксберге, и его семья также находилась при нем. Время шло очень приятно, скрашиваемое лишь незначительными событиями, из которых я опишу только одно.
Пока мы занимали западный берег Биг-Блэка, за восточным следила дивизия кавалерии мятежников под командованием генерала Армстронга. В ее составе было четыре бригады под началом генералов Уитфилда, Старка, Косби и Вирта Адамса. Они довольно часто выходили с нами на связь под парламентским флагом по пустячным вопросам, и мы отвечали тем же — просто чтобы наблюдать за ними. Однажды доложили, что у переправы Мессинджера объявился парламентский флаг, который нес капитан Б… из Луисвилла в сопровождении примерно двадцати пяти человек, и я отдал приказ пропустить их прямо в мою палатку. Это привело их через лагеря Четвертой дивизии и части Второй; когда же они выстроились перед моей палатной, я пригласил капитана Б… и другого офицера, бывшего с ним (майора из Мобила), спешиться, войти в мою палатку и чувствовать себя как дома. Их эскорт был отправлен к моему с приказом обеспечить их фуражом и всем необходимым. Б… привез запечатанное письмо для генерала Гранта в Виксберг, которое тотчас ему переслали. Вечером у нас был отличный ужин с вином и сигарами, и, пока мы сидели беседуя, Б… заговорил о своем отце и матери в Луисвилле, испросил разрешения написать им длинное письмо без предварительного прочтения кем бы то ни было, а затем мы заговорили о войне. Он сказал: «Какой смысл вам упорствовать? Покорить восемь миллионов человек просто невозможно», утверждая, будто «настроения на Юге стали настолько озлобленными, что примирение исключено». Я ответил: «Сидя здесь сейчас, мы выглядим весьма удобно, и уж точно нет никаких проблем в том, чтобы стать друзьями». «Да, — сказал он, — это верно в отношении нас, но мы образованные джентльмены и легко можем приспособиться к любым условиям; однако это в равной степени неприменимо к простому народу или рядовым солдатам». Я вывел его к кострам позади палатки, где солдаты его и моего эскортов сидели вперемешку, попивая кофе и счастливые, какими солдаты кажутся всегда. Я спросил Б…, что он об этом думает, и он признал, что в этом споре я одержал верх. Перед тем как отпустить этот парламентский отряд, его спутник конфиденциально посоветовался со мной насчет того, как ему поступить со своей семьей, находившейся тогда в Мобиле, и я откровенно дал ему лучший совет, какой мог.