character some great virtue which balanced his vices and
counteracted their effects. However, this young giddy-pate
had no talent for government except that of making himself
feared, and, at the same time, passed for the most cowardly
of men. At first he had shown some regard for the officers of
the army, because, until he was recognized as Nawab, he felt
his need of them. He had even shown generosity, but this
quality, which was quite opposed to his real character,
soon disappeared,to make place for violence and greed, which decided
against him all those who had favoured his accession in the
hope that he would behave discreetly when he became Nawab."
Вследствие общего отвращения, испытываемого в Муршидабаде к навабу, его кузен Саукат Джанг, наваб Пурнии, счел этот момент благоприятным для возобновления своих притязаний, и в начале октября Сирадж-уд-Даула, услышав о его замышляемом мятеже, вторгся в его владения.
"Every one longed for a change, and many flattered
themselves it would take place. In fact, it was the most
favourable opportunity to procure it. The result would have
been happiness and tranquillity for Bengal. Whilst contributing
to the general good—which even the Dutch might
have interested themselves in—we could have prevented
the misfortunes which have since happened to us. Three or
four hundred Europeans and a few sepoys would have done
the business. If we could have joined this force to the
enemies of Siraj-ud-daula we should have placed on the
throne another Nawab—not, indeed, one wholly to our taste,
but, not to worry about trifles, one to the liking of the house
of Jagat Seth,[79] and the chief Moors and Rajas. I am sure
such a Nawab would have kept his throne. The English
would have been re-established peaceably, they would certainly
have received some compensation, and would have had
to be satisfied whether they liked it or not. The neutrality of
the Ganges assured, at least to the same extent as in the time
of Aliverdi Khan, the English would have been prevented
from invading Bengal, and from sending thither the reinforcements
which had contributed so much to their success
on the Madras Coast. All this depended on us, but how
could we foresee the succession of events which has been as
contrary to us as it has been favourable to the English? As
it was, we remained quiet, and the rash valour of the young
Nawab of Purneah, whilst it delivered Siraj-ud-daula from
the only enemy he had to fear in the country, made it clear
to the whole of Bengal that the change so much desired
could be effected only by the English."
Мир Джафар и другие военачальники армии наваба уже собирались объявить о поддержке Сауката Джанга, когда Рамнараин [80], наиб Патны, прибыл на помощь Сирадж-уд-Дауле. Пока мятежники колебались, не зная, как поступить, Саукат Джанг предпринял опрометчивую атаку на армию наваба и был застрелен в ходе боя.
"Behold him then, freed by this event from all his
inquietudes; detested, it is true, but feared even by those
who only knew him by name. In a country where predestination
has so much power over the mind, the star of
Siraj-ud-daula was, people said, predominant. Nothing could
resist him. He was himself persuaded of this. Sure of the
good fortune which protected him, he abandoned himself
more than ever to those passions which urged him to the
commission of every imaginable form of violence.
"It can be guessed what we had to suffer, we and the
Dutch, at Cossimbazar. Demand followed demand, and insult
followed insult, on the part of the native officers and soldiers;
for they, forming their behaviour on that of their master,
thought they could not sufficiently show their contempt for
everything European. We could not go outside of our Factories
without being exposed to annoyance of one kind or another."
Все в стране устремили полные надежды взоры на англичан, но те оставались бездействующими в Фулте, и казалось, что помощь из Мадраса никогда не придет. Англичане поэтому попытались совершить в Муршидабаде выгодный для себя переворот и стали искать людей, которых можно было бы склонить к его осуществлению; однако это было непросто, поскольку мавры-аристократы мало знали европейцев. Что же касается индусов в Бенгалии, то —
"the best informed were the bankers and merchants, who
by their commercial correspondence had been in a position
to learn many things. The house of Jagat Seth, for instance,
was likely to help the English all the more because to its
knowledge of them it joined several causes of complaint
against Siraj-ud-daula. Up to the death of Aliverdi Khan
it had always enjoyed the greatest respect. It was this
family which had conducted almost all his financial business,
and it may be said that it had long been the chief cause of
all the revolutions in Bengal. But now things were much
changed. Siraj-ud-daula, the most inconsiderate of men,
never supposing that he would need the assistance of mere
bankers, or that he could ever have any reason to fear them,
never showed them the slightest politeness. He wanted
their wealth, and some day or other it was certain he would
seize it. These bankers, then, were the persons to serve the
English. They could by themselves have formed a party,
and, even without the assistance of any Europeans, have
put another Nawab upon the throne and re-established the
English, but this would have required much time. Business
moves very slowly amongst Indians, and this would not have
suited the English. The bankers also were Hindus, and of
a race which does not like to risk danger. To stimulate
them to action it was necessary for the English to commence
operations and achieve some initial successes, and as yet
there seemed no likelihood of their doing so. To negotiate
with Siraj-ud-daula for a peaceful re-establishment was quite
as difficult, unless they were inclined to accept the very
hardest conditions, for the Nawab had now the most extravagant
contempt for all Europeans; a pair of slippers, he
said, is all that is needed to govern them."
Как раз в тот момент, когда казалось, что англичанам придется покориться условиям наваба, они получили известие об отправке подкреплений из Мадраса. Примерно тогда же как французам, так и англичанам стало известно, что в мае предшествовавшего года Франция и Англия объявили друг другу войну [81]. Англичане, разумеется, ничего об этом не упоминали, а французы слишком жаждали увидеть наваба основательно разбитым, чтобы чинить им какие-либо ненужные препятствия. Переговоры с друзьями европейцев в Муршидабаде тихо продолжались до прибытия адмирала Уотсона и полковника Клайва. После этого последовало стремительное продвижение к Калькупте, которая была взята почти без сопротивления.
Сирадж-уд-Даула был настолько мало встревожен отвоеванием Калькутты, что французы думали, будто все завершится мирным путем; однако, возможно, из-за репутации Уотсона и Клайва, столь долго воевавших против французов [82], они полагали вероятным, что если англичане потребуют компенсации за свои убытки, наваб позволит им возместить их путем захвата французских факторий. Поэтому господин Рено написал Ло с тем, чтобы убедиться: в любой договор между навабом и англичанами будет внесена статья, предусматривающая нейтралитет Ганга; но французы на тот момент тревожились понапрасну. Англичане не собирались тихонько возвращаться в страну. Уотсон и Клайв обратились к навабу с надменными письмами, требуя возмещения за причиненные англичанам обиды; а адмирал и Совет объявили войну от имени короля и Компании. Это, возможно, позабавило наваба, который оставил их письма без внимания; однако все изменилось, когда небольшой английский отряд поднялся по Хугли, прошел мимо Шандернагора без сопротивления со стороны французов, захватил форт Хугли, сжег города Хугли [83] и Бандел и опустошил оба берега реки вплоть до Калькупты. Французы оказались в неловком положении. Англичане прошли мимо Шандернагора без салюта, что являлось недружелюбным, если не враждебным актом; в то же время наваб считал, что раз французы по ним не стреляли, значит, они состоят с ними в союзе. Ло пришлось принять на себя всю тяжесть этих подозрений. Здравый смысл подсказывал ему, что англичане никогда не согласятся на нейтралитет, и он написал Рено, что присоединение к маврам абсолютно необходимо.
"The neutrality was by no means obligatory, as no treaty
existed. In fact, what confidence could we have in a forced
neutrality, which had been observed so long only out of
fear of the Nawab, who for the general good of the country
was unwilling to allow any act of hostility to be committed
by the Europeans? Much more so when the English were
at war with the Nawab himself. If they managed to get
the better of him, what would become of this fear, the sole
foundation of the neutrality?"
Итак, Ло написал Рено, умоляя его — если он не может сразу убедить англичан подписать договор о нейтралитете — принять решение и присоединиться к навабу. Мы уже видели, почему Рено не мог сделать ни того, ни другого, и Ло, рассуждая задним числом, пишет с достаточным великодушием: —
"I am bound to respect the reasons which determined
M. Renault as well as the gentlemen of the Council, who
were all much too good citizens not to have kept constantly
in their minds the welfare of our nation and the Company.
People always do see things differently, and the event does
not always prove the correctness or incorrectness of the
reasons which have decided us to take one or the other course."
Как только наваб услышал о грабеже Хугли, он выступил к Калькутте, но для отвода глаз англичанам попросил господина Рено выступить посредником между ними. Отказ англичан вести переговоры через французов привел к прояснению отношений между последними и навабом; однако он никак не мог взять в толк, почему французы не хотят оказывать ему активную содействия. Убедившись в любом случае, что ему приходится иметь дело исключительно с одними англичанами, он по глупости сыграл им на руку, выступив сражаться с ними на их собственной территории, в то время как, оставайся он бездеятельным на некотором расстоянии и просто запрещая подвоз провизии, он мог бы уморить их голодом и выбить из Калькупты за несколько месяцев. Как я уже говорил ранее, Клайв атаковал его лагерь 5 февраля и до того перепугал его, что он согласился на позорный мир, в котором забыл упомянуть о нейтралитете Ганга. Ло рассказывает любопытную историю о том, что больше всего наваба испугало письмо адмирала Уотсона, в котором тот угрожал взять его в плен и увезти в Англию. Письмо Уотсона сохранилось и не содержит подобных угроз, но вполне возможно, что навабу оно было истолковано именно так.
Хотя наваб заверил англичан, что у него будут те же друзья и враги, что и у них, и не упомянул французов в договоре, теперь он по собственной воле отдал французам все то, что англичане исторгли из него силой. Этот поступок невозможно было сохранить в тайне.
"A great fault at present, and which has always existed,
in the management of affairs in India, especially in Bengal,
is that nothing is secret. Scarcely had the Nawab formed
any project when it was known to the lowest of his slaves.
The English, who were suspicious, and who had for friends
every one who was an enemy of Siraj-ud-daula, whom all
detested, were soon informed of his proposals to M. Renault
and of the letters written on both sides."
И все же Ло считает, что лишь европейская война и опасения, будто Рено замышляет союз с навабом, побудили англичан пойти на крайние меры:
"The dethronement of the Nawab had become an absolute
necessity. To drive us out of Bengal was only a preliminary
piece of work. A squadron of ours with considerable forces
might arrive. Siraj-ud-daula might join his forces to it.
What, then, would become of the English? They needed
for Nawab a man attached to their interests. Besides, this
revolution was not so difficult to carry out as one might
imagine. With Chandernagore destroyed, nothing could be
more easy; but even if we were left alone the revolution
could have been effected by the junction of the English with
the forces which would have been produced against Siraj-ud-daula
by the crowd of enemies whom he had, and amongst
whom were to be counted the most respectable persons in
the three provinces.[84] This statement demands an explanation.
I have already spoken of the house of Jagat Seth, or
rather of its chiefs, who are named Seth Mahtab Rai and Seth
Sarup Chand, bankers of the Mogul, the richest and most
powerful merchants who have ever lived. They are, I can
say, the movers of the revolution. Without them the English
would never have carried out what they have. I have
already said they were not pleased with Siraj-ud-daula, who
did not show them the same respect as the old Nawab
Aliverdi Khan had done; but the arrival of the English
forces, the capture of the Moorish forts, and the fright of
the Nawab before Calcutta, had made a change which was
apparently in their favour. The Nawab began to perceive
that the bankers were necessary to him. The English
would have no one except them as mediators, and so they
had become, as it were, responsible for the behaviour of
both the Nawab and the English. Accordingly after the
Peace there was nothing but kindness and politeness from
the Nawab towards them, and he consulted them in everything.
At the bottom this behaviour of his was sheer
trickery. The Seths were persuaded that the Nawab who
hated the English must also dislike the persons whom the
English employed. Profiting by the hatred which the
Nawab had drawn on himself by his violence, and distributing
money judiciously, they had long since gained over
those who were nearest to the Nawab, whose imprudence
always enabled them to know what he had in his heart.
From what came to the knowledge of the Seths it was easy
to guess what he intended, and this made them tremble, for
it was nothing less than their destruction, which could be
averted only by his own. The cause of the English had
become that of the Seths; their interests were identical. Can
one be surprised to see them acting in concert? Further,
when one remembers that it was this same house of bankers
that overthrew Sarfaraz Khan[85] to enthrone Aliverdi Khan,
and who, during the reign of the latter, had the management
of all important business, one must confess that it ought not
to be difficult for persons of so much influence to execute a
project in which, the English were taking a share."[86]
Ло не смог убедить Рено действовать, и без этого шансы на успех были практически потеряны. Тем не менее он упорно трудился над созданием французской партии при дворе. Через Коджу Ваджида, армянского купца из Хугли, имущество которого было разграблено англичанами, он добился аудиенции у наваба и убедил его отправить 2000 солдат, находившихся с Рено в начале осады. Было бы отправлено и больше, если бы не кажущаяся неизбежность подписания договора о нейтралитете. На самом деле Рено был так встревожен тем, что после жалоб Уотсона и Клайва на то, что Ло настраивает наваба против англичан, он написал Ло письмо, из-за которого тот попросил об отзове из Кассимбазара; и лишь по настоятельной просьбе Рено он согласился остаться на своем посту. Ло продолжал формировать свою партию.
"It would appear from the English memoirs that we
corrupted the whole Durbar at Murshidabad to our side by
presents and lies. I might with justice retort this reproach.
As a matter of fact, except Siraj-ud-daula himself, one may
say the English had the whole Durbar always in their
favour. Without insisting on this point, let us honestly
agree, since the English themselves confess it, that we were,
like them, much engaged in opposing corruption to corruption
in order to gain the friendship of scoundrels so as to
place ourselves on equal terms with our enemies. This has
always happened, and ought not to cause surprise in a Court
where right counts for nothing and, every other motive apart,
one can never be successful except by the weight of what
one puts in the balance of iniquity. For the rest, right
or wrong, it is certain that the English were always in a
position to put in more than we could.
"Fear and greed are the two chief motives of Indian
minds. Everything depends on one or the other. Often
they are combined towards the same object, but, when they
are opposed, fear always conquers. A proof of this is easily
to be seen in all the events connected with, the revolution
in Bengal. When, in 1756, Siraj-ud-daula determined to
expel the English, fear and greed combined to make him
act. As soon as he had himself proved the superiority of
the English troops, fear took the upper hand in his mind,
grew stronger day by day, and soon put him in a condition
in which he was unable to follow, and often even to see, his
true interests.
"I mention the Nawab first. His hatred for the English
certainly indicated friendship for us. I think so myself, but
we have seen what was his character and his state of mind
in general. I ask, in all good faith, whether we could expect
any advantage from his friendship? This person, cowed by
fear, irresolute and imprudent, could he alone be of any use
to us? It was necessary for him to be supported by some
one who had his confidence and was capable by his own
firmness of fixing the irresolution of the Prince.
"Mohan Lal, chief Diwan of Siraj-ud-daula, was this
man, the greatest scoundrel the earth has ever borne, worthy
minister of such a master, and yet, in truth, the only person
who was really attached to him. He had firmness and also
sufficient judgment to understand that the ruin of Siraj-ud-daula
must necessarily bring on his own. He was as much,
detested as his master. The sworn enemy of the Seths, and
capable of holding his own against them, I think those
bankers would not have succeeded so easily in their project
if he had been free to act, but, unfortunately for us, he had
been for some time, and was at this most critical moment
dangerously ill. He could not leave his house. I went to
see him twice with Siraj-ud-daula, but it was not possible to
get a word from him. There is strong reason to believe he
had been poisoned. Owing to this, Siraj-ud-daula saw himself
deprived of his only support.
"Coja Wajid, who had introduced me to the Nawab, and
who, it would be natural to suppose, was our patron, was a