«Конституция Соединенных Штатов Америки: Анализ и толкование»

Пункт 3. Упомянутые выше сенаторы и представители, а также члены законодательных органов различных штатов и все должностные лица исполнительных и судебных органов, как Соединенных Штатов, так и различных штатов, должны быть связаны присягой или торжественным заявлением с целью поддержки настоящей Конституции; при этом никаких религиозных испытаний никогда не должно требоваться в качестве квалификационного требования для занятия какой-либо должности или для отправления какой-либо общественной доверенной функции под эгидой Соединенных Штатов.

Присяга при вступлении в должность

ПОЛНОМОЧИЯ КОНГРЕССА В ОТНОШЕНИИ ПРИСЯГ

Конгресс не может требовать никакой иной присяги на верность Конституции, но он может добавлять к этой присяге такую другую должностную присягу, какая потребуется по его усмотрению [106]. Однако он не может предписывать присягу об отсутствии политической неблагонадежности (test oath) в качестве ценза для замещения должности, поскольку такой акт по сути является законом обратной силы (ex post facto law) [107]; то же правило действует и в отношении штатов [108].

НАЦИОНАЛЬНЫЕ ОБЯЗАННОСТИ ДОЛЖНОСТНЫХ ЛИЦ ШТАТОВ

Комментируя в «Федералисте» № 27 требование о том, чтобы должностные лица штатов, а также члены легислатур штатов были связаны присягой или торжественным заявлением для поддержания настоящей Конституции, Гамильтон писал: «Таким образом, легислатуры, суды и магистраты соответствующих субъектов будут вплетены в деятельность национального правительства в той мере, в какой простирается его справедливая и конституционная власть; и оно окажется вспомогательным инструментом для обеспечения исполнения его законов». Младший Пинкни выразил ту же мысль с трибуны Филадельфийского конвента: «Они [штаты] являются теми инструментами, от которых Союз должен часто зависеть для поддержки и осуществления своих полномочий, * * *» [109]. Действительно, сама Конституция возлагает множество обязанностей, как позитивных, так и негативных, на различные органы управления штатов [110], и Конгресс может часто добавлять другие, при условии, что он не требует от властей штатов действовать вне пределов их обычной юрисдикции. Раннее законодательство Конгресса содержит множество иллюстраций подобных действий со стороны Конгресса.

Судебный акт 1789 года [111] оставил за судами штатов исключительную юрисдикцию над значительной частью споров между гражданами разных штатов и параллельную юрисдикцию над остальными. Другими разделами этого же акта суды штатов уполномочивались рассматривать производства, инициируемые самими Соединенными Штатами с целью взыскания штрафов и конфискаций на основании налогового законодательства, в то время как любой мировой судья или другой магистрат любого из штатов уполномочивался обеспечивать арест и заключение под стражу или освобождение под залог любого правонарушителя против Соединенных Штатов в соответствии с обычным порядком судопроизводства. Даже в 1839 году Конгресс уполномочил возбуждать иски по всем денежным штрафам и конфискациям по законам Соединенных Штатов перед любым судом компетентной юрисдикции в штате, где возникло основание иска или где мог быть обнаружен правонарушитель [112]. Следуя той же идее рассмотрения правительственных органов штатов в качестве доступных Национальному правительству для административных целей, акт 1793 года возложил возвращение беглых рабов частично на национальных должностных лиц и частично на должностных лиц штатов, а возвращение беглецов от правосудия из одного штата в другой — исключительно на высших должностных лиц исполнительной власти штатов [113]. Определенные более поздние акты наделяли суды штатов полномочиями рассматривать уголовные преследования за подделку бумаг Банка Соединенных Штатов и фальсификацию монеты Соединенных Штатов [114], в то время как другие наделяли судьей штатов полномочиями принимать иностранцев в национальное гражданство и предусматривали штрафные санкции в случае выдачи такими судьями фальшивых свидетельств о натурализации — положения, которые до сих пор содержатся в своде статутов [115].

С зарождением доктрины прав штатов и равного суверенитета штатов с Национальным правительством доступность первых в качестве инструментов последнего при осуществлении его власти подверглась сомнению [116]. В деле «Пригг против Пенсильвании» [117], разрешенном в 1842 году, оспаривалась конституционность положения акта 1793 года, предписывающего магистратам штатов действовать при возвращении беглых рабов; а в деле «Кентукки против Деннисона» [118], рассмотренном накануне Гражданской войны, аналогичное возражение было выдвинуто против положения того же акта, которое делало «обязанностью» высшего должностного лица исполнительной власти штата выдать беглеца от правосудия по требованию высшего должностного лица исполнительной власти штата, из которого беглец скрылся. Суд поддержал оба положения, но исходя из той теории, что сотрудничество властей штата носит чисто добровольный характер. В деле Пригга Суд в изложении судьи Стори заявил: «* * * магистраты штатов могут по своему усмотрению осуществлять полномочия [предоставленные актом], если это не запрещено законодательством штата» [119]. В деле Деннисона «обязанность» высших должностных лиц исполнительной власти штатов по выдаче беглецов от правосудия была истолкована как декларация «моральной обязанности». Главный судья Тэни заявил от имени Суда: «Акт не предусматривает никаких средств принуждения к исполнению этой обязанности и не устанавливает какого-либо наказания за пренебрежение ею или отказ со стороны исполнительной власти штата; нет также в Конституции какой-либо статьи или положения, которые вооружали бы Правительство Соединенных Штатов этой властью. Действительно, такая власть поставила бы каждый штат под контроль и господство Генерального правительства даже в вопросах управления его внутренними делами и зарезервированными правами. И мы считаем очевидным, что Федеральное правительство по Конституции не имеет полномочий налагать на должностное лицо штата как таковое какую бы то ни было обязанность и принуждать его к ее исполнению; ибо если бы оно обладало этой властью, оно могло бы перегрузить должностное лицо обязанностями, которые заполнили бы все его время и лишили бы его возможности выполнять свои обязательства перед штатом, а также могло бы наложить на него обязанности характера, несовместимого с тем рангом и достоинством, до которых оно было возвышено штатом. Правда, — признал главный судья, — в первые дни существования Правительства Конгресс с уверенностью полагался на сотрудничество и поддержку штатов при осуществлении законных полномочий Генерального правительства и привык получать их, [но это, пояснил он,] на принципах вежливости и из чувства взаимного и общего интереса, когда никакой подобной обязанности не было возложено Конституцией» [120].

Восемнадцать лет спустя в деле «Ех parte Зибольд» [121] Суд подтвердил право Конгресса на основании статьи I, раздела 4, параграфа 1 Конституции возлагать обязанности на должностных лиц штатов по проведению выборов в связи с выборами в Конгресс и устанавливать дополнительные наказания за нарушение такими должностными лицами своих обязанностей по закону штата. Хотя доктрина этого решения прямо ограничивается случаями, в которых Национальное правительство и штаты обладают «параллельными полномочиями в отношении одного и того же предмета», никаких попыток составить каталог таких случаев не предпринимается. Более того, взгляд судьи Брэдли, выраженный в мнении от имени Суда, носит решительно националистический, а не дуалистический характер, что подтверждается ответом на довод адвокатов о том, «что природа суверенитета такова, что исключает совместное сотрудничество двух суверенов, даже в вопросе, в котором они взаимно заинтересованы». На это судья Брэдли ответил: «Как общее правило, несомненно, целесообразно и разумно, чтобы деятельность государственного и национального правительств, насколько это практически возможно, осуществлялась раздельно во избежание излишнего соперничества, трений и конфликтов юрисдикций и полномочий. Но нет никаких оснований возводить это в правило универсального применения. Оно никогда не должно использоваться для преодоления прямых и очевидных велений самой Конституции. Мы не можем поддаться столь трансцендентальному взгляду на суверенитет штата. Конституция и законы Соединенных Штатов являются высшим законом страны, и им повинуется каждый гражданин каждого штата, выступает ли он в своем индивидуальном или официальном качестве» [122]. Тремя годами ранее Суд, также устами судьи Брэдли, поддержал положение Закона о банкротстве 1867 года, предоставляющее управляющим имуществом право обращаться с исками в суды штатов для взыскания активов банкрота. Суд заявил: Статуты Соединенных Штатов являются в любом штате в такой же степени законом страны, как и законы самого штата; и хотя исключительная юрисдикция для их применения может быть предоставлена федеральным судам, тем не менее, когда она не предоставлена ни прямо, ни в силу необходимости, суды штата, обладающие в иных отношениях надлежащей юрисдикцией, могут быть задействованы [123].

Закон о выборочной воинской повинности 1917 года [124] в значительной степени приводился в исполнение через «служащих» штатов, «которые функционировали под надзором штатов» [125]; а должностные лица штатов часто задействовались Национальным правительством при обеспечении Национального судимого сухого закона [126]. В настоящее время как в мирное, так и в военное время во многих сферах осуществляется постоянное сотрудничество между национальными и государственными должностными лицами и официальными органами [127]. Эти отношения очевидно требуют активной верности обеих категорий должностных лиц Конституции.

Примечания

[1] О верховенстве международных договоров над противоречащим им правом штатов см. стр. 414–418. Верховенство, обусловленное международными договорами, в последние годы было распространено на определенные соглашения исполнительной власти. См. мнение судьи Дугласа по делу «Соединенные Штаты против Пинк», 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Что касается верховенства законодательства Конгресса, реализующего национальную судебную власть, см. «Теннесси против Дэвиса», 100 U.S. 257, 266–267 (1880); и «Ex parte Зибольд», 100 U.S. 404 (1880).

[2] 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). Маршалл предвосхитил свои аргументы по этому делу в 1805 году по делу «Соединенные Штаты против Фишера», 2 Cr. 358 (1805), в котором он поддержал акт 1797 года, провозглашавший для Соединенных Штатов приоритет их требований над требованиями штатов. См. мнение главного судьи Тафта по делу «Округ Спокан против Соединенных Штатов», 279 U.S. 80, 87 (1929), где дело «Соединенные Штаты против Фишера» принято в качестве прецедента; а также 1 Warren, Supreme Court in United States History, 372, 538 ff.

[3] 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).

[4] 4 Wheat. 316, 436 (1819).

[5] 9 Wheat. 1, 210–211 (1824).

[6] 11 Pet. 102 (1837).

[7] Ibid. 139.

[8] Ibid. 161.

[9] 5 How. 504 (1847).

[10] Ibid. 573–574.

[11] National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).

[12] Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).

[13] United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); see especially ibid. 113-124.

[14] Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 170 (1942); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); см. также Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 380, 391 (1947); Francis v. Southern Pacific Co. 333 U.S. 445 (1918); и Bus Employers v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.S. 383 (1951).

[15] Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 825 U.S. 761 (1945); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Auto Workers v. Wis. Board, 336 U.S. 245, 253 (1949); United States v. Burnison, 339 U.S. 87, 91–92 (1950).

[16] Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276, 283 (1899).

[17] Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).

[18] Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 451 (1931).

[19] 9 Wall. 353 (1870).

[20] Ibid. 362.

[21] 161 U.S. 275 (1896).

[22] Ibid. 283.

[23] Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U.S. 413 (1894).

[24] Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56 (1920).

[25] Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n., 318 U.S. 261 (1943).

[26] Pacific Coast Dairy v. Dept. of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943).

[27] Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 335 (1816).

[28] 93 U.S. 130 (1876).

[29] Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 335 (1816).

[30] 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876).

[31] Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 57 (1912).

[32] 330 U.S. 386 (1947).

[33] Ibid. 393.

[34] Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, 523 (1859), followed in United States v. Tarble, 13 Wall. 397 (1872).

[35] Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880); see also Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 36 (1926).

[36] 135 U.S. 1 (1890).

[37] Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454, 461 (1878).

[38] White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443, 450 (1868). См. также Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 197 (1870); Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U.S. 193, 195 (1878).

[39] Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 604 (1878); United States v. Keehler, 9 Wall. 83, 86 (1870).

[40] Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 726 (1869).

[41] Ibid. 733. См. также Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall. 570, 580 (1873); Thomas v. Richmond, 12 Wall. 349, 357 (1871); White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (1872); United States v. Home Ins. Co., 22 Wall. 99 (1875); Taylor v. Thomas, 22 Wall. 479 (1875); и Huntington v. Texas, 16 Wall. 402 (1873).

[42] 9 Wheat. 788 (1924).

[43] Ibid. 865.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid. 866.

[46] Ibid. 867.

[47] 2 Pet. 449 (1829), принято в качестве прецедента в New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce v. Comrs. of Taxes and Assessments, 2 Bl. 620 (1863).

[48] 12 Stat. 710 (1863).

[49] 31 U.S.C. § 742 (1946).

[50] 7 Wall. 26 (1869).

[51] Hibernia Sav. & L. Soc. v. San Francisco, 200 U.S. 310, 315 (1906).

[52] Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111 (1944).

[53] Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 12 (1928).

[54] Northwestern Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, 140 (1927).

[55] Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927).

[56] Provident Inst. for Savings v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611 (1868); Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (1868); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632 (1868); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890).

[57] Macallen v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 625 (1929).

[58] Northwestern Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136 (1927).

[59] 9 Wheat. 738 (1824).

[60] Ibid. 867.

[61] 302 U.S. 134 (1937).

[62] Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931).

[63] Trinityfarm Const. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934).

[64] Atkinson v. Tax Commission, 303 U.S. 20 (1938).

[65] Superior Bath House Co. v. McCarroll, 312 U.S. 176 (1941).

[66] Buckstaff Bath House v. McKinley, 308 U.S. 358 (1939).

[67] Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938).

[68] Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), overruling Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) and Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936). See also Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941).

[69] Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946).

[70] 306 U.S. 466 (1939), followed in State Tax Comm'n. v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511 (1939). This case overruled by implication Dobbins v. Erie County, 16 Pet. 435 (1842) and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937), which held the income of federal employees to be immune from State taxation.

[71] 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939).

[72] Ibid. 492.

[73] 4 Wheat. 316, 426 (1819).

[74] Thompson v. Union P.R. Co., 9 Wall. 579, 588 (1870); Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 31 (1873).

[75] Susquehanna Power Co. v. State Tax Comm'n., 283 U.S. 291 (1931).

[76] Baltimore Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U.S. 375 (1904).

[77] Northern P.R. Co. v. Myers, 172 U.S. 589 (1899); New Brunswick v. United States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928).

[78] Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219 (1922).

[79] United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).

[80] 117 U.S. 151 (1886).

[81] Lee v. Osceola & L. River Road Improv. Dist, 268 U.S. 643 (1925).

[82] Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923). See also Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329, 333 (1945).

[83] Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943).

[84] Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 464 (1882).

[85] Des Moines Nat. Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899); First Nat. Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S. 362 (1922).

[86] Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Comm'n., 297 U.S. 209 (1936).

[87] Maricopa County v. Valley National Bank, 318 U.S. 357, 362 (1943).

[88] 308 U.S. 21 (1939).

[89] 314 U.S. 95 (1941).

[90] Ibid. 101.

[91] Ibid. 102; cf. 9 Wheat. 738, 864-865 (1824).

[92] Colorado Nat. Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 (1940).

[93] 342 U.S. 232 (1952).

[94] 60 Stat. 765; 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (b).

[95] 342 U.S. 232, 234.

[96] Ibid. 236.

[97] Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).

[98] 286 U.S. 123 (1932).

[99] Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931).

[100] 235 U.S. 292 (1944).

[101] Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916).

[102] Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1918); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U.S. 549 (1919).

[103] 257 U.S. 501 (1922).

[104] Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Barnsdall Refiners, 296 U.S. 521 (1936).

[105] 330 U.S. 342 (1949). Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court, sketched the history of the immunity of lessees of Indian lands from State taxation, which he found to stem from early rulings that tribal lands are themselves immune (The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737 (1867); The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761 (1867)). One of the first steps taken to curtail the scope of the immunity was Shaw v. Gibson-Zahniser Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928), which held that lands outside a reservation, though purchased with restricted Indian funds, were subject to State taxation. Congress soon upset the decision, however, and its act was sustained in Board of County Comm'rs v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943).

[106] McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 416 (1819).

[107] Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 337 (1867).

[108] Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 323 (1867).

[109] The Federalist No. 27, p. 123; I Farrand Records, 404.

[110] See Article I, Section III, Paragraph 1 ; Section IV, Paragraph 1 ; Section X ; Article II, Section I, Paragraph 2 ; Article III, Section II, Paragraph 2 ; Article IV, Sections I and II ; Article V ; Amendments XIII , XIV , XV , XVII , and XIX .

[111] 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

[112] 5 Stat. 322 (1839).

[113] 1 Stat. 302 (1793).

[114] 2 Stat. 404 (1806).

[115] See 2 Kent's Commentaries, 64-65 (1826); 34 Stat. 590, 602 (1906); 8 U.S.C. §§ 357, 379; 18 ibid. § 135 (1934); also Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910).

[116] For the development of opinion especially on the part of State courts, adverse to the validity of the above mentioned legislation, see 1 Kent's Commentaries, 396-404 (1826).

[117] 16 Pet. 539 (1842).

[118] 24 How. 66 (1861).

[119] 16 Pet. at 622.

[120] 24 How. at 107-108.

[121] 100 U.S. 371 (1880).

[122] Ibid. 392.

[123] Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136, 137 (1876); followed in Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 55-59 (1912).

[124] 40 Stat. 76 (1917).

[125] Jane Perry Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism, 91 (Columbia University Press, 1938).

[126] See James Hart in 13 Virginia Law Review, 86-107 (1926) discussing President Coolidge's order of May 8, 1926, for Prohibition enforcement.

[127] Clark, New Federalism, cited in note 2 above; Corwin, Court Over Constitution, 148-168 (Princeton University Press, 1938).

ARTICLE VII

RATIFICATION

Article VII

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

IN GENERAL

In Owings v. Speed, [1] the question at issue was whether the Constitution of the United States operated upon an act of Virginia passed in 1788. The Court held it did not, stating in part:

"The Conventions of nine States having adopted the Constitution, Congress, in September or October, 1788, passed a resolution in conformity with the opinions expressed by the Convention, and appointed the first Wednesday in March of the ensuing year as the day, and the then seat of Congress as the place, 'for commencing proceedings under the Constitution.'

"Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same time. The new Government did not commence until the old Government expired. It is apparent that the Government did not commence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing existence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially until the 2d of March, the day preceding that on which the Members of the new Congress were directed to assemble.

"The resolution of the Convention might originally have suggested a doubt, whether the Government could be in operation for every purpose before the choice of a President; but this doubt has been long solved, and were it otherwise, its discussion would be useless, since it is apparent that its operation did not commence before the first Wednesday in March 1789 * * *"

Notes

[1] 5 Wheat. 420, 422-423 (1820).

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1-10

Bill of Rights

Page

History 749

Ordinance of 1787 749

Formulation and adoption of the bill of rights 750

Bill of rights and the States: Barron v. Baltimore 750

Bill of rights and Amendment XIV 750

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENTS NOS. 1-10

Bill of Rights HISTORY: THE ORDINANCE OF 1787

While the Constitutional Convention was engaged in drafting the Constitution, the Congress of the Confederation included in the Ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory, adopted July 13, 1787, the following provisions:

"It is hereby ordained and declared by the authority aforesaid, that the following articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the said territory and forever remain unalterable, unless by common consent, to wit:

"Art. 1. No person, demeaning himself in a peaceable and orderly manner, shall ever be molested on account of his mode of worship or religious sentiments, in the said territory.

"Art. 2. The inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus , and of the trial by jury; of a proportionate representation of the people in the legislature; and of judicial proceedings according to the course of the common law. All persons shall be bailable, unless for capital offenses, where the proof shall be evident or the presumption great. All fines shall be moderate; and no cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted. No man shall be deprived of his liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land; and, should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to demand his particular services, full compensation shall be made for the same. And, in the just preservation of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have force in the said territory, that shall, in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bona fide , and without fraud, previously formed.

"Art. 3. Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.

"Art. 6. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the party shall have been duly convicted: * * *" [1]

FORMULATION AND ADOPTION OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Two months later, at the very end of its labors, the Constitutional Convention rejected, with scant consideration, a proposal by Gerry and Mason, to prepare a bill of rights. [2] This omission furnished the principal argument urged against ratification of the Constitution. Hamilton replied with the following ingenious argument: "* * * bills of rights are in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince. * * * It is evident, therefore, that according to their primitive signification, they have no application to the constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immediate representatives and eservants. Here, in strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain everything, they have no need of particular reservations." [3]

The people did not find this line of reasoning persuasive. Several States ratified only after Washington put forward the suggestion that the desired guarantees could be added by amendment. [4] No less than 124 amendments were proposed by the States. [5] Shortly after the First Congress convened, Madison introduced a series of amendments, [6] designed "to quiet the apprehension of many, that without some such declaration of rights the government would assume, and might be held to possess, the power to trespass upon those rights of persons and property which by the Declaration of Independence were affirmed to be unalienable * * *" [7] After prolonged debate seventeen proposals were accepted by the House two of which were rejected by the Senate. The remainder were reduced to twelve in number, all but two of which were ratified by the requisite number of States. [8]

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE STATES: BARRON v. BALTIMORE

One of the amendments which the Senate refused to accept—the one which Madison declared to be "the most valuable of the whole list" [9] —read as follows: "The equal rights of conscience, the freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by jury in criminal cases, shall not be infringed by any State." [10] The demand for assurance of these rights against encroachment by the States would not die. In spite of the deliberate rejection of Madison's proposal the contention that the first Ten Amendments were applicable to the States was repeatedly pressed upon the Supreme Court. By a long series of decisions, beginning with the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Baltimore [11] in 1833, the argument was consistently rejected. Nevertheless the enduring vitality of natural law concepts encouraged renewed appeals for judicial protection. Expression such as the statement of Justice Miller in Citizens Savings and Loan Association v. Topeka that: "It must be conceded that there are * * * rights in every free government beyond the control of the States" [12] probably account for the fact, reported by Charles Warren that: "In at least twenty cases between 1877 and 1907, the Court was required to rule upon this point and to reaffirm Marshall's decision of 1833, * * *" [13]

THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND AMENDMENT XIV

After the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a fresh attack was launched on that front. The rights assured against encroachment by the Federal Government were claimed as privileges and immunities which no State may deny to any citizen. [14] As early as 1884 the further contention was made that the procedural safeguards prescribed by these articles are essential ingredients of due process of law. [15] For many years, the Court continued to reject these arguments also, over the vigorous and prophetic dissents of Justice Harlan. With respect to the due process clause it held that these words have the same meaning in the Fourteenth Amendment as in the Fifth, and hence do not embrace the other rights more specifically enumerated in the latter, there being no superfluous language in the Constitution. [16] In 1897, however, it retreated from this position to the extent of holding that the Fifth Amendment's explicit guarantee against the taking of private property without just compensation is included in the due process clause of the Fourteenth. [17] Later cases have established that the terms, "liberty" and "due process of law" as used in Amendment XIV, render available against the States certain fundamental rights guaranteed accused persons in the Bill of Rights [18] and the substantive rights which are protected against Congress by Amendment I. [19]

Notes

[1] 1 Stat. 51 n.

[2] Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, V, 538 (1836).

[3] The Federalist No. 84.

[4] McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States, 203 (1936).

[5] Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution, 19 (1896).

[6] Annals of Congress, I, 424, 433.

[7] Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 324 (1893).

[8] Ames, op. cit., 184, 185 (1896).

[9] Annals of Congress, 1, 755.

[10] Ibid.

[11] 7 Pet. 243 (1833); Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 7 Pet. 469 (1833); Permoli v. New Orleans, 3 How. 589, 609 (1845); Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847); Smith v. Maryland, 18 How. 71 (1855); Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84 (1858); Pervear v. Massachusetts, 5 Wall. 475 (1867); Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 7 Wall. 321 (1869).

[12] 20 Wall. 655, 669 (1875).

[13] Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 Harv. L. Rev., 431, 436 (1926).

[14] Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1873); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).

[15] Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).

[16] Ibid. 534, 535.

[17] Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).

[18] See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947).

[19] See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 288 (1952).

AMENDMENT 1

RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC.

Page

Absorption of Amendment I into the Fourteenth Amendment 757

"An establishment of religion" 758

"No preference" doctrine 758

"Wall of separation" doctrine 759

Zorach Case 762

Permissible monetary aids to religion 763

Free exercise of religion; dimensions 764

Parochial schools 765

Free exercise of religion; federal restraints 765

Free exercise of religion; State and local restraints 766

Free exercise of religion; obligations of citizenship 768

Freedom of speech and press 769

Blackstonian background 769

Effect of Amendment I on the common law 769

Amendment XIV and Blackstone 771

Clear and present danger rule, meaning 772

Contrasting operation of the common law rule 772

Emergence of the clear and present test 773

Gitlow and Whitney Cases 775

Acceptance of the clear and present danger test 777

Police power and clear and present danger 777

Public order 777

Public morals 779

Picketing and clear and present danger 781

Contempt of court and clear and present danger 783

Freedom of speech and press in public parks and streets 784

Censorship 786

Clear and present danger test: judicial diversities 788

Taxation 792

Federal restraints on freedom of speech and press 792

Regulations of Business and Labor Activities 792

Regulation of political activities of federal employees 793

Legislative protection of the armed forces and the war power 794

Loyalty regulations: The Douds Case 794

The Case of the Eleven Communists 795

Subversive organizations 801

Recent state legislation 801

Loyalty tests 801

Group libel 802

Censorship of the mails 804

Rights of assembly and petition 805

Restraints on the right of petition 806

The Cruikshank Case 807

Hague v. C.I.O. 808

Recent cases 809

Lobbying and the right of petition 810

RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC.

Amendment 1

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Absorption of Amendment I Into the Fourteenth Amendment

Eventually the long sought protection for certain substantive personal rights was obtained by identifying them with the "liberty" which States can take away without due process of law. The shift in the Court's point of view was made known quite casually in Gitlow v. New York, [1] where, although affirming a conviction for violation of a State statute prohibiting the advocacy of criminal anarchy, it declared that: "For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." [2] This dictum became, two years later, accepted doctrine when the Court invalidated a State law on the ground that it abridged freedom of speech contrary to the due process clause of Amendment XIV. [3] Subsequent decisions have brought the other rights safeguarded by the First Amendment, freedom of religion, [4] freedom of the press, [5] and the right of peaceable assembly, [6] within the protection of the Fourteenth. In consequence of this development the cases dealing with the safeguarding of these rights against infringement by the States are included in the ensuing discussion of the First Amendment.

An Establishment of Religion

THE "NO PREFERENCE" DOCTRINE

The original proposal leading to the First Amendment was introduced into the House of Representatives by James Madison, and read as follows: "The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretence, infringed." [7] This was altered in the House to read: "Congress shall make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to infringe the rights of conscience." [8] In the Senate the above formula was replaced by the following; "Congress shall make no law establishing articles of religion." [9] The conference committee of the two houses adopted the House proposal, but with the neutral term "respecting an establishment," etc., taking the place of the original sweeping ban against any law "establishing religion." [10] Explaining this phraseology, in his Commentaries, Story asserted that the purpose of the amendment was not to discredit the then existing State establishments of religion, but rather "to exclude from the National Government all power to act on the subject." He wrote: "The situation, * * *, of the different States equally proclaimed the policy as well as the necessity of such an exclusion. In some of the States, episcopalians constituted the predominant sect; in others, presbyterians; in others, congregationalists; in others, quakers; and in others again, there was a close numerical rivalry among contending sects. It was impossible that there should not arise perpetual strife and perpetual jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendency, if the national government were left free to create a religious establishment. The only security was in extirpating the power. But this alone would have been an imperfect security, if it had not been followed up by a declaration of the right of the free exercise of religion, and a prohibition (as we have seen) of all religious tests. Thus, the whole power over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the State governments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice and the State constitutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Calvinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at the common table of the national councils without any inquisition into their faith or mode of worship." [11]

For the rest, Story contended, the no establishment clause, while it inhibited Congress from giving preference to any denomination of the Christian faith, was not intended to withdraw the Christian religion as a whole from the protection of Congress. He said: "Probably at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and of the amendment to it now under consideration, the general if not the universal sentiment in America was, that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state so far as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience and the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal indignation." [12] As late as 1898 Cooley expounded the no establishment clause as follows: "By establishment of religion is meant the setting up or recognition of a state church, or at least the conferring upon one church of special favors and advantages which are denied to others (citing 1 Tuck. Bl. Com. App. 296; 2 id. , App. Note G.). It was never intended by the Constitution that the government should be prohibited from recognizing religion, * * * where it might be done without drawing any invidious distinctions between different religious beliefs, organizations, or sects." [13]

THE "WALL OF SEPARATION" DOCTRINE

In 1802 President Jefferson wrote a letter to a group of Baptists in Danbury, Connecticut in which he declared that it was the purpose of the First Amendment to build "a wall of separation between Church and State," [14] and in Reynolds v. United States, [15] the first Anti-Mormon Case, Chief Justice Waite, speaking for the unanimous Court, characterized this as "almost an authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment," one which left Congress "free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." [16] Recently the Court has given Jefferson's "almost authoritative" pronouncement a greatly enlarged application. Speaking by Justice Black, a sharply divided Court sustained in 1947 the right of local authorities in New Jersey to provide free transportation for children attending parochial schools, [17] but accompanied its holding with these warning words, which appear to have had the approval of most of the Justices: "The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations of groups and vice versa ." [18] And a year later a nearly unanimous Court overturned on the above grounds a "released time" arrangement under which the Champaign, Illinois Board of Education agreed that religious instruction should be given in the local schools to pupils whose parents signed "request cards." The classes were to be conducted during regular school hours in the school building by outside teachers furnished by a religious council representing the various faiths, subject to the approval or supervision of the superintendent of schools. Attendance records were kept and reported to the school authorities in the same way as for other classes; and pupils not attending the religious-instruction classes were required to continue their regular secular studies. [19] Said Justice Black, speaking for the Court: "Here not only are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of religious doctrines. The State also affords sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and State." [20]

Justice Frankfurter presented a concurring opinion for himself and Justices Jackson, Rutledge and Burton. "We are all agreed," it begins, "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an 'established church.'" [21] What ensues is a well documented account of the elimination of sectarianism from the American school system which is reinterpreted as a fight for the secularization of public supported education. [22] Facing then the emergence of the "released time" expedient, [23] Justice Frankfurter characterizes it as a "conscientious attempt to accommodate the allowable functions of Government and the special concerns of the Church within the framework of our Constitution." [24] Elsewhere in his opinion he states: "Of course, 'released time' as a generalized conception, undefined by differentiating particularities, is not an issue for Constitutional adjudication. * * * The substantial differences among arrangements lumped together as 'released time' emphasize the importance of detailed analysis of the facts to which the Constitutional test of Separation is to be applied. How does 'released time' operate in Champaign?" [25] And again: "We do not consider, as indeed we could not, school programs not before us which, though colloquially characterized as 'released time,' present situations differing in aspects that may well be constitutionally crucial. Different forms which 'released time' has taken during more than thirty years of growth include programs which, like that before us, could not withstand the test of the Constitution; others may be found unexceptionable." [26] Justice Jackson added further reservations of his own as follows: "We should place some bounds on the demands for interference with local schools that we are empowered or willing to entertain. * * * It is important that we circumscribe our decision with some care." [27]

In a dissenting opinion Justice Reed took exception to the extended meaning given to the words "an establishment of religion." "The phrase 'an establishment of religion,'" said he, "may have been intended by Congress to be aimed only at a state church. When the First Amendment was pending in Congress in substantially its present form, 'Mr. Madison said, he apprehended the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.' Passing years, however, have brought about the acceptance of a broader meaning, although never until today, I believe, has this Court widened its interpretation to any such degree as holding that recognition of the interest of our nation in religion, through the granting, to qualified representatives of the principal faiths, of opportunity to present religion as an optional, extracurricular subject during released school time in public school buildings, was equivalent to an establishment of religion." [28] He further pointed out that "the Congress of the United States has a chaplain for each House who daily invokes divine blessings and guidance for the proceedings. The armed forces have commissioned chaplains from early days. They conduct the public services in accordance with the liturgical requirements of their respective faiths, ashore and afloat, employing for the purpose property belonging to the United States and dedicated to the services of religion. Under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, eligible veterans may receive training at government expense for the ministry in denominational schools. The schools of the District of Columbia have opening exercises which 'include a reading from the Bible without note or comment, and the Lord's Prayer.'" [29]

THE ZORACH CASE; THE McCOLLUM CASE LIMITED

In a decision handed down July 11, 1951 the New York Court of Appeals, one Judge dissenting, sustained the "released time" program of that State, distinguishing it from the one condemned in the McCollum Case as follows: "In the New York City program there is neither supervision nor approval of religious teachers and no solicitation of pupils or distribution of cards. The religious instruction must be outside the school building and grounds. There must be no announcement of any kind in the public schools relative to the program and no comment by any principal or teacher on the attendance or non-attendance of any pupil upon religious instruction. All that the school does besides excusing the pupil is to keep a record—which is not available for any other purpose—in order to see that the excuses are not taken advantage of and the school deceived, which is, of course, the same procedure the school would take in respect of absence for any other reason." [30] On appeal this decision was sustained by the Supreme Court, six Justices to three. [31] Said Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority: "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do believe. Government may not finance religious groups nor undertake religious instruction nor blend secular and sectarian education nor use secular institutions to force one or some religion on any person. But we find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence. The government must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compulsory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday, or to take religious instruction. But it can close its doors or suspend its operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction. No more than that is undertaken here." [32]

A few weeks earlier, moreover, the Court had indicated an intention to scrutinize more closely the basis of its jurisdiction in this class of cases. This occurred in a case in which the question involved was the validity of a New Jersey statute which requires the reading at the opening of each public school day of five verses of the Old Testament. [33] The Court held that appellant's interest as taxpayers was insufficient to constitute a justiciable case or controversy, while as to the alleged rights of the child involved the case had become moot with her graduation from school. [34]

PERMISSIBLE MONETARY AIDS TO RELIGION

In 1899 the Court held that an agreement between the District of Columbia and the directors of a hospital chartered by Congress for erection of a building and treatment of poor patients at the expense of the District was valid despite the fact that the members of the Corporation belonged to a monastic order or sisterhood of a particular church. [35] It has also sustained a contract made at the request of Indians to whom money was due as a matter of right, under a treaty, for the payment of such money by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the support of Indian Catholic schools. [36] In 1930 the use of public funds to furnish nonsectarian textbooks to pupils in parochial schools of Louisiana was sustained, [37] and in 1947, as we have seen, the case of public funds for the transportation of pupils attending such schools in New Jersey. [38] In the former of these cases the Court cited the State's interest in secular education even when conducted in religious schools; in the latter its concern for the safety of school children on the highways; and the National School Lunch Act, [39] which aids all school children attending tax-exempt schools can be similarly justified. The most notable financial concession to religion, however, is not to be explained in this way, the universal practice of exempting religious property from taxation. This unquestionably traces back to the idea expressed in the Northwest Ordnance that Government has an interest in religion as such.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: DIMENSIONS

The First Amendment "was intended to allow every one under the jurisdiction of the United States to entertain such notions respecting his relations to his Maker and the duties they impose as may be approved by his judgment and conscience, and to exhibit his sentiments in such form of worship as he may think proper, not injurious to the equal rights of others, and to prohibit legislation for the support of any religious tenets, or the modes of worship of any sect. The oppressive measures adopted, and the cruelties and punishments inflicted, by the governments of Europe for many ages, to compel parties to conform, in their religious beliefs and modes of worship, to the views of the most numerous sect, and the folly of attempting in that way to control the mental operations of persons, and enforce an outward conformity to a prescribed standard, led to the adoption of (this) amendment." [40] "The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot be." [41]

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

The Society of Sisters, an Oregon corporation, was empowered by its charter to care for orphans and to establish and maintain schools and academies for the education of the youth. Systematic instruction and moral training according to the tenets of the Roman Catholic Church was given in its establishments along with education in the secular branches. By an Oregon statute, effective September 1, 1926, it was required that every parent, or other person having control or charge or custody of a child between eight and sixteen years send him "to a public school for the period of time a public school shall be held during the current year" in the district where the child resides; and failure so to do was declared a misdemeanor. The District Court of The United States for Oregon enjoined the enforcement of the statute and the Supreme Court unanimously sustained its action, [42] holding that the measure unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control—a liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. While the First Amendment was not mentioned in the Court's opinion, the subsequent absorption of its religious clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment seems to make the case relevant to the question of their proper interpretation.

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: FEDERAL RESTRAINTS

Religious belief cannot be pleaded as a justification for an overt act made criminal by the law of the land. "Laws are made for the government of action, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." [43] To permit a man to excuse conduct in violation of law on the ground of religious belief "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." [44] It does not follow that "because no mode of worship can be established or religious tenets enforced in this country, therefore any tenets, however destructive of society, may be held and advocated, if asserted, to be a part of the religious doctrine of those advocating and practicing them * * * Whilst legislation for the establishment of a religion is forbidden, and its free exercise permitted, it does not follow that everything which may be so-called can be tolerated. Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what any particular sect may designate as religion." [45] Accordingly acts of Congress directed against either the practice of the advocacy of polygamy by members of a religious sect which sanctioned the practice, were held valid. [46] But when, in the Ballard Case, [47] decided in 1944, the promoters of a religious sect, whose founder had at different times identified himself as Saint Germain, Jesus, George Washington, and Godfre Ray King, were convicted of using the mails to defraud by obtaining money on the strength of having supernaturally healed hundreds of persons, they found the Court in a softened frame of mind. Although the trial judge, carefully discriminating between the question of the truth of defendants' pretensions and that of their good faith in advancing them, had charged the jury that it could pass on the latter but not the former, this caution did not avail with the Court, which contrived on another ground ultimately to upset the verdict of "guilty." The late Chief Justice Stone, speaking for himself and Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, dissented: "I cannot say that freedom of thought and worship includes freedom to procure money by making knowingly false statements about one's religious experiences." [48]

FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: STATE AND LOCAL RESTRAINTS

Дела мормонской церкви были разрешены до появления доктрины ясной и реальной опасности, рассматриваемой ниже. Рассматривая дела, проистекающие из законодательства штатов и местных органов власти, Суд порой стремился принимать во внимание эту доктрину, в результате чего его решения следовали несколько неустойчивым курсом. Ведущим делом является «Кантвелл против Коннектикута» [49]. В этом деле три члена секты, называющей себя «Свидетелями Иеговы», были осуждены по закону, который запрещал нелицензированный сбор средств под предлогом того, что они предназначены для религиозных или благотворительных целей, а также по общему обвинению в нарушении общественного порядка в связи с тем, что они в районе с преобладающим католическим населением обратились к двум прихожанам этой веры и включили им граммофонную пластинку, которая грубо оскорбляла христианскую религию в целом и католическую церковь в частности. Оба обвинения были признаны нарушающими конституционные гарантии свободы слова и религии; при этом норма о ясной и реальной опасности была приведена в качестве частичного обоснования данного решения, хотя из собственного изложения обстоятельств дела Судом можно вполне обоснованно сделать вывод, что слушатели граммофонной пластинки проявили степень самообладания, весьма необычную при данных обстоятельствах. Две недели спустя Суд, словно желая «компенсировать» свое рьяное усердие в деле Кантвелла, впал в другую крайность и, подчеркивая принцип, согласно которому законодательные акты должны презумироваться конституционными, поддержал штат Пенсильвания в исключении из его школ детей «Свидетелей Иеговы», которые во имя своих убеждений отказались салютовать флагу [50]. Последующая практика решений Суда в этой области несколько изменчива. Решение от июня 1942 года, подтверждающее применение недискриминационного лицензионного сбора к распространителям религиозных книг и брошюр [51], одиннадцать месяцев спустя было аннулировано и формально отменено [52]; вскоре после этого аналогичная участь постигла и решение по делу о «салютовании флагу» [53]. В мае 1943 года Суд установил, что постановление города Струтерс (штат Огайо), объявляющее незаконным для любого распространителя литературы звонить в дверь или иным образом вызывать жильцов дома к двери для получения такой литературы, нарушает Конституцию при применении к распространителям листовок, рекламирующих религиозное собрание [54]. Но восемь месяцев спустя он поддержал применение законов Массачусетс о детском труде в деле девятилетней девочки, которой ее законный опекун разрешил заниматься «проповеднической работой» и продажей религиозных изданий во внеурочное время [55]. Тем не менее в деле «Сайя против Нью-Йорка» [56], разрешенном в 1948 году, Суд пятью голосами против четырех постановил, что постановление города Локпорт (штат Нью-Йорк), запрещающее использование звукоусилительных устройств без разрешения начальника полиции, является неконституционным в применении к «Свидетелю Иеговы», который использовал звуковую аппаратуру для усиления лекций на религиозные темы в общественном парке в воскресенье. Однако несколько месяцев спустя тот же Суд, вновь разделившись в соотношении пять к четырем, поддержал постановление Трентона (штат Нью-Джерси), которое запрещало на улицах этого города все громкоговорители и другие устройства, излучающие «громкие и резкие шумы» [57]. Текущее состояние доктрины по этому конкретному вопросу представлено тремя делами, разрешенными в один и тот же день. В одном из них был отменен обвинительный приговор баптистскому пастору за проведение религиозных служб на улицах Нью-Йорка без предварительного получения разрешения у городского комиссара полиции [58], причем в выдаче разрешения ему было отказано на том основании, что в прошлом он высмеивал другие религиозные верования, тем самым разжигая рознь и создавая угрозу насилия. Судья Джексон выразил несогласие, процитировав мистера Бертрана Рассела в подтверждение того, что «слишком мало свободы ведет к застою, а слишком много — к хаосу. Лихорадка наших времен, — предположил он, — склоняет Суд сегодня к тому, чтобы отдать предпочтение хаосу» [59]. Во втором деле Суд отменил обвинительный приговор группе «Свидетелей Иеговы» в Мэриленде за использование общественного парка без предварительного получения разрешения [60]. Третье дело [61], не имевшее никакого отношения к религии, представляет собой интересный контраст к первым двум. Оно рассматривается в ином контексте [62].