because of the dry banks and the strong currents which
would have put my boats in danger. However, I found
myself in the country of Rungpore, which was a dependency
of Bengal. I determined nevertheless to remain where I
was, flattering myself the English would not come to look
for me, nor the Nawab or the ruler of the province think of
disturbing themselves about me, as I was doing no harm in
the country, and as I was very strict in observing proper
order and discipline. I was so confident on this latter head
that I did not think of throwing up now entrenchments, and
occupied myself only with hunting and walking whilst I
awaited the arrival of the French forces. However, one day,
towards the middle of January, a secret rumour came to me
that Kasim Ali Khan, Faujdar of Rungpore, was coming to
attack me. I sent out scouts, who reported that all was
tranquil in his town, and that, far from wishing to come and
look for a quarrel, he was in fear lest I should march against
his town, which was three days' journey from where I was.
Doubtless my men deceived me or did not take the trouble
to go to Rungpore, for on the 15th of the same month, at
3 p.m., on the opposite side of the river to that on which
we were, there appeared a body of soldiers, cavalry and
infantry, about 600 in number, who approached so near my
fleet that I no longer doubted the correctness of the first
advice which had been given me. I ordered a discharge
of three guns on this troop, which was so well directed that
the enemy were forced to take themselves off and to encamp
a little further from me. Next day the commander sent me
a present of some fruit, and an intimation that he only
wished to see me quit his country. He knew I could not
do this without risk, and, according to the custom of the
infidels, he gave me the strongest possible assurances of my
safety and tranquillity. I took care not to trust to them;
I was then, as I said above, without entrenchments and
without defence, so in the evening I set to work at surrounding
myself with a ditch, the mud taken out of which would
serve me for embrasures. I was short of provisions, which
made me very anxious, and I was still more so when
I learned that the enemy were trying to cut me off from
provisions on all sides, and that their intention was to
capture me by famine or treachery. Their number quickly
increased to 3000 men, of whom a part came over to my
side of the river, and harassed my people whenever they
went out for provisions. This forced me to detach. MM.
Chevalier and Gourlade, with about 10 men, some peons
and boatmen, against one of their little camps, where there
were about 150 men, foot and horse. Our men received
their fire, stormed the camp, and destroyed it after having
put every one to flight. There was not a single person
wounded on our side. This little advantage gave me time to
make a good provision of rice and other things in the villages
near my entrenchments. I cleared out these villages and
drove out the inhabitants, but I was still in need of a
quantity of things necessary to life. To procure these, I
tried to frighten the enemy by cannonading their chief camp
on the other side of the river. This only resulted in making
them withdraw altogether beyond the reach of my guns, not
with the idea of going away, but of starving me out, and, as
I learned later, to give time for a reinforcement of artillery
which they were expecting to arrive. They had already 4
or 5 guns, but their calibre was small compared with mine,
as I was able to see from the balls which fell in my camp
when it was entrenched only on the land side.
"The 19th of January, early in the morning, I sent across
the river a number of workmen, supported by a little detachment
under M. Gourlade, to cut down a grove of bamboos
which masked my guns, and to burn down some houses which
were also in their way. I forbade them to engage the enemy,
and all went well until some topasses and peons advanced
too far towards the enemy's camp, and I heard discharges
so loud and frequent on both sides, that I ordered a retreat
to be beaten in my entrenchments, to make my people recross
the river. I fired my guns continually to facilitate this and to
cover the movement. In this skirmish I had only one soldier
wounded, and I do not know whether the enemy had any
losses. This day more than 1500 shots were fired on both
sides. Some of the guns which the enemy brought up
troubled us greatly, as we were not entrenched on the water
side. Several balls fell at my side or passed over my head.
This determined me to set all my people at work the next
night with torches, to put us under cover on this side
also."
[Судя по всему, именно об этом бое Касим Али доложил Клайву 24 января:]
"I wrote expressly to my people to go and take them"
(the French) "and they went immediately and found them
ready to fight. On both sides there were cannon and
jenjalls.[145] A nulla[146] was between them, which the French
crost, and advancing upon my people, fought with great
intrepidity: but luckily, three or four of them being killed,
they retired into their fort."[147]]
"The Moors saw, from my manoeuvre, how important it
was for them to seize the ground which I had intended to
clear, and, contrary to my expectation, established themselves
on it the same evening without my being able to hinder
them, keeping themselves always well hidden behind the
bamboos, where they had nothing to fear from my artillery,
and still less from my musketry. Like me they worked at
night, and, having as many prisoners or other workmen at
their command as they wanted, I saw, with regret, next
morning the progress which they had made opposite me. I
could not dislodge them without risking everything. Weak
as I was, I thought it wiser not to hazard anything more in
sorties, but to hold myself always on the defensive.
"Sheikh Faiz Ulla (that was the name of the Moorish
general) sent me one of his men next day with a present and
proposals of peace, the first condition of which was, of course,
that I should quit his country, and as, since the dry weather
had set in, a very large and dangerous bank had formed in
the river seven or eight leagues below me, he offered me one
or two thousand workmen to assist in making a passage for
my boats. The shocking treachery used by the Moors being
well known to me, I refused to accept his offers except on
his furnishing me with hostages for his good faith. He first
proposed himself, but with such a strong escort that it was
not difficult to see that it was a trap which he was setting
for me, so as to seize and massacre us. After many debates
between our emissaries, he consented to come to my bajarow,
he and his servants, and that all of them should serve as
hostages until I was quite out of the domains of his master.
"I loyally agreed to this arrangement and made preparations
in consequence, but at 7 in the morning on the
23rd of January, the day I expected the hostages, I was
awakened by a cannon-shot quickly followed by a second, the
ball of which pierced the rezai[148] at the foot of my bed from
side to side, and made a great noise. For a long time I had
been accustomed to sleep fully dressed, so I was able to go out
quickly and give orders in the entrenchments. The treachery
and perfidy of the enemy were too manifest; nevertheless, I
forbade a single shot to be fired with musket or cannon, and
simply recommended my people to be on their guard on
the land side. The enemy kept up a continuous and very
lively fire until 4 o'clock in the evening. I considered that
it would be useless for me to reply, and wished to see how far
they would push their insolence. That day we picked up 40
cannon-balls, and our whole loss was one boatman slightly
wounded in the leg. From 4 o'clock till night the enemy's
fire was continued, but at long intervals. It began again
the next morning. I suffered this as on the previous day
for a couple of hours, at the end of which. I fired several
shots and silenced it. My firing seemed to trouble the
enemy more than I expected it would. One of my boats was
sunk by a cannon-ball, several were pierced through, and
my rezai, which used to serve me as a coat, was much
damaged.
"The succeeding days passed much in the same manner
until the 3rd of February, when, on the same bank and to
the north above my fleet, I saw a new entrenchment, which
had been thrown up during the preceding night. Its batteries
enfiladed mine along their whole length. It was necessary
either to risk everything by making a sortie in order to
destroy it, or to arrange terms. I determined on the latter,
which appeared to me all the more necessary, as I was
beginning to be in want of everything, and as I had just
received letters which deprived me of all hope of the arrival
of our forces in Bengal until April or May. I therefore
informed Sheikh Faiz Ulla that I was ready to enter upon
negotiations, and the same day he sent me some of his people,
with whom I agreed to leave my entrenchments and go
down the river. I consented to do this without hostages,
but, that it might be done in security, I promised them a
sum of money for themselves as well as for their general.
This arrangement being agreed to by Sheikh Faiz Ulla, he
sent me word that, in order that he might not appear to
betray his master, it would be necessary for me next morning
to open the fiercest fire possible on his camp; that he would
reply; that on both sides it should be with the intention of
doing as little hurt as possible; that I should pretend it was
to force him to give me a passport, which he would send me
in the evening; and that I should then send him the
money I had promised. All these precautions were only
to assist his rascality, and they appeared to me all the more
surprising, as he had already repeatedly informed me that
he had his master's permission to give me a passport, and to
let me go where I pleased. But of what are these Moors not
capable? Without being blind to the continuance of his perfidy,
I flattered myself that it might happen that he would not
trouble me on my march when he had received my money.
"However this might be, my cannon fired from 10 in
the morning till 3 in the evening. Our people, perceiving
that the enemy were firing in earnest, did not spare them
any more than they spared us, and that which was at first,
on our side, only a pretence, finally became serious. At 4
o'clock I received an envoy, who brought me the passport,
and to whom I paid the money. He assured me that I
might embark my artillery the next morning, and set out the
day after without the slightest apprehension of being interfered
with, I took my precautions, and, in fear of treachery, kept
on shore my two Swedish guns. At last, at seven in the
morning, my boats started, having on board only the sick
and helpless, and I set out by land with my two guns and
the rest of my troop, at the head of which I put myself."
Об этом торжестве времени и предательства господин Касим Али, хозяин шейха Файз Уллы, доложил Клайву 14 февраля:
"I before wrote you that I had sent forces to fight the
French, that they had a fort and strong intrenchments, and
that we had a battle with them.... ever since I wrote
you last we have been fighting, my people have behaved well,
and I make no doubt but you have heard it from other people.
God knows what pains and trouble I have taken in this
affair. The French being shut up in their fort and undergoing
much fatigue by always fighting, and likewise being
in want of provisions were obliged to run away in their
boats by night, and went towards the Dinajpur country.
My people being always ready to fight followed them....
They can go no other way but through the Dinajpur country.
I have therefore wrote expressly to the Rajah to stop the
passage."
Примерно в это же время, хотя Куртен упоминает об этом лишь позже, он начал осознавать, каким будет неизбежный конец. Он не мог пробиться с боем, чтобы соединиться с Ло, а когда вся страна поднялась против него, он был слишком слаб, чтобы долго удерживать позиции. Соответственно, он тайно отправил гонцов к мистеру Люку Скрафтону в Муршидабад. Как я уже упоминал выше, именно Скрафтон писал Куртену за помощью, когда наваб Дакки вознамерился захватить их факторию и взять англичан под стражу. Теперь Куртен написал ему, чтобы спастись от попадания в руки туземцев, и 18 февраля Скрафтон обратился к Секретному комитету в Калькутте за необходимым разрешением.
Теперь мы вновь возвращаемся к рассказу Куртена:
"What was my surprise, at the end of an hour and a
half, to see that we were followed by a body of four or five
hundred men, with two guns drawn by oxen. I pretended
not to notice, and continued my march, but at 3 o'clock
in the afternoon, seeing this troop approach, within range of
my pieces, I pointed them at the Moors, and put my force
in a position of defence. Their rascality followed its usual
course, and they sent me word that I had nothing to fear,
that they would not march so close to me any more, and
that they followed me only to preserve the peace and to
hinder my people, especially the stragglers, from committing
any disorder. I received this excuse for what it was worth,
and pretended to be content with, it, seeing clearly that they
were looking for an opportunity to surprise and destroy us.
"Several accidents happening to the boats of the rearguard
prevented my troop and myself from rejoining the
main body of the fleet till far on in the night. I found it
anchored in the most disadvantageous position possible, and
in the morning I saw at a distance of one-eighth of a league
the same body of troops, that had followed me the day before,
establishing and settling itself. A moment later I learned
that Sheikh Faiz Ulla was on the opposite bank with his
army and his artillery, that he intended to wait for me in a
narrow place called Choquova,[151] at the foot of which my boats
must pass, and that he was diligently making entrenchments
there. My embarrassment was then extreme. I found
myself surrounded on all sides; I was without any provisions,
destitute of the most necessary articles of life. In
this perplexity I saw only the most cruel alternatives, either
to surrender or to fight to the death so as to perish with our
arms in our hands. The latter appeared to be less dreadful
than the former.
"After repeated consultations, we determined it would
be best to risk the passage of the fleet by Choquova. We
thought that possibly we should find provisions there, and
that certainly the position could not be worse (for defence)
than that in which we then found ourselves. The passage
was carried out in three hours' time without confusion or
disorder, by means of my Swedish guns on the boat which
led the van. What was our delight to find, not only a better
position than that which we had quitted, but one that was
almost completely entrenched by nature, and had villages
full of rice to the right and left of it.
"Next day I collected provisions in abundance, cleared
the country round for a quarter of a league, and did my best
to ameliorate my condition. The enemy were disconcerted by
my boldness. They pretended as usual, in order to deceive
me the more easily, that they were not surprised at my march.
They feared rightly that if I commenced new entrenchments
all their trouble would begin again. Besides, I had completely
protected myself from the possibility of surprise. Pourparlers
for an accommodation were renewed and lasted three
days, at the end of which it was agreed that I should
continue my march, that two hostages should be given me
for my safety, and that the army with its guns should retire
from Choquova, and should be sent a long way ahead across
country, and as, at half a league from this place, the river
was no longer navigable because of the bank which had
formed in it, I should be supplied with people to facilitate
my passage. Thou wilt notice, my dear wife, that in all the
negotiations I had for various reasons and on several occasions
proposed to suspend all hostilities until an answer
could be received from Jafar All Khan and the English, to
whom I said I would write to come to some accommodation
with them, offering to send my letter open. This was repeatedly
refused, but the refusal did not prevent my asking
for the honours of war. My letters were despatched secretly
by my own messengers.
"At last, on the 23rd, I quitted, though with regret
(always expecting treachery), my new position, and approached
the shallow or bank mentioned. It was night when I
arrived. In spite of this I could understand, from the
dreadful noise made by the waters, that I should have
difficulty in traversing this dangerous passage even with the
assistance promised me. I was only too well convinced of
the truth of this when day broke, and I saw that I had
again been betrayed. There was nothing to be seen of the
work which the Moors had engaged to do to lessen the
difficulty of the passage. However, I did not hesitate to
put out with my lighter boats, firmly resolved, if they arrived
safely, to sacrifice the larger, with all that was upon them,
to my safety, and thus to effect my retreat during the night.
With the exception of two, which were lost, they all arrived
safely. During this piece of work, which took up the whole
day, I dissimulated my intentions in the presence of my hostages,
merely letting them see I was somewhat surprised to
find that, contrary to the promise given, there were no workmen,
but that the army, which ought to have been withdrawn,
was still close to us. Their excuses were vague and unsatisfactory.
One of them, who, no doubt, knew the enemy's plans,
asked permission to go to their camp, promising to come
back the next day. Though his demand accorded with my
designs, I agreed to it only after much persuasion, warning
him not to break his parole to return the next morning very
early. This he swore to do. As a rule these people think
nothing of an oath. I did not intend to wait for him, which
his comrade clearly perceived, for, seeing that he himself
had been sacrificed by his master's perfidy, he approved of
the resolution I had taken to set out by night, and swore
that he had acted in good faith, and was ignorant of the
treachery that had been concocted. 'You can,' he said to me,
'have my throat cut. You would be justified in doing so;