«Платон и другие сподвижники Сократа. Том 2»

ПЛАТОН И ДРУГИЕ СПУТНИКИ СОКРАТА.

ПЛАТОН,

и другие

СПУТНИКИ СОКРАТА.

Джорджа Грота,

ДЖОРДЖ ГРОТ,

автор «Истории Греции».

НОВОЕ ИЗДАНИЕ.

В ЧЕТЫРЕХ ТОМАХ.

Том II.

ЛОНДОН:

ДЖОН МЮРРЕЙ, АЛЬБЕМАРЛ-СТРИТ.

1888.

Право на перевод сохранено.

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ.

CHAPTER XII.

ALKIBIADES I. AND II.

Situation supposed in the dialogue. Persons — Sokrates and Alkibiades 1

Exorbitant hopes and political ambition of Alkibiades 2

Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What has he learnt, and what does he know? ib.

Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace. Questions of Sokrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight — to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust 3

How, or from whom, has Alkibiades learnt to discern or distinguish Just and Unjust? He never learnt it from any one ; he always knew it, even as a boy 4

Answer amended. Alkibiades learnt it from the multitude, as he learnt to speak Greek. — The multitude cannot teach just and unjust, for they are at variance among themselves about it. Alkibiades is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself 5

Answer farther amended. The Athenians do not generally debate about just or unjust — which they consider plain to every one — but about expedient and inexpedient, which are not coincident with just and unjust. But neither does Alkibiades know the expedient. He asks Sokrates to explain. Sokrates declines: he can do nothing but question 6

Comment on the preceding — Sokratic method — the respondent makes the discoveries for himself ib.

Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates 7

Humiliation of Alkibiades. Other Athenian statesmen are equally ignorant. But the real opponents, against whom Alkibiades is to measure himself, are, the kings of Sparta and Persia. Eulogistic description of those kings. To match them, Alkibiades must make himself as good as possible 8

But good — for what end, and under what circumstances? Abundant illustrative examples 9

Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth 10

Platonic Dialectic — its actual effect — its anticipated effect — applicable to the season of youth 11

Know Thyself — Delphian maxim — its urgent importance — What is myself? My mind is myself ib.

I cannot know myself, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom 11

Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates 12

Second Alkibiades — situation supposed ib.

Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it ib.

Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar 13

Frequent cases, in which men pray for supposed benefits, and find that when obtained, they are misfortunes. Every one fancies that he knows what is beneficial: mischiefs of ignorance 14

Mistake in predications about ignorance generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of what? Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always ib.

Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used 15

Special accomplishments, without the knowledge of the good or profitable, are oftener hurtful than beneficial 16

It is unsafe for Alkibiades to proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates ib.

Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues 17

Grounds for disallowing them — less strong against the Second than against the First 18

The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority ib.

The two dialogues may probably be among Plato’s earlier compositions 20

Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men 21

Fitness of the name and character of Alkibiades for idealising this feature in Sokrates ib.

Plato’s manner of replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates 22

The purpose proclaimed by Sokrates in the Apology is followed out in Alkibiades I. Warfare against the false persuasion of knowledge 24

Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance 25

Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue — but these are acknowledged Incognita 26

Prolixity of Alkibiadês I. — Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples — How explained ib.

Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined 27

Sokrates commends the practice of praying to the Gods for favours undefined — his views about the semi-regular, semi-irregular agency of the Gods — he prays to them for premonitory warnings 28

Comparison of Alkibiadês II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydemus. Sokrates not always consistent with himself 29

Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadês II. — that knowledge is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable: without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial ib.

Knowledge of Good — appears postulated and divined, in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles 31

The Good — the Profitable — what is it? — How are we to know it ? Plato leaves this undetermined ib.

CHAPTER XIII.

HIPPIAS MAJOR — HIPPIAS MINOR.

Hippias Major — situation supposed — character of the dialogue. Sarcasm and mockery against Hippias 33

Real debate between the historical Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic Memorabilia — subject of that debate 34

Opening of the Hippias Major — Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures 35

Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions — their law forbids ib.

Question, What is law? The law-makers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful 36

Comparison of the argument of the Platonic Sokrates with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates 37

The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives and to this he does not always adhere 38

Lectures of Hippias at Sparta not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question — What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth? 39

Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it — What is the Beautiful? ib.

Hippias thinks the question easy to answer 40

Justice, Wisdom, Beauty must each be something. What is Beauty, or the Beautiful? ib.

Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object ib.

Cross-questioning by Sokrates — Other things also are beautiful ; but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances — it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful 41

Second answer of Hippias — Gold, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful — scrutiny applied to the answer. Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies ib.

Third answer of Hippias — questions upon it — proof given that it fails of universal application 42

Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself — 1. The Suitable or Becoming — objections thereunto — it is rejected 43

2. The useful or profitable — objections — it will not hold 44

3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable — that which is received through the eye and the ear 45

Objections to this last — What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful? ib.

Answer — There is, belonging to each and to both in common, the property of being innocuous and profitable pleasures — upon this ground they are called beautiful 46

This will not hold — the Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good — to say that the beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good but this has been already declared inadmissible ib.

Remarks upon the Dialogue — the explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples: those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept 47

Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia 49

Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates 51

Rhetoric against Dialectic 52

Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophers ib.

Concrete Aggregates — abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct aptitudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician 53

Antithesis of Absolute and Relative, here brought into debate by Plato, in regard to the Idea of Beauty 54

Hippias Minor — characters and situation supposed 55

Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus — the veracious and straightforward hero better than the mendacious and crafty 56

This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same — the only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses, i. e. the knowing man — the ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either the one or the other 57

Analogy of special arts — it is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question of arithmetic when he chooses ib.

View of Sokrates respecting Achilles in the Iliad. He thinks that Achilles speaks falsehood cleverly. Hippias maintains that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, it is with an innocent purpose, whereas Odysseus does the like with fraudulent purpose 58

Issue here taken — Sokrates contends that those who hurt, or cheat, or lie wilfully, are better than those who do the like unwillingly — he entreats Hippias to enlighten him and answer his questions ib.

Questions of Sokrates — multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses 59

It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark only by design, than that of one who misses even when he intends to hit 60

Dissent and repugnance of Hippias ib.

Conclusion — That none but the good man can do evil wilfully: the bad man does evil unwillingly. Hippias cannot resist the reasoning, but will not accept the conclusion — Sokrates confesses his perplexity 61

Remarks on the dialogue. If the parts had been inverted, the dialogue would have been cited by critics as a specimen of the sophistry and corruption of the Sophists 62

Polemical purpose of the dialogue — Hippias humiliated by Sokrates 63

Philosophical purpose of the dialogue — theory of the Dialogues of Search generally, and of Knowledge as understood by Plato ib.

The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory — Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion shown up in the Lesser Hippias — Error in the Greater 64

The thesis maintained here by Sokrates, is also affirmed by the historical Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia 66

Aristotle combats the thesis. Arguments against it 67

Mistake of Sokrates and Plato in dwelling too exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct ib.

They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts — they take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame 68

Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review 69

Antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic 70

CHAPTER XIV.

HIPPARCHUS — MINOS.

Hipparchus — Question — What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain 71

Gain is good. Every man loves good: therefore all men are lovers of gain 72

Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him — accusation is retorted upon Sokrates 73

Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid — never deceive a friend. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates ib.

Sokrates allows the companion to retract some of his answers. The companion affirms that some gain is good, other gain is evil 74

Questions by Sokrates — bad gain is gain, as much as good gain. What is the common property, in virtue of which both are called Gain? Every acquisition, made with no outlay, or with a smaller outlay, is gain. Objections — the acquisition may be evil — embarrassment confessed ib.

It is essential to gain, that the acquisition made shall be greater not merely in quantity, but also in value, than the outlay. The valuable is the profitable — the profitable is the good. Conclusion comes back. That Gain is Good 75

Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain — all men are lovers of gain — no man ought to be reproached for being so the companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded ib.

Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the companion. What is Law, or The Law? All law is the same, quatenus law: what is the common constituent attribute? 76

Answer — Law is, 1. The consecrated and binding customs. 2. The decree of the city. 3. Social or civic opinion ib.

Cross-examination by Sokrates — just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law; unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful: lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city — or bad social opinion — cannot be law 77

Suggestion by Sokrates — Law is the good opinion of the city — but good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so 77

Objection taken by the Companion — That there is great discordance of laws in different places — he specifies several cases of such discordance at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer 78

Farther questions by Sokrates — Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so, and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful ib.

There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule 79

That which is right is the regal law, the only true and real law — that which is not right, is not law, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant 80

Minos, King of Krete — his laws were divine and excellent, and have remained unchanged from time immemorial ib.

Question about the character of Minos — Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable, the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was an enemy of Athens 81

That Minos was really admirable — and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city — we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered ib.

The question is made more determinate — What is it that the good lawgiver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind, as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close 81

The Hipparchus and Minos are analogous to each other, and both of them inferior works of Plato, perhaps unfinished 82

Hipparchus — double meaning of φιλοκερδὴς and κέρδος ib.

State or mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found 83

Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word gain? None is found ib.

Purpose of Plato in the dialogue — to lay bare the confusion, and to force the mind of the respondent into efforts for clearing it up 84

Historical narrative and comments given in the dialogue respecting Hipparchus — afford no ground for declaring the dialogue to be spurious ib.

Minos. Question — What is the characteristic property connoted by the word Νόμος or law? 86

This question was discussed by the historical Sokrates, Memorabilia of Xenophon ib.

Definitions of law — suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decrees are not laws 86

Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same — it is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man upon the subject to which it refers — it is truth and reality, found out and certified by him 87

Reasoning of Sokrates in the Minos is unsound, but Platonic. The Good, True, and Real, coalesce in the mind of Plato — he acknowledges nothing to be Law, except what he thinks ought to be Law 88

Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind — the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man 89

Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the Minos, Politikus, Kratylus, &c. Natural Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c ib.

Eulogy on Minos, as having established laws on this divine type or natural rectitude 90

The Minos was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the Leges 91

Explanations of the word Law — confusion in its meaning ib.

CHAPTER XV.

THEAGES.

Theagês — has been declared spurious by some modern critics — grounds for such opinion not sufficient 98

Persons of the dialogue — Sokrates, with Demodokus and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist 99

Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants ib.

Theagês desires to acquire that wisdom by which he can govern freemen with their own consent 100

Incompetence of the best practical statesmen to teach any one else. Theagês requests that Sokrates will himself teach him ib.

Sokrates declares that he is not competent to teach — that he knows nothing except about matters of love. Theagês maintains that many of his young friends have profited largely by the conversation of Sokrates 101

Sokrates explains how this has sometimes happened — he recites his experience of the divine sign or Dæmon ib.

The Dæmon is favourable to some persons, adverse to others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him 102

Theagês expresses his anxiety to be received as the companion of Sokrates 103

Remarks on the Theagês — analogy with the Lachês 104

Chief peculiarity of the Theagês — stress laid upon the divine sign or Dæmon ib.

Plato employs this divine sign here to render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of his unequal influence upon different companions ib.

Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach himself — difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal. The Theagês furnishes an excuse 106

Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign in the same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person ib.

CHAPTER XVI.

ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ — RIVALES.

Erastæ — subject and persons of the dialogue — dramatic introduction — interesting youths in the palæstra 111

Two rival Erastæ — one of them literary, devoted to philosophy — the other gymnastic, hating philosophy ib.

Question put by Sokrates — What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total 112

In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured quantity. For the mind also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure? ib.

No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher — as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise 113

The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts — a Pentathlus — who talks well upon each ib.

On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner 114

Philosophy cannot consist in multiplication of learned acquirements ib.

Sokrates changes his course of examination — questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the good 115

In this art the philosopher must not only be second-best, competent to talk — but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act ib.

Close of the dialogue — humiliation of the literary Erastes 116

Remarks — animated manner of the dialogue ib.

Definition of philosophy — here sought for the first time — Platonic conception of measure — referee not discovered 117

View taken of the second-best critical talking man, as compared with the special proficient and practitioner 118

Plato’s view — that the philosopher has a province special to himself, distinct from other specialties — dimly indicated — regal or political art 119

Philosopher — the supreme artist controlling other artists 120

CHAPTER XVII.

ION.

Ion. Persons of the dialogue. Difference of opinion among modern critics as to its genuineness 124

Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant 124

Functions of the Rhapsodes. Recitation — exposition of the poets — arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent 125

The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation — powerful effect which they produced ib.

Ion both reciter and expositor — Homer was considered more as an instructor than as a poet 126

Plato disregards and disapproves the poetic or emotional working ib.

Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him — How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The poetic art is one 127

Explanation given by Sokrates — both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and system, but by divine inspiration — fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God ib.

Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of iron rings. The Gods first inspire Homer, then act through him and through Ion upon the auditors 128

This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the Apology 129

Platonic Antithesis: systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods. Varieties of madness, good and bad 129

Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life — privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates — his firm belief in them 130

Condition of the inspired person — his reason is for the time withdrawn 131

Ion does not admit himself to be inspired and out of his mind 132

Homer talks upon all subjects — Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province? ib.

The Rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the general, and is competent to command soldiers, having learnt it from Homer 133

Conclusion. Ion expounds Homer, not with any knowledge of what he says, but by divine inspiration 134

The generals in Greece usually possessed no professional experience — Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers — Plato’s view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing ib.

Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge 136

Illustration of Plato’s opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises ib.

CHAPTER XVIII.

LACHES.

Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue — whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion 138

Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion — he replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge 139

Those who deliver an opinion must begin by proving their competence to judge — Sokrates avows his own incompetence 140

Nikias and Lachês submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates 141

Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case — Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education 141

Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man — this man is never seen or identified 142

We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education — virtue, as a whole, is too large a question — we will enquire about one branch of virtue — courage ib.

Question — what is courage? Laches answers by citing one particularly manifest case of courage — mistake of not giving a general explanation 143

Second answer. Courage is a sort of endurance of the mind — Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect — endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage ib.

Confusion. New answer given by Nikias. Courage is a sort of Intelligence — the intelligence of things terrible and not terrible. Objections of Lachês 144

Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible; but intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present 145

Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof — it will not hold therefore as a definition of courage 146

Remarks. Warfare of Sokrates against the false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage without knowing what it is ib.

No solution given by Plato — apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence — cannot be understood without reference to some object or end 147

Object — is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence — of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists 148

Postulate of a Science of Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man — correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends ib.

Perfect condition of the intelligence — is the one sufficient condition of virtue 149

Dramatic contrast between Lachês and Sokrates, as cross-examiners 150

CHAPTER XIX.

CHARMIDES.

Scene and personages of the dialogue. Crowded palæstra. Emotions of Sokrates 153

Question, What is Temperance? addressed by Sokrates to the temperate Charmides. Answer, It is a kind of sedateness or slowness 154

But Temperance is a fine or honourable thing, and slowness is, in many or most cases, not fine or honourable, but the contrary. Temperance cannot be slowness ib.

Second answer. Temperance is a variety of the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates ib.

Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one’s own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing 155

Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge ib.

Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case ? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge itself 156

Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given cognitum as its object. Analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible 156

All knowledge must be relative to some object 157

All properties are relative — every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else ib.

Even if cognition of cognition were possible, cognition of non-cognition would be impossible. A man may know what he knows, but he cannot know what he is ignorant of. He knows the fact that he knows: but he does not know how much he knows, and how much he does not know 158

Temperance, therefore, as thus defined, would be of little or no value 159

But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of little value. Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end — Happiness ib.

Which of the varieties of knowledge contributes most to well-doing or happiness? That by which we know good and evil 160

Without the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of little or of no service. Temperance is not the science of good and evil, and is of little service 161

Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified ib.

Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not ; since what temperance is remains unknown 162

Expressions both from Charmides and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout ib.

The Charmides is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed 163

Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance 164

Familiar words — constantly used, with much earnest feeling, but never understood nor defined — ordinary phenomenon in human society 165

Different ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues 167

Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible ib.

In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have presented to him dissentient points of view ib.

Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognizance of good and evil 168

Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good and Evil. Without this last, the special sciences are of no use ib.

Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology 169

Courage and Temperance, handled both by Plato and by Aristotle. Comparison between the two 170

CHAPTER XX.

LYSIS.

Analogy between Lysis and Charmides. Richness of dramatic incident in both. Youthful beauty 172

Scenery and personages of the Lysis ib.

Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit 173

Conversation of Sokrates with Lysis ib.

Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalês 177

Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus ib.

Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonico-Sokratic manner 177

Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue 178

Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected ib.

Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons pro and con. Rejected 179

Confusion of Sokrates. He suggests, That the Indifferent (neither good nor evil) is friend to the Good 180

Suggestion canvassed. If the Indifferent is friend to the Good, it is determined to become so by the contact of felt evil, from which it is anxious to escape 180

Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition — not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance 181

Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The Primum Amabile, or object originally dear to us, per se: by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear ib.

The cause of love is desire. We desire that which is akin to us or our own 182

Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien to every one. Inconsistency with what has been previously laid down 183

Failure of the enquiry. Close of the dialogue 184

Remarks. No positive result. Sokratic purpose in analysing the familiar words — to expose the false persuasion of knowledge ib.

Subject of Lysis. Suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons why each is defective 185

The process of trial and error is better illustrated by a search without result than with result. Usefulness of the dialogue for self-working minds 186

Subject of friendship, handled both by the Xenophontic Sokrates, and by Aristotle ib.

Debate in the Lysis partly verbal, partly real. Assumptions made by the Platonic Sokrates, questionable, such as the real Sokrates would have found reason for challenging 188

Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good to escape from it 189

This general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute 190

Another theory of Sokrates. The Primum Amabile, or original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved through association with this. The object is Good 191

Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association ib.

Theory of the Primum Amabile, here introduced by Sokrates, with numerous derivative objects of love. Platonic Idea. Generic communion of Aristotle, distinguished by him from the feebler analogical communion 192

Primum Amabile of Plato, compared with the Prima Amicitia of Aristotle. Each of them is head of an analogical aggregate, not member of a generic family 194

The Good and Beautiful, considered as objects of attachment ib.

CHAPTER XXI.

EUTHYDEMUS.

Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydêmus. Judgments of various critics 195

Scenery and personages ib.

The two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus: manner in which they are here presented 196

Conversation carried on with Kleinias, first by Sokrates, next by the two Sophists ib.

Contrast between the two different modes of interrogation 197

Wherein this contrast does not consist 198

Wherein it does consist 199

Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists — their bidding for the applause of the by-standers ib.

Comparison of the Euthydêmus with the Parmenidês 200

Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous 201

Opinion of Stallbaum and other critics about the Euthydêmus, that Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias talked to their auditors 202

That opinion is unfounded. Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture ib.

Sokrates in the Euthydêmus is drawn suitably to the purpose of that dialogue 203

The two Sophists in the Euthydêmus are not to be taken as real persons, or representatives of real persons 204

Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias — possession of good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them ib.

But intelligence — of what? It must be such intelligence, or such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right use of it when made 205

Where is such an art to be found? The regal or political art looks like it; but what does this art do for us? No answer can be found. Ends in puzzle 206

Review of the cross-examination just pursued by Sokrates. It is very suggestive — puts the mind upon what to look for 207

Comparison with other dialogues — Republic, Philêbus, Protagoras. The only distinct answer is found in the Protagoras 208

The talk of the two Sophists, though ironically admired while it is going on, is shown at the end to produce no real admiration, but the contrary ib.

Mistaken representations about the Sophists — Aristotle’s definition — no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician 210

Philosophical purpose of the Euthydêmus — exposure of fallacies, in Plato’s dramatic manner, by multiplication of particular examples 211

Aristotle (Soph. Elench.) attempts a classification of fallacies: Plato enumerates them without classification 212

Fallacies of equivocation propounded by the two Sophists in the Euthydêmus ib.

Fallacies — à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter — in the Euthydêmus 213

Obstinacy shown by the two Sophists in their replies — determination not to contradict themselves 214

Farther verbal equivocations ib.

Fallacies involving deeper logical principles — contradiction is impossible. — To speak falsely is impossible 215

Plato’s Euthydêmus is the earliest known attempt to set out and expose fallacies — the only way of exposing fallacies is to exemplify the fallacy by particular cases, in which the conclusion proved is known aliunde to be false and absurd 216

Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists — they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them 217

Wide-spread prevalence of erroneous belief, misguided by one or other of these fallacies, attested by Sokrates, Plato, Bacon, &c., — complete enumeration of heads of fallacies by Mill 218

Value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies 221

Without the habit of formal debate, Plato could not have composed his Euthydêmus, nor Aristotle the treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis ib.

Probable popularity of the Euthydêmus at Athens — welcomed by all the enemies of Dialectic 222

Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents — Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton 223

Altered tone in speaking of Euthydêmus — Disparagement of persons half-philosophers, half-politicians 224

Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons — Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher — tells him to search for himself 225

Euthydêmus is here cited as representative of Dialectic and philosophy 226

Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates? 227

Variable feeling at different times, between Plato and Isokrates 228

CHAPTER XXII.

MENON.

Persons of the Dialogue 232

Question put by Menon — Is virtue teachable? Sokrates confesses that he does not know what virtue is. Surprise of Menon ib.

Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it 233

Answer of Menon — plurality of virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them ib.

Analogous cases cited — definitions of figure and colour 235

Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions — Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system ib.

Definition of virtue given by Menon: Sokrates pulls it to pieces 236

Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock — Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both 237

But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows: and for what he does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it ib.

Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates — anterior immortality of the soul — what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten ib.

Illustration of this theory — knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon 238

Enquiry taken up — Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is 239

Virtue is knowledge — no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge ib.

Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No teachers of it can be found 239

Conversation of Sokrates with Anytus, who detests the Sophists, and affirms that any one of the leading politicians can teach virtue 240

Confused state of the discussion. No way of acquiring virtue is shown ib.

Sokrates modifies his premisses — knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results — right opinion will do the same ib.

Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others — good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods 241

All the real virtue that there is, is communicated by special inspiration from the Gods 242

But what virtue itself is, remains unknown ib.

Remarks on the dialogue. Proper order for examining the different topics, is pointed out by Sokrates ib.

Mischief of debating ulterior and secondary questions when the fundamental notions and word are unsettled ib.

Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon — desire of good alleged to be universally felt — in what sense this is true 243

Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what ? 244

Subject of Menon; same as that of the Protagoras — diversity of handling — Plato is not anxious to settle a question and get rid of it 245

Anxiety of Plato to keep up and enforce the spirit of research 246

Great question discussed among the Grecian philosophers — criterion of truth — Wherein consists the process of verification? ib.

None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato — that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience 247

Plato’s view of the immortality of the soul — difference between the Menon, Phædrus, and Phædon 249

Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind — how far correct ? ib.

Plato’s doctrine about à priori reasonings — different from the modern doctrine 251

Plato’s theory about pre-natal experience. He took no pains to ascertain and measure the extent of post-natal experience 252

Little or nothing is said in the Menon about the Platonic Ideas or Forms 253

What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning — his distinction between knowledge and right opinion ib.

This distinction compared with modern philosophical views 254

Manifestation of Anytus — intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally 255

The enemy of Sokrates is also the enemy of the sophists — practical statesmen 256

The Menon brings forward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen 257

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROTAGORAS.

Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue 259

Introduction. Eagerness of the youthful Hippokrates to become acquainted with Protagoras 260

Sokrates questions Hippokrates as to his purpose and expectations from Protagoras ib.

Danger of going to imbibe the instruction of a Sophist without knowing beforehand what he is about to teach 262

Remarks on the Introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light 263

Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras 264

Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist ib.

Protagoras prefers to converse in presence of the assembled company 266

Answers of Protagoras. He intends to train young men as virtuous citizens ib.

Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teachable. Reasons for such doubt. Protagoras is asked to explain whether it is or not. ib.

Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe 267

Mythe. First fabrication of men by the Gods. Prometheus and Epimetheus. Bad distribution of endowments to man by the latter. It is partly amended by Prometheus 267

Prometheus gave to mankind skill for the supply of individual wants, but could not give them the social art — Mankind are on the point of perishing, when Zeus sends to them the dispositions essential for society 268

Protagoras follows up his mythe by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens and taught by all to all 269

Constant teaching of virtue. Theory of punishment 270

Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent 271

Teaching by parents, schoolmaster, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c. ib.

All learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude 272

Analogy of learning vernacular Greek. No special teacher thereof. Protagoras teaches virtue somewhat better than others 273

The sons of great artists do not themselves become great artists 274

Remarks upon the mythe and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself 274

Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art 275

Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras — he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions 276

One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer 277

Questions by Sokrates — Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous ? ib.

Whether justice is just, and holiness holy? How far justice is like to holiness? Sokrates protests against an answer, “If you please” 278

Intelligence and moderation are identical, because they have the same contrary 279

Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term ib.

Protagoras is puzzled, and becomes irritated 280

Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity ib.

Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart 281

Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue 282

Claim of a special locus standi and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric ib.

Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him ib.

Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song 283

Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech 283

Character of this speech — its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech 284

Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering 285

Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose 287

The interrupted debate is resumed. Protagoras says that courage differs materially from the other branches of virtue 288

Sokrates argues to prove that courage consists in knowledge or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack ib.

Identity of the pleasurable with the good — of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate 289

Enquiry about knowledge. Is it the dominant agency in the mind? Or is it overcome frequently by other agencies, pleasure or pain ? Both agree that knowledge is dominant 290

Mistake of supposing that men act contrary to knowledge. We never call pleasures evils, except when they entail a preponderance of pain, or a disappointment of greater pleasures 291

Pleasure is the only good — pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future — resolves itself into pleasure and pain 292

Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly — all the security of our lives depend upon it 293

To do wrong, overcome by pleasure, is only a bad phrase for describing what is really a case of grave ignorance 294

Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasures or freedom from pain, are honourable 295

Explanation of courage. It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible ib.

Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras 297

Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates 298

Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited: one under the name of Protagoras; the other, under that of Sokrates 299

Order of ethical problems, as conceived by Sokrates ib.

Difference of method between him and Protagoras flows from this difference of order. Protagoras assumes what virtue is, without enquiry 300

Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony 301

Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of the problem which Protagoras had left out ib.

Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner 303

Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction ib.

Affirmation of Protagoras about courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere ib.

The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness 304

Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides 305

Ethical view given by Sokrates worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation of pleasures and pains of the agent ib.

Protagoras is at first opposed to this theory 306

Reasoning of Sokrates 307

Application of that reasoning to the case of courage ib.

The theory which Plato here lays down is more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues 308

Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential 309

Comparison with the Republic 310

The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates 311

The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other persons besides the agent himself 312

Plato’s reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage 313

Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct. That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists 314

Grounds of that doctrine. Their insufficiency 315

Subject is professedly still left unsettled at the close of the dialogue 316

CHAPTER XXIV.

GORGIAS.

Persons who debate in the Gorgias. Celebrity of the historical Gorgias 317

Introductory circumstances of the dialogue. Polus and Kalliklês 318

Purpose of Sokrates in questioning. Conditions of a good definition ib.

Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion 319

The Rhetor produces belief without knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise? 319

The Rhetor can persuade the people upon any matter, even against the opinion of the special expert. He appears to know, among the ignorant 320

Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates 321

Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the general head flattery ib.

Distinction between the true arts which aim at the good of the body and mind — and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure 322

Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetors have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish 323

All men wish for what is good for them. Despots and Rhetors, when they kill any one, do so because they think it good for them. If it be really not good, they do not do what they will, and therefore have no real power 324

Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia — Polus affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so — Sokrates admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it 325

Sokrates maintains — 1. That it is a greater evil to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. 2. That if a man has done wrong, it is better for him to be punished than to remain unpunished 326