, q. vii., art. 1.449.To Special Metaphysics also belongs the controverted question whether or not a plurality of really distinct substantial forms can enter into the constitution of an individual corporeal substance. When we classify corporeal things into genera and species according to their natural kinds (cf. Science of Logic, i., § 67), these latter are determined by the formae substantiales of the things classified, and are called infimæ species. Numerically distinct individuals which have (conceptually) the same forma substantialis, fall into the same infima species; while if such individuals have (conceptually and numerically) distinct formae substanialis they fall into distinct infimae species of some higher common genus. The wider the generic concept the larger the group of individuals which it unifies: it is a principle of conceptual unity, i.e. of universality. The objects of our generic, differential, and specific concepts, throughout this process of classification, are only virtually distinct metaphysical grades of being in the individuals. Now if the forma substantialis which yields the unifying concept of the species infima for the individuals, and the material principle which is the ground of the numerical distinction between these latter, were likewise regarded by the scholastics as being merely virtually distinct metaphysical grades of being, in each individual, then the question of a plurality of really distinct forms in one and the same individual would have no meaning: all “forms” in the latter would be only virtually distinct from one another and from the material principle. But the scholastics did not conceive that the real ground for grouping individuals into species infimae was the same as that for grouping these latter into wider genera. They regarded the relation between the forma substantialis and the materia prima in the individual as quite different from that between the generic and specific grades of being in the individual (cf. supra, § 38; Science of Logic, i., § 44; Joseph, Introduction to Logic, pp. 93-6). While they considered the latter a relation of virtual distinction they held the former to be one of real distinction. And while they recognized the concept of the species infima to be a principle of conceptual unity in grouping the individuals together mentally, St. Thomas emphasized especially the rôle of the forma substantialis (on which that concept was founded) as a principle of real unity in the individual: “Ab eodam habet res esse et unitatem. Manifestum est autem quod res habet esse per formam. Unde et per formam res habet unitatem” (Quodlib. i., art. 6). If we accept this doctrine of St. Thomas the arguments which he bases on it against the possibility of a plurality of distinct substantial forms in the same corporeal individual are unanswerable (Cf. Mercier, Ontologie, § 215).450.“Idem actus secundum rem est duorum secundum diversam rationem: agentis quidem, secundum quod est ab eo, patientis autem, secundum quod est in ipso.... Ex eo quod actio et passio sunt unus motus non sequitur quod actio et passio, vel doctio et doctrina, sint idem; sed quod motus cui inest utrumque eorum, sit idem. Qui quidem motus secundum unam rationem est actio, et secundum aliam rationem est passio; alterum enim est secundum rationem esse actus hujus, ut in hoc, et esse actus hujus, ut ab hoc; motus autem dicitur actio secundum quod est actus agentis ut ab hoc; dicitur autem passio secundum quod est actus patientis ut in hoc. Et sic patet quod licet motus sit idem moventis et moti, propter hoc quod abstrahit ab utraque ratione: tamen actio et passio differunt propter hoc quod diversas rationes in sua significatione habent.”—St. Thomas, In Phys., iii. 1. 5.451.“Solet dubium esse apud quosdam, utrum motus sit in movente, aut in mobili.... Sed manifestum est quod actus cujuslibet est in eo cujus est actus; actus autem motus est in mobili, cum sit actus mobilis, causatus tamen in eo a movente ... cum motus sit actus existentis in potentia, sequitur quod motus non sit actus alicujus inquantum est movens, sed inquantum est mobile.”—ibid., 1. 4.452.Some languages mark the distinction between these two kinds of action: “Differt autem facere et agere: quia factio est actio transiens in exteriorem materiam, sicut aedificare, secare et hujusmodi; agere autem est actio permanenslin ipso agente sicut videre, velle et hujusmodi.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol. iae iia, q. lxvii., art. 4, c.453.Hume went even farther, at least in language; for he alleged (whether he really believed is another question) that he could overcome the supposed merely psychological difficulty, that he could easily—and, presumably, without doing violence to his rational nature—conceive a non-existent thing as coming into existence without a cause! He proclaimed that he could achieve the feat of thinking what the universal voice of mankind has declared to be unthinkable: an absolute beginning of being from nothingness. “The knowledge of this relation (causality) is not,” he writes, “in any instance attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other ”(Works, ed. Green and Grose, iv., 24). “All distinct ideas are separable from each other, and, as the ideas of cause and effect are evidently distinct, 'twill be easy for us (!) to conceive any object as nonexistent this moment, and existent the next, without conjoining to it the distinct idea of a cause or producing principle” (Treatise on Human Nature, p. 381). On this argument (?) even such an ardent admirer of the pan-phenomenist as Huxley was, is forced to remark that “it is of the circular sort, for the major premise, that all distinct ideas are separable in thought, assumes the question at issue” (Huxley's Hume, p. 122).454.Thus, for instance, man, elevated by sanctifying grace, can perform acts which merit the supernatural reward of the Beatific Vision.455.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., § 231.456.Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., ii., cap. 2.457.Cf. Urraburu, op. cit., § 392 (p. 1123): “Unde adaequata virtus instrumentalis videtur conflari ex naturali instrumenti virtute vel efficacitate et ex virtute causae principalis sibi transeunter addita, docente S. Thoma: Instrumentum virtutem instrumentalem acquirit dupliciter scilicet quando accipit formam instrumenti et quando movetur a principali agente ad effectum (Summa Theol., iii., q. xix., art. 3, ad. 2).”458.“Ad aliquem effectum aliquid operatur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut per se agens; et dicitur per se agere quod agit per aliquam formam sibi inhaerentem per modum naturae completae, sive habeat illam formam a se, sive ab alio.... Alio modo aliquid operatur ad effectum aliquem instrumentaliter, quod quidem non operatur ad effectum per formam sibi inhaerentem, sed solum inquantum est motum a per se agente. Haec est ratio instrumenti, inquantum est instrumentum, ut moveat motum; unde sicut se habet forma completa ad per se agentem, ita se habet motus, quo movetur a principale agente, ad instrumentum, sicut serra operatur ad scamnum. Quamvis enim serra habeat aliquam actionem quae sibi competit secundum propriam formam, ut dividere; tamen aliquem effectum habet qui sibi non competit, nisi inquantum est mota ab artifice, scilicet facere rectam incisionem, et convenientem formae artis: et sic instrumentum habet duas operationes; unam quae competit ei secundam rationem propriam; aliam quae competit ei secundam quod est motum a per se agente, quae transcendit virtutem propriae formae.”—De Veritate, q. xxvii., art. 4. It is not clear, however, that St. Thomas regarded these two “operationes” of the instrumental cause as really distinct, for he says that it acts as an instrument (i.e. modifies the efficiency of the principal cause) only by exercising its own proper function: “Omne agens instrumentale exsequitur actionem principalis agentis per aliquam operationem propriam, et connaturalem sibi, sicut calor naturalis generat carnem dissolvendo et digerendo, et serra operatur ad factionem scamni secando” (Contra Gentes, ii., ch. xxi.): from which he goes on to argue that no creature can act even as an instrumental cause in creating.—Cf. iv. Sent., Dist. i., q. i., art. 4, sol. 2.—De Potentia, q. iii., art. 7.—Summa Theol., iii., q. lxii., art. 1, ad. 2.459.St. Thomas, proving the necessity of the Divine concursus for all created causes, illustrates the general distinction between a principal and an instrumental cause: “Virtus naturalis quae est rebus naturalibus in sua institutione collata, inest eis ut quaedem forma habens esse ratum et firmum in natura. Sed id quod a Deo fit in re naturali, quo actualiter agat, est ut intentio sola, habens esse quoddam incompletum, per modum quo ... virtus artis [est] in instrumento artificis. Sicut ergo securi per artem dari potuit acumen, ut esset forma in ea permanens, non autem dari ei potuit quod vis artis esset in ea quasi quaedam forma permanens, nisi haberet intellectum; ita rei naturali potuit conferri virtus propria, ut forma in ipsa permanens, non autem vis qua agit ad esse ut instrumentum primae causae, nisi daretur ei quod esset universale essendi principium; nec iterum virtuti naturali conferri potuit ut moveret seipsam, nec ut conservaret se in esse: unde sicut patet quod instrumento artificis conferri non oportuit quod operaretur absque motu artis; ita rei naturali conferri non potuit quod operaretur absque operatione divina.”—QQ. DD. De. Pot., q. iii., art. 7.460.Cf. Maher, Psychology, ch. xix.—Mercier, Psychologie, ii., ch. i. § 2.461.For a fuller treatment of this whole subject, cf. Science of Logic, ii., Part iv., chs. iii., iv.; Part v., ch. i.—Maher, Psychology, ch. xix., pp. 423-4.462.Cf. Newman, Grammar of Assent, Part i., ch. iv., § 1 (5), (6); § 2, remark 1.463.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., §§ 216, 218, 219.464.ibid., § 216.465.ibid., § 220.466.Introduction to Logic, pp. 64-5.467.Cf. what was said above (32) about the causal or extrinsic, as distinct from the intrinsic, principle of individuation.468.“Whenever science tries to find the cause not of a particular event, such as the French Revolution (whose cause must be as unique as that event itself is), but of an event of a kind, such as consumption, or commercial crises, it looks in the last resort for a commensurate cause. What is that exact state or condition of the body, given which it must and without which it cannot be in consumption? What are those conditions in a commercial community, given which there must and without which there cannot be a commercial crisis?”—Joseph, op. cit., p. 65. Cf. Science of Logic, ii., § 221.469.System of Logic, iii., v., § 2.470.For instance: (a) The “ontological” or “true” cause, which “actually produces” the effect, need not necessarily be the “ultimate” cause of the latter. (b) A “physical fact” can be the cause of another in the sense of being the invariable antecedent (or physical cause) of the latter, but not “in that sense alone”; it may also be an efficient cause of the latter by exerting an active influence on the happening of this latter. (c) Whether or not efficiency is “a mysterious and most powerful tie,” at any rate it does exist between “physical facts” in the universe. (d) Its analysis reveals not a “supposed necessity of ascending ... to ... the true cause, ... which ... produces the effect,” as if the proximate causes did not also truly produce the latter; but a real necessity of ascending to a First Cause as the source and support and complement of the real efficiency of these proximate causes. (e) A merely logical theory of Induction does not indeed demand any inquiry either into the efficiency of natural agencies, or into the nature and grounds of the “invariability” or “necessity” or “law” whereby these are connected with their effects. But a philosophical theory of Induction does imply such inquiries. And here phenomenist writers like Mill have laid themselves open to two accusations. For while professing merely to abstract from the problem of efficiency they have tried equivalently to deny its existence by proclaiming it superfluous and insoluble, besides consciously or unconsciously misrepresenting it. And similarly, in dealing with the invariability of causal sequences in the universe, with the necessary character of its physical laws, they have misconceived this necessity as being mechanical, fatal, absolutely inviolable; and have wrongly proclaimed its ultimate grounds to be unknowable (Agnosticism). Cf. infra, § 104; Science of Logic, ii., Part IV., chs. iii., iv., and v.; Part V., ch. i. Thus, while eschewing the genuine Metaphysics, which seeks the real nature and causes of the world of our experience, as superfluous and futile, they have substituted for it a masked and spurious metaphysics which they have wrongly fathered on Physical Science: a mass of more or less superficial speculations which have not even the merit of consistency. No philosopher, starting with their views on the nature of the human mind, can consistently claim for the latter any really valid or reliable knowledge of laws, any more than of causes. For the knowledge of a law, even as a generalized fact, is a knowledge that claims to pass beyond the limits of the individual's present and remembered experiences. But there can be no rational justification, whether psychological or ontological, for the certain reliability of such a step, in the philosophy which logically reduces all certain knowledge to the mere awareness of a flow of successive sensations supposed to constitute the total content of the individual consciousness and the total reality of human experience.471.Cf. Maher, Psychology, ch. xvii., pp. 368-70.—Mercier, op. cit., § 229.472.“When an effort of attention combines two ideas, when one billiard ball moves another, when a steam hammer flattens out a lump of solid iron, when a blow on the head knocks a man down, in all these cases there is something more than, and essentially different from, the mere sequence of two phenomena: there is effective force—causal action of an agent endowed with real energy.”—Maher, op. cit., ibid., p. 370.473.Grammar of Assent, p. 66.474.Cf. Domet de Vorges, Cause efficiente et cause finale, p. 39. Volitional activity is no doubt the most prominent type of efficient causality in our mental life. But it is not the only type; we have direct conscious experience of intellectual effort, of the work of the imagination, of the exercise of organic and muscular energy. There is no warrant therefore for conceiving all efficient power or energy, after the model of will-power, as Newman among others appears to have done when he wrote in these terms: “Starting, then, from experience, I consider a cause to be an effective will: and by the doctrine of causation, I mean the notion, or first principle, that all things come of effective will” (ibid., p. 68). No doubt, all things do come ultimately from the effective will of God. This, however, is not a first principle, but a remote philosophical conclusion.475.ibid., p. 66.476.St. Thomas, QQ. Disp. De Potentia, q. iii., art. 7, in c.477.“Nulla res per seipsam movet vel agit, nisi sit movens non motum.... Et quia natura inferior agens non agit nisi mota ... et hoc non cessat quousque perveniatur ad Deum, sequitur de necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cujuslibet rei naturalis, ut movens et applicans virtutem ad agendum.”—St. Thomas, De Potentia Dei, q. iii., art. 7.478.This is the principle repeatedly expressed by St. Thomas: “Unde quarto modo unum est causa alterius, sicut principale agens est causa actionis instrumenti: et hoc modo etiam oportet dicere, quod Deus est causa omnis actionis rei naturalis. Quanto enim aliqua causa est altior, tanto est communior et efficacior, tanto profundius ingreditur in effectum, et de remotiori potentia ipsum reducit in actum. In qualibet autem re naturali invenimus quod est ens et quod est res naturalis, et quod est talis vel talis naturae. Quorum primum est commune omnibus entibus; secundum omnibus rebus naturalibus; tertium in una specie; et quartum, si addamus accidentia, est proprium huic individuo. Hoc ergo individuum agendo non potest constituere aliud in simili specie, nisi prout est instrumentum illius causae quae respicit totam speciem et ulterius totum esse naturae inferioris. Et propter hoc nihil agit in speciem in istis inferioribus ... nec aliquid agit ad esse nisi per virtutem Dei. Ipsum enim esse est communissimus effectus, primus et intimior omnibus aliis effectibus; et ideo soli Deo competit secundum virtutem propriam talis effectus: unde etiam, ut dicitur in Lib. de Causis (prop. 9), intelligentia non dat esse, nisi prout est in ea virtus divina. Sic ergo Deus est causa omnis actionis prout quodlibet agens est instrumentum divinae virtutis operantis.”—St. Thomas, De Potentia Dei, q. iii. art 7.—Cf. supra, 99 (c), p. 375, n. 2.479.Why, then, is a finite cause not capable of acting uninterruptedly? why are its powers, forces, energies, fatigued, lessened, exhausted by exercise? Simply because its action is proportionate to its powers, and these to its finite nature.480.“Creatio non est mutatio nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum. Nam de ratione mutationis est quod aliquid idem se habeat aliter nunc et prius.... Sed in creatione, per quam producitur tota substantia rei, non potest accipi aliquid idem aliter se habens nunc et prius, nisi secundum intellectum tantum; sicut si intelligatur aliqua res prius non fuisse totaliter, et postea esse. Sed cum actio et passio conveniant in una substantia motus, et differant solum secundum habitudines diveras ... oportet quod subtracto motu, non remaneant nisi diversae habitudines in creante et creato. Sed quia modus significandi sequitur modum intelligendi ...
creatio significatur per modum mutationis; et propter hoc dicitur quod creare est ex nihilo aliquid facere; quamvis facere et fieri magis in hoc conveniant quam mutare et mutari; quia facere et fieri important habitudinem causae ad effectum et effectus ad causam, sed mutationem ex consequenti.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., i., q. xlv., art. 2, ad. 2.481.“Remoto motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis [effectus] secundum quod [effectus] a causa aliqua procedit.”—op. cit., i. q. xli., art. 1, ad 2.482.The act of the will is, of course, virtually transitive when it wills or determines bodily movements.—Cf. Maher, Psychology, chs. x., xxiii. (pp. 517-24).483.At the same time it must be noted that organic vital activity is transitive in the sense that no part or member of the organism acts upon itself, but only on other parts, in the production of the local, quantitative and qualitative changes involved in nutrition. It is subject to the inductively established law which seems to regulate all corporeal action: that all such action involves reaction of the patiens on the agens. Mental activity is outside this law. Cognitive and appetitive faculties do not react on the objects which reduce these faculties to act, thus arousing their immanent activity.—Cf. Mercier, op. cit., § 227.484.Cf. Mercier, op. cit.485.Cf. Maher, Psychology, chs. xiii. and xiv.486.Cf. Urraburu: “Vel, si mavis, dic causam efficientem esse causam, a qua fit aliquid, vel a quo proprie oritur actio, intelligendo per actionem emanationem et fluxum ac dependentiam effectus a causa.”—op. cit., § 389 (p. 1112).487.Cf. Mercier, op. cit., § 229: “L'action, l'efficience, qu'est elle, en quoi consiste-t-elle? Est-ce une sorte d'écoulement de la cause dans l'effet? Évidemment non. Lorsque nous voulons nous élever à une conception métaphysique, nous nous raccrochons à une image sensible, et nous nous persuadons volontiers, que la netteté de la première répond à la facilité avec laquelle nous nous figurons la seconde. Il faut se défier de cette illusion. Puisque l'action, même corporelle, ne modifie point l'agent, la causalité efficiente ne peut consister dans un influx physique, qui passerait de la cause dans l'effet.”488.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., §§ 228-9.489.We might add this other fact: that all kinds of corporeal activity and change (11) seem to involve motion or local change. This does not prove that they all are motion or local change. The significance of the fact lies probably in this, that local motion is necessary for procuring and continuing physical contact between the interacting physical agencies.—Cf. Nys, Cosmologie, §§ 227-9.490.Cf. St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, iii., 69.491.“Une cause véritable est une cause, entre laquelle et son effet l'esprit aperçoit une liaison nécessaire: c'est ainsi que je l'entendes. [This is ambiguous.] Or il n'y a que l'être infiniment parfait entre la volonté duquel et les effets l'esprit aperçoive une liaison nécessaire. Il n'y a donc que Dieu qui soit véritable cause, et il semble même qu'il y ait contradiction à dire que les hommes puissent l'être”—De la récherche de la vérité, Liv. 6me, 2e partie, ch. iii.492.“Si l'on vient à considérer attentivement l'idée que l'on a de cause ou de puissance d'agir, on ne peut en douter que cette idée ne présente quelque chose de divin.”—ibid.493.“Il n'y a point d'homme qui sache seulement ce qu'il faut faire pour remuer un de ses doigts par le moyen des esprits animaux.”—ibid.494.“J'ai toujours soutenue que l'âme était l'unique cause de ses actes, c'est à dire de ses déterminations libres ou de ses actes bons ou mauvais.... J'ai toujours soutenu que l'âme était active, mais que ses actes ne produisaient rien de physique.”—Réflexions sur la prémotion physique. “Je crois que la volonté est une puissance active, qu'elle a un véritable pouvoir de se déterminer; mais son action est immanente; c'est une action qui ne produit rien par son efficace propre, pas même le mouvement de son bras.”—Réponse à la 3me lettre d'Arnauld.495.Cf. Mercier, op. cit., §§ 230-2; Zigliara, Ontologia (45); Urraburu, op. cit., §§ 393 sqq.496.We may reasonably ask the occasionalist to suppose for the moment that we are efficient causes of our mental processes and to tell us what better proof of it could he demand, or what better proof could be forthcoming, than this proof from consciousness.497.Maher, Psychology, ch. x., p. 220.498.Should anyone doubt that consciousness does testify to this fact, we may prove it inductively from the constant correlation between the mental state and the bodily movement: “I will to move my arm, it moves; I will that it remain at rest, it does not move; I will that its movement be more or less strong and rapid, the strength and rapidity vary with the determination of my will. What more complete inductive proof can we have of the efficiency of our will-action on the external world?”—Mercier, op. cit., § 231.499.“Si effectus non producuntur ex actione rerum creatarum, sed solum ex actione Dei, impossibile est quod per effectus manifestetur virtus alicujus causae creatae: non enim effectus ostendit virtutem causae nisi ratione actionis, quae a virtute procedens ad effectum terminatur. Natura autem causae non cognoscitur per effectum, nisi inquantum per ipsum cognoscitur virtus, quae naturam consequitur. Si igitur res creatae non habent actiones ad producendum effectum, sequitur, quod nunquam naturam alicujus rei creatae poterit cognosci per effectum; et sic subtrahitur nobis omnis cognitio scientiae naturalis, in qua praecipuae demonstrationes per effectum sequuntur.”—St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, L. iii., cap. 69.500.“Je demeure d'accord que la foi oblige à croire qu'il y a des corps; mais, pour l'évidence, il me semble qu'elle n'est point entière, et que nous ne sommes point invinciblement portés à croire qu'il y ait quelqu'autre chose que Dieu et notre esprit.”—Récherche de la vérite, 6me éclaircissement.501.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., § 217.502.Metaph., v., 17.503.“Quaedam vero ad bonum inclinantur cum aliqua cognitione; non quidem sic quod cognoscant ipsam rationem boni, sed cognoscunt aliquod bonum particulare.... Inclinatio autem hanc cognitionem sequens dicitur appetitus sensitivus. Quaedam vero inclinantur ad bonum cum cognitione qua cognoscant ipsam boni rationem; et haec inclinatio dicitur voluntas.”—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., i., q. xlix., art. 1.504.“Sicut influere causae efficientis est agere, ita influere causae finalis est appeti et desiderari.”—De Veritate, q. xxii., art. 2.505.In its modern usage the term “intention” is inseparable from the notion of conscious direction. The scholastics used the term “intentio” in a wider and deeper sense to connote the natural tendency of all created agencies towards their natural activities and lines of development. And in unconscious agencies they did not hesitate to refer to it as “intentio naturae” or “appetitus naturalis”.506.«Res naturalis per formam qua perficitur in sua specie, habet inclinationem in proprias operationes et proprium finem, quem per operationes consequitur; quale enim unumquodque est, talia operatur, et in sibi convenientia tendit.» — Святой Фома, Contra Gentes, iv., 19.
«Omnia suo modo per appetitum inclinantur in bonum, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim inclinantur in bonum per solam naturalem habitudinem absque cognitione, sicut plantae et corpora inanimata; et talis inclinatio ad bonum vocatur appetitus naturalis.» — Summa Theol., i., q. xlix., art. 1. 507.«Causa efficiens et finis sibi correspondent invicem, quia efficiens est principium motus, finis autem terminus. Et similiter materia et forma: nam forma dat esse, materia autem recipit. Est igitur efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est causa finis quantum ad esse, quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens ad hoc, quod sit finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non quantum ad esse sed quantum ad rationem causalitatis. Nam efficiens est causa in quantum agit; non autem agit nisi causa [gratia] finis. Unde ex fine habet suam causalitatem efficiens.» — Святой Фома, In Metaph., v., 2.
«Sciendum quod licet finis sit ultimus in esse in quibusdam, in causalitate tamen est prior semper, unde dicitur causa causarum, quia est causa causalitatis in omnibus causis. Est enim causa causalitatis efficientis, ut jam dictum est. Efficiens autem est causa causalitatis et materiae et formae.» — ibid., lect. 3. 508.Φύσις ἐστιν ἀρχὴ τὶς καὶ αἰτία του κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ῷ ὑπάχει πρώτως καθ᾽ αὑτο, καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Natura est principium quoddam et causa cur id moveatur et quiescat, in quo inest primum, per se et non secundum accidens.—Physic., L. ii., cap. 1.509.“Ars nihil aliud est quam recta ratio aliquorum operum faciendorum.”—Summa Theol. ia iiae, q. lvii., art. 3.—Cf. In Post. Anal., l. 1.510.«Natura nihil aliud est quam ratio cujusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum; sicut si artifex factor navis posset lignis tribuere quod ex seipsis moverentur ad navis formam inducendam.» — In II Phys., lect. 14. «Omnia naturalia, in ea quae eis conveniunt, sunt inclinata, habentia in seipsis aliquod inclinationis principium, ratione cujus eorum inclinatio naturalis est, ita ut quodammodo ipsa vadant, et non solum ducantur in fines debitos.» — De Veritate, q. xxii., art. 7. 511.“In nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium extrinsicum. Si enim ars factiva navis esset intrinseca ligno, facta fuisset navis a natura, sicut modo fit ab arte.”—In II. Phys., lect. 13.512.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., § 217.513.Cf. Science of Logic, ii, § 227.514.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., §§ 226-31.515.Aristotle, Metaph., iv., ch. v.516.Physic., ii., ch. v.517.ibid.518.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., §§ 264, 268-9.519.Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὤς ἔτυχε ποιεῖ ἡ φυσις.—De Coelo, ii., 8.520.Fatalism is the view that all things happen by a blind, inevitable, eternally foredoomed and unintelligible necessity. Thus Seneca (Nat. Quaest., L. III., cap. 36) describes fatum as necessitas omnium rerum actionumque, quam nulla vis rumpat. This necessitas ineluctabilis is totally different from the conditional physical necessity of the course of Nature dependently on the Fiat of a Supreme Free Will guided by Supreme Intelligence (Cf. Science of Logic, §§ 224, 249, 253, 257). If the necessity of actual occurrences is not ultimately traceable to the Fiat of an Intelligent Will—and mechanists deny that it can be so traced—it is rightly described as fatalistic, blind, purposeless, unintelligible.521.Cf. Mercier, op. cit., §§ 259, 260.522.“Expliquer par une rencontre fortuite, la convergence d'éléments, dont chacun a sa poussée propre, c'est rendre raison de la convergence par des principes de divergence.... Il est donc contradictoire d'attribuer au hasard la raison explicative de l'ordre.”—Mercier, op. cit., § 260.523.Cf. Science of Logic, ii., §§ 224, 250, and passim.524.“Similiter ex prioribus pervenitur ad posteriora in arte et in natura: unde si artificialia, ut domus, fierent a natura, hoc ordine fierent, quo nunc fiunt per artem: scilicet prius institueretur fundamentum, et postea erigerentur parietes, et ultimo supponeretur tectum.... Et similiter si ea quae fiunt a natura fierent ab arte, hoc modo fierent sicut apta nata sunt fieri a natura; ut patet in sanitate, quam contigit fieri, et ab arte et a natura.... Unde manifestum est quod in natura est alterum propter alterum, scilicet priora propter posteriora, sicut et in arte.”—St. Thomas, In II. Phys., lect. 13.—Cf. supra, p. 417, n. 3.525.“Ordo est parium dispariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.”—De Civ. Dei, xix., 13.526.Cf. Mercier, op. cit., §§ 257-61.527.“La convergence de causes indifférentes qui réalisent d'une manière harmonieuse et persistante un même objet ordonné, ne s'explique point par des coincidences fortuites; elle réclame un principe interne de convergence.”—Ibid., § 260.528.Tennyson, In Memoriam, lvi.529.Browning, A Soul's Tragedy, Act. 1.530.“Universum habet bonum ordinis et bonum separatum.”—In Metaph., xii., l. 12.531.Aristotle, Metaph., xi., 10. Does Aristotle teach that God moves the universe only as its Final Cause, as the Supreme Good towards which it tends, or also as Efficient Cause? His thought is here obscure, and has given rise to much controversy among his interpreters.532.Ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ᾽ ἁυτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν.—Ibid., xi., 8.533.Κινεῖ δὲ (οὐ ἕνεκα) ὡς ἐρώμενον, κινούμενον δὲ τᾶλλα κινει.—ibid., 7.534.“Totus ordo universi est propter primum moventem, ut scilicet explicetur in universo ordinato id quod est in intellectu et voluntate primi moventis. Et sic oportet quod a primo movente sit tota ordinatio universi.”—Ibid., xii., l. 12.535. ... Среди себя все вещи имеют порядок; и отсюда форма, которая делает вселенную похожей на Бога. В этом высшие существа видят отпечатанные следы той вечной ценности, которая есть цель, куда направлена линия. Все природы склоняются в этом своем порядке, по-разному, некоторые больше, некоторые меньше приближаясь к своему первоисточнику. Так они движутся к разным гаваням через огромное море бытия, и каждая с данным инстинктом, который несет ее по курсу; этот направляет огонь к лунной сфере, этот побуждает сердца смертных животных, этот связывает и соединяет грубую землю. И не только существа, лишенные интеллекта, являются целью этого лука; но даже те, у кого есть разум и любовь, пронзены. То Провидение, которое так хорошо упорядочивает все, своим собственным светом всегда делает спокойным небо, в котором вращается субстанция, имеющая наибольшую скорость: и туда теперь, как к нашему предопределенному месту, мы несемся силой той крепкой веревки, которая никогда не выпускает стрелу, но в верную цель и радостную ...
— Данте, «Рай», Песнь i. (пер. Кэри).