All of the points of the measure have been commented on, except the provision in the fifth section, which makes the adoption of the
The condition that the
proposed Fourteenth
Amendment be ratified
by a sufficient number
of "States" to make it a
part of the Constitution.
proposed Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by a number of "States" sufficient to ratify it a condition precedent to the admission of any one of these so-called "rebel States" to representation in Congress. The adoption of the proposed amendment by the particular "rebel State" seeking representation was not sufficient. It must be ratified by at least three-fourths of all the "States." No matter how speedily and sincerely the legislature of Virginia might ratify the proposed Amendment, and fulfil all the other conditions required by the Act, Virginia must remain under military despotism until a very large number of the Northern "State" legislatures had pleased to ratify the proposed Amendment. This was certainly a pretty hard condition, and it was not a very fair way of forcing the legislatures of the Northern States to adopt the proposed Amendment. It was, however, an efficient weapon, and Congress had the legal power to use it. It was unconscionable, though it was one of the things about this measure which was constitutional.
Hand in hand with this bill went another measure, the purpose of which was to limit the customary power of the President, if not his
The Tenure-of-Office bill.
constitutional power, over the civil official system, the so-called Tenure-of-Office bill. On the first day of the session, December 3d, 1866, Mr. Williams of Oregon introduced this bill in the Senate, while at the same moment a bill was introduced and passed in the House repealing that section of the Confiscation Act of July 17th, 1862, which authorized the President to extend pardon and amnesty by proclamation to persons participating in the rebellion. The Senate passed the latter bill or resolution on the 8th of January, 1867, and the President, not considering that the Congress could either give or take away his power to pardon secured to him by the Constitution, simply pocketed the resolution, and it became a law on and from the 21st of January, having been presented to the President on the 9th.
The propositions contained in the Tenure-of-Office bill were, however, of a very different significance. There was no clause in the Constitution which by express literal grant vested the power to dismiss from office in the President, but the clause which made the President solely responsible for the execution of the laws was interpreted by the first Congress as doing so. Madison took the ground that the President must have this power in order to secure the necessary obedience in his subordinates, and declared that the convention which framed the Constitution so understood it and so intended it. This is certainly sound political science and correct constitutional interpretation. It had also been the practice of the Government from the beginning. The Whigs had undertaken to reverse it in their contest with Jackson, and Webster had given his opinion that good political science required that dismissal from office should be treated as an incident of appointment, and should be effected in the same manner as appointment, i.e., with the concurrence of the Senate, and that the decision of 1789 on this subject was, in his opinion, erroneous from the point of view of a proper interpretation of the Constitution as well. But the Whigs did not succeed, as we have seen, in their attempt to break down Presidential prerogative and introduce parliamentary government, and the practice of the Government on this subject remained, after, as before, the fourth decade of the century, the same.
During the experiences of the years 1865 and 1866 the Republicans feared that the President would use this great power of dismissal from
The reasons for the
Tenure-of-Office bill.
office in order to make the entire official system solid with himself on the subject of Reconstruction, and toward the end of 1866 they suspected and asserted that he was dismissing officers from their positions simply on the ground of a difference of opinion with himself on this subject, and they professed to believe that he would make a clean sweep of all such as soon as Congress should adjourn. There is little doubt that excessive partisan feeling made them exaggerate greatly what the President had done and what he intended to do. The President was guided by Mr. Seward in all public matters except his imprudent speeches, and Seward's conservative and diplomatic disposition and methods were all against any such radical and reckless procedure. Besides, it was the constitutional right of the President to require obedience in their official acts from his subordinates, and to dismiss them when in his opinion their views of policy interfered with the discharge of their official duties as he required them to be discharged. The Thirty-ninth Congress, however, resolved to disregard the precedents set by all of its predecessors and to dispute the President's prerogative of control over the tenure of his subordinates.
The bill drafted for this purpose made the removal of all officers, appointed by and with the consent of the Senate, except only members of
The contents
of the bill.
the President's Cabinet, subject to the consent of the Senate. This consent might be given in the form of a ratification of the nomination of a successor to any officer. It allowed the President, during a recess of the Senate, the power of suspension for misconduct in office, crime, legal disqualification or incapacity, and of making appointment of a suitable person to discharge temporarily the duties of such suspended officer, but it required of the President a report of all such suspensions to the Senate within the first twenty days of the next meeting of the Senate, with the reasons therefor, and reinstated the suspended officer in case the Senate should not concur in the suspension. If the Senate should concur, the President must remove the officer, and appoint, with the advice and consent of the Senate, another person in his place.
From the point of view of the present this would seem, in all conscience, to have been a sufficient usurpation of the President's
Discussion
of the bill.
constitutional powers to have satisfied the most radical and reckless interpretation of the organic law. But the bill had hardly come under discussion when Senator Howe moved to strike out the clause excepting the Cabinet officers from its operation, and although the Senate refused to pass this amendment, the House of Representatives did so when the bill came before it. The Senate, however, refused to concur on the ground, of course, that the intimate and confidential relations which should exist between the President and the members of his Cabinet made it necessary that the President should have only the men of his own choice in these positions. The strenuous insistence of the House, however, forced the Senate to a compromise upon the subject, and the bill was finally made to provide that the members of the Cabinet should "hold their offices, respectively, for and during the term of the President by whom they have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the consent of the Senate." That is, that a Cabinet officer might hold his position against the will of the President who appointed him during the entire term of the President and for one month of the term of his successor unless the Senate should agree to such officer's removal either directly or by ratification of the nomination of a successor.
The bill as finally enacted contained, moreover, the most stringent provisions for its enforcement. It made
The provisions for
enforcing the measure.
the acceptance or exercise of any office or the attempt to exercise any office contrary to the Act a high misdemeanor, punishable by a maximum fine of ten thousand dollars or a maximum imprisonment of five years, or both in the discretion of the court; and it made the removal, appointment, or employment of any officer contrary to the provisions of the Act, or the preparation, signing, sealing, countersigning or issuing of any commission of office or letter of authority in respect to any such appointment or employment high misdemeanors, punishable with the same extreme penalties. Lastly, it forbade the officers of the Treasury and all officers of the United States to pay any money, salary or compensation to any person claiming to hold any office or employment contrary to the provisions of this Act, and made the violation of this order a high misdemeanor, punishable with the same extreme penalties as in the other cases.
This monstrous measure went to the President on the same day with the Reconstruction bill, the 20th of February. It is not to be wondered at
The President's
vetoes of these bills.
that he felt that the Republican chiefs were offering him intentional personal insult, as well as that the legislative department of the Government was attempting an unwarranted encroachment upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive. It is rather to be wondered at that, in his message to Congress on these subjects, he succeeded so well in ignoring the personal affronts intended by Congress, and in confining himself so closely to a discussion of the public questions and considerations involved in the measures.
The vetoes of these bills were sent to Congress on the same day, March 2d. To the publicist and historian of this day they are masterpieces of political logic, constitutional interpretation, and official style. If not written by Mr. Seward, they must have been edited and revised by him. These documents showed most convincingly, both from constitutional provisions, opinions of contemporaries, statutes of Congress, judicial decisions, and the uniform practices of the Government, that Congress had no power to establish or re-establish martial law anywhere in the country, except when and where war or armed rebellion existed as a fact, a condition which did not then exist anywhere in the length and breadth of the land; and that Congress had no power to force the President to retain agents and subordinates in office against his judgment and will. No good political scientist and no sound constitutional lawyer will, at this day, disagree with the contention of the President upon these two points, and it is very difficult to understand how the great leaders of the Republican party could, at that day, have differed with him.
Undoubtedly, in some of the baser minds among them, the determination to create Republican party "States" in the South was a very weighty
Republican motives
in Reconstruction.
consideration, but just as undoubtedly the consideration with the majority of them was the conviction that the work of the four years of war might have to be done all over again unless a new political people, a new body of suffrage holders, should be created at the South, whose members had never been disloyal. But even from this point of view again, it is difficult to understand how they could have failed to see that the Constitution required that this should be done through the forms of Territorial civil government, instead of through the forms of martial law. Put the best light upon their conduct that is possible, there is still left the conviction that the fanaticism of extreme partisanship had an undue influence over them all. The contest with the President had blinded their perceptions as to the morality, legality and propriety of the means they were willing to employ in securing the victory over him.
As this contest developed it dwarfed, to say the least, all other considerations. Even as late as when the Reconstruction bill was
Congressional
encroachment
on the President's
military prerogatives.
passed, the majority of the Republicans refused to vote to take the President's military prerogatives from him. In less than a fortnight from this time, however, they voted, in a section of the Army Appropriation bill, "that the head-quarters of the General of the army of the United States shall be at the city of Washington, and all orders and instructions relating to military operations issued by the President or Secretary of War shall be issued through the General of the army, and, in case of his inability, through the next in rank. The General of the army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere than at said head-quarters, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate; and any orders or instructions relating to military operations issued contrary to the requirements of this section shall be null and void; and any officer who shall issue orders or instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office; and any officer of the army who shall transmit, convey, or obey any orders or instructions so issued contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing that such orders were so issued, shall be liable to imprisonment for not less than two nor more than twenty years, upon conviction in any court of competent jurisdiction."
To the mind of any unprejudiced constitutional lawyer, at the present day, this act must appear as a gross usurpation by Congress of the President's military powers conferred upon him by the Constitution. The Constitution makes the President the Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy, and gives Congress no power whatsoever over the methods or channels by, and through, which he may issue his military commands. Neither does the Constitution give Congress any power to assign any of the officers or troops of the army to any particular position. These are all functions of the commandership-in-chief, and, unless expressly granted by the Constitution to some other department of the Government, belong to the President.
It was not only a usurpation by Congress to pass such an act, but it was a mean thing to do it as a section of an appropriation bill; and there is no escaping the suspicion that it had a sinister purpose, namely, to entrap the President in the commission of what Congress had made a high misdemeanor, and open the way for his impeachment and expulsion from office. The President signed this bill, however, in order to save the appropriations for the support of the army, although he protested strongly against the seizure of his constitutional powers by the Congress.
On the same day that the vetoes of the Reconstruction bill and the Tenure-of-Office bill were sent to Congress, this body passed a bill
The supplementary
Reconstruction bill.
supplementary to the first measure. It was in the nature of an administrative measure for the purpose of carrying out the new plan of Reconstruction. It ordered the commanding generals of the respective districts to cause a registration to be made before September 1st next following of all male citizens of the United States, twenty-one years of age and over, resident in each county or parish in the "State" or "States" included in their respective districts, who were qualified as
prescribed by the Reconstruction Act to vote for delegates to a constitutional convention, and who had taken an oath asserting citizenship and residence, and freedom from disfranchisement on account of participation in rebellion or the commission of felony, and had sworn that they had never engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States after having been members of Congress or of a "State" legislature, or officers of the United States or of a "State" of the Union, and that they would henceforth faithfully support the Constitution and obey the laws of the United States and encourage others to do so.
It next made it the duty of the commanding generals to order elections, at such times after the completion of the registrations and at such places as they might choose, for delegates to constitutional conventions in the "States" comprised in their respective districts. It required them to give thirty days' notice of the elections, and it fixed the number of delegates to each convention at the number of members in the lower House of the legislature of the "State" concerned in the year 1860, except in the case of Virginia, where, on account of the separation of West Virginia from the old Commonwealth, the number of deputies to the Virginia convention was made to correspond with the number of members in the lower House of the legislature of 1860, representing the territory not included in West Virginia. The bill further directed the commanding generals to distribute the representation in the conventions among the districts, counties and parishes of the "States" in accordance with the number of registered voters in each.
The bill then provided that at the elections for delegates, the voters should vote on the question as to whether there should be a constitutional convention or not, and that such convention should be held only when a majority of the inscribed electors voted upon this question, and a majority of those voting voted in the affirmative. It then ordered the commanding generals, in case the voters did so decide for conventions and elect delegates thereto, to call such within sixty days from the date of the elections, and to notify the delegates to assemble at a given time and place, and frame constitutions according to the provisions of the bill and of the former Act to which it was supplementary, and, when framed, to submit the same to the registered voters for ratification with a notice of thirty days.
The bill then further provided, that if, at such elections, a majority of the registered voters voted upon the question of ratification, and a majority of those voting voted in favor of ratification, the presidents of the respective conventions should transmit copies of the respective constitutions to the President of the United States, who should transmit them to Congress, and that Congress should declare the respective "States," whose conventions had framed these constitutions and whose voters had adopted them, entitled to representation in Congress, provided Congress was satisfied that there had been perfectly free elections, and that no force, fraud or intimidation had been perpetrated at them, and that the constitutions presented met the approval of a majority of the qualified electors and were in conformity with the requirements of the Reconstruction Act.