«Философские труды (1705–1721)»

Дэвид Юм так отзывается о доктрине Беркли об «абстрактных идеях»: — «Великий философ утвердил, что все общие идеи суть не что иное, как частные, присоединенные к определенному термину, который придает им более широкое значение. Я считаю это одним из величайших и наиболее ценных открытий, сделанных за последние годы в республике ученых». («Трактат о человеческой природе», ч. I, разд. 7.)

Одновременное восприятие «одних и тех же» (подобных?) чувственных идей разными лицами, в отличие от чисто индивидуального сознания чувств и фантазий, здесь берется как критерий виртуально внешней реальности первых.

521. This resembles Locke's account of the ideas with which human knowledge is concerned. They are all originally presented to the senses, or got by reflexion upon the passions and acts of the mind; and the materials contributed in this external and internal experience are, with the help of memory and imagination, elaborated by the human understanding in ways innumerable, true and false. See Locke's Essay, Bk. II, ch. 1, §§ 1-5; ch. 10, 11, 12. 522. The ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in our five senses make their appearance, not isolated, but in individual masses, constituting the things, that occupy their respective places in perceived ambient space. It is as qualities of things that the ideas or phenomena of sense arise in human experience. 523. This is an advance upon the language of the Commonplace Book, in which “mind” is spoken of as only a “congeries of perceptions.” Here it is something “entirely distinct” from ideas or perceptions, in which they exist and are perceived, and on which they ultimately depend. Spirit, intelligent and active, presupposed with its implicates in ideas, thus becomes the basis of Berkeley's philosophy. Is this subjective idealism only? Locke appears in sect. 1, Descartes, if not Kant by anticipation, in sect. 2. 524. This sentence expresses Berkeley's New Principle, which filled his thoughts in the Commonplace Book. Note “in a mind,” not necessarily in my mind. 525. That is to say, one has only to put concrete meaning into the terms existence and reality, in order to have “an intuitive knowledge” that matter depends for its real existence on percipient spirit. 526. In other words, the things of sense become real, only in the concrete experience of living mind, which gives them the only reality we can conceive or have any sort of concern with. Extinguish Spirit and the material world necessarily ceases to be real. 527. That esse is percipi is Berkeley's initial Principle, called “intuitive” or self-evident. 528. Mark that it is the “natural or real existence” of the material world, in the absence of all realising Spirit, that Berkeley insists is impossible—meaningless. 529. “our own”—yet not exclusively mine. They depend for their reality upon a percipient, not on my perception. 530. “this tenet,” i.e. that the concrete material world could still be a reality after the annihilation of all realising spiritual life in the universe—divine or other. 531. “existing unperceived,” i.e. existing without being realised in any living percipient experience—existing in a totally abstract existence, whatever that can mean. 532. “notions”—a term elsewhere (see sect. 27, 89, 142) restricted, is here applied to the immediate data of the senses—the ideas of sense. 533. This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 534. In the first edition, instead of this sentence, we have the following: “To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an Axiom, it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflexion of the reader, that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and turn his thoughts upon the subject itself; free and disengaged from all embarras of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes.” 535. In other words, active percipient Spirit is at the root of all intelligible trustworthy experience. 536. 'proof'—“demonstration” in first edition; yet he calls it “intuitive.” 537. “the ideas themselves,” i.e. the phenomena immediately presented in sense, and that are thus realised in and through the percipient experience of living mind, as their factor. 538. As those say who assume that perception is ultimately only representative of the material reality, the very things themselves not making their appearance to us at all. 539. He refers especially to Locke, whose account of Matter is accordingly charged with being incoherent. 540. “inert.” See the De Motu. 541. “ideas existing in the mind,” i.e. phenomena of which some mind is percipient; which are realised in the sentient experience of a living spirit, human or other. 542. What follows to the end of the section is omitted in the second edition. 543. “the existence of Matter,” i.e. the existence of the material world, regarded as a something that does not need to be perceived in order to be real. 544. Sometimes called objective qualities, because they are supposed to be realised in an abstract objectivity, which Berkeley insists is meaningless. 545. See Locke's Essay, Bk. II, ch. 8, §§ 13, 18; ch. 23, § 11; Bk. IV, ch. 3, § 24-26. Locke suggests this relation between the secondary and the primary qualities of matter only hypothetically. 546. “in the mind, and nowhere else,” i.e. perceived or conceived, but in no other manner can they be real or concrete. 547. “without the mind,” i.e. independently of all percipient experience. 548. Extension is thus the distinguishing characteristic of the material world. Geometrical and physical solidity, as well as motion, imply extension. 549. “number is the creature of the mind,” i.e. is dependent on being realised in percipient experience. This dependence is here illustrated by the relation of concrete number to the point of view of each mind; as the dependence of the other primary qualities was illustrated by their dependence on the organisation of the percipient. In this, the preceding, and the following sections, Berkeley argues the inconsistency of the abstract reality attributed to the primary qualities with their acknowledged dependence on the necessary conditions of sense perception. 550. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 109. 551. e.g. Locke, Essay, Bk. II, ch. 7, § 7; ch. 16, § 1. 552. “without any alteration in any external object”—“without any external alteration”—in first edition. 553. These arguments, founded on the mind-dependent nature of all the qualities of matter, are expanded in the First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. 554. “an outward object,” i.e. an object wholly abstract from living Mind. 555. This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 556. “reason,” i.e. reasoning. It is argued, in this and the next section, that a reality unrealised in percipient experience cannot be proved, either by our senses or by reasoning. 557. Omitted in the second edition, and the sentence converted into a question. 558. But the ideas of which we are cognizant in waking dreams, and dreams of sleep, differ in important characteristics from the external ideas of which we are percipient in sense. Cf. sect. 29-33. 559. “external bodies,” i.e. bodies supposed to be real independently of all percipients in the universe. 560. i.e. they cannot shew how their unintelligible hypothesis of Matter accounts for the experience we have, or expect to have; or which we believe other persons have, or to be about to have. 561. “the production,” &c., i.e. the fact that we and others have percipient experience. 562. Mind-dependent Matter he not only allows to exist, but maintains its reality to be intuitively evident. 563. i.e. bodies existing in abstraction from living percipient spirit. 564. “Matter,” i.e. abstract Matter, unrealised in sentient intelligence. 565. The appeal here and elsewhere is to consciousness—directly in each person's experience, and indirectly in that of others. 566. i.e. otherwise than in the form of an idea or actual appearance presented to our senses. 567. This implies that the material world may be realised in imagination as well as in sensuous perception, but in a less degree of reality; for reality, he assumes, admits of degrees. 568. “to conceive the existence of external bodies,” i.e. to conceive bodies that are not conceived—that are not ideas at all, but which exist in abstraction. To suppose what we conceive to be unconceived, is to suppose a contradiction. 569. This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 570. “The existence of things without mind,” or in the absence of all spiritual life and perception, is what Berkeley argues against, as meaningless, if not contradictory; not the existence of a material world, when this means the realised order of nature, regulated independently of individual will, and to which our actions must conform if we are to avoid physical pain. 571. Here again notion is undistinguished from idea. 572. This and the three following sections argue for the essential impotence of matter, and that, as far as we are concerned, so-called “natural causes” are only signs which foretell the appearance of their so-called effects. The material world is presented to our senses as a procession of orderly, and therefore interpretable, yet in themselves powerless, ideas or phenomena: motion is always an effect, never an originating active cause. 573. As Locke suggests. 574. This tacitly presupposes the necessity in reason of the Principle of Causality, or the ultimate need for an efficient cause of every change. To determine the sort of Causation that constitutes and pervades the universe is the aim of his philosophy. 575. In other words, the material world is not only real in and through percipient spirit, but the changing forms which its phenomena assume, in the natural evolution, are the issue of the perpetual activity of in-dwelling Spirit. The argument in this section requires a deeper criticism of its premisses. 576. In other words, an agent cannot, as such, be perceived or imagined, though its effects can. The spiritual term agent is not meaningless; yet we have no sensuous idea of its meaning. 577. Omitted in second edition. 578. This sentence is not contained in the first edition. It is remarkable for first introducing the term notion, to signify idealess meaning, as in the words soul, active power, &c. Here he says that “the operations of the mind” belong to notions, while, in sect. 1, he speaks of “ideas perceived by attending to the ‘operations’ of the mind.” 579. “ideas,” i.e. fancies of imagination; as distinguished from the more real ideas or phenomena that present themselves objectively to our senses. 580. With Berkeley the world of external ideas is distinguished from Spirit by its essential passivity. Active power is with him the essence of Mind, distinguishing me from the changing ideas of which I am percipient. We must not attribute free agency to phenomena presented to our senses. 581. In this and the four following sections, Berkeley mentions marks by which the ideas or phenomena that present themselves to the senses may be distinguished from all other ideas, in consequence of which they may be termed “external,” while those of feeling and imagination are wholly subjective or individual. 582. This mark—the superior strength and liveliness of the ideas or phenomena that are presented to the senses—was afterwards noted by Hume. See Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, sect. II. 583. Berkeley here and always insists on the arbitrary character of “settled laws” of change in the world, as contrasted with “necessary connexions” discovered in mathematics. The material world is thus virtually an interpretable natural language, constituted in what, at our point of view, is arbitrariness or contingency. 584. Under this conception of the universe, “second causes” are divinely established signs of impending changes, and are only metaphorically called “causes.” 585. So Schiller, in Don Carlos, Act III, where he represents sceptics as failing to see the God who veils Himself in everlasting laws. But in truth God is eternal law or order vitalised and moralised. 586. “sensations,” with Berkeley, are not mere feelings, but in a sense external appearances. 587. “more reality.” This implies that reality admits of degrees, and that the difference between the phenomena presented to the senses and those which are only imagined is a difference in degree of reality. 588. In the preceding sections, two relations should be carefully distinguished—that of the material world to percipient mind, in which it becomes real; and that between changes in the world and spiritual agency. These are Berkeley's two leading Principles. The first conducts to and vindicates the second—inadequately, however, apart from explication of their root in moral reason. The former gives a relation sui generis. The latter gives our only example of active causality—the natural order of phenomena being the outcome of the causal energy of intending Will. 589. Sect. 34-84 contain Berkeley's answers to supposed objections to the foregoing Principles concerning Matter and Spirit in their mutual relations. 590. To be an “idea” is, with Berkeley, to be the imaginable object of a percipient spirit. But he does not define precisely the relation of ideas to mind. “Existence in mind” is existence in this relation. His question (which he determines in the negative) is, the possibility of concrete phenomena, naturally presented to sense, yet out of all relation to living mind. 591. Omitted in second edition. 592. i.e. of imagination. Cf. sect. 28-30. 593. Cf. sect. 29. 594. “more reality.” This again implies that reality admits of degrees. What is perceived in sense is more real than what is imagined, and eternal realities are more deeply real than the transitory things of sense. 595. Cf. sect. 33. “Not fictions,” i.e. they are presentative, and therefore cannot misrepresent. 596. With Berkeley substance is either (a) active reason, i.e. spirit—substance proper, or (b) an aggregate of sense-phenomena, called a “sensible thing”—substance conventionally and superficially. 597. And which, because realised in living perception, are called ideas—to remind us that reality is attained in and through percipient mind. 598. “combined together,” i.e. in the form of “sensible things,” according to natural laws. Cf. sect. 33. 599. “thinking things”—more appropriately called persons. 600. Berkeley uses the word idea to mark the fact, that sensible things are real only as they manifest themselves in the form of passive objects, presented to sense-percipient mind; but he does not, as popularly supposed, regard “sensible things” as created and regulated by the activity of his own individual mind. They are perceived, but are neither created nor regulated, by the individual percipient, and are thus practically external to each person. 601. Cf. sect. 87-91, against the scepticism which originates in alleged fallacy of sense. 602. Omitted in second edition. 603. It is always to be remembered that with Berkeley ideas or phenomena presented to sense are themselves the real things, whilst ideas of imagination are representative (or misrepresentative). 604. Here feelings of pleasure or pain are spoken of, without qualification, as in like relation to living mind as sensible things or ideas are. 605. That the ideas of sense should be seen “at a distance of several miles” seems not inconsistent with their being dependent on a percipient, if ambient space is itself (as Berkeley asserts) dependent on percipient experience. Cf. sect. 67. 606. In the preceding year. 607. Essay, sect. 2. 608. Ibid. sect. 11-15. 609. Ibid. sect. 16-28. 610. Ibid. sect. 51. 611. Ibid. sect. 47-49, 121-141. 612. Ibid. sect. 43. 613. i.e. what we are immediately percipient of in seeing. 614. Touch is here and elsewhere taken in its wide meaning, and includes our muscular and locomotive experience, all which Berkeley included in the “tactual” meaning of distance. 615. To explain the condition of sensible things during the intervals of our perception of them, consistently with the belief of all sane persons regarding the material world, is a challenge which has been often addressed to the advocates of ideal Realism. According to Berkeley, there are no intervals in the existence of sensible things. They are permanently perceivable, under the laws of nature, though not always perceived by this, that or the other individual percipient. Moreover they always exist really in the Divine Idea, and potentially, in relation to finite minds, in the Divine Will. 616. Berkeley allows to bodies unperceived by me potential, but (for me) not real existence. When I say a body exists thus conditionally, I mean that if, in the light, I open my eyes, I shall see it, and that if I move my hand, I must feel it. 617. i.e. unperceived material substance. 618. Berkeley remarks, in a letter to the American Samuel Johnson, that “those who have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged that natura naturans (to use the language of the Schoolmen) is God; and that the Divine conservation of things is equipollent to, and in fact the same thing with, a continued repeated creation;—in a word, that conservation and creation differ only as the terminus a quo. These are the common opinions of Schoolmen; and Durandus, who held the world to be a machine, like a clock made up and put in motion by God, but afterwards continued to go of itself, was therein particular, and had few followers. The very poets teach a doctrine not unlike the Schools—mens agitat molem (Virgil, Æneid, VI). The Stoics and Platonists are everywhere full of the same notion. I am not therefore singular in this point itself, so much as in my way of proving it.” Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV. sect. 14; Vindication of New Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 17, &c.; Siris, passim, but especially in the latter part. See also Correspondence between Clarke and Leibniz (1717). Is it not possible that the universe of things and persons is in continuous natural creation, unbeginning and unending? 619. Cf. sect. 123-132. 620. He distinguishes “idea” from “mode or attribute.” With Berkeley, the “substance” of matter (if the term is still to be applied to sensible things) is the naturally constituted aggregate of phenomena of which each particular thing consists. Now extension, and the other qualities of sensible things, are not, Berkeley argues, “in mind” either (a) according to the abstract relation of substance and attribute of which philosophers speak; nor (b) as one idea or phenomenon is related to another idea or phenomenon, in the natural aggregation of sense-phenomena which constitute, with him, the substance of a material thing. Mind and its “ideas” are, on the contrary, related as percipient to perceived—in whatever “otherness” that altogether sui generis relation implies. 621. “Matter,” i.e. abstract material Substance, as distinguished from the concrete things that are realised in living perceptions. 622. “take away natural causes,” i.e. empty the material world of all originative power, and refer the supposed powers of bodies to the constant and omnipresent agency of God. 623. Some philosophers have treated the relation of Matter to Mind in perception as one of cause and effect. This, according to Berkeley, is an illegitimate analysis, which creates a fictitious duality. On his New Principles, philosophy is based on a recognition of the fact, that perception is neither the cause nor the effect of its object, but in a relation to it that is altogether sui generis. 624. He refers to Descartes, and perhaps Geulinx and Malebranche, who, while they argued for material substance, denied the causal efficiency of sensible things. Berkeley's new Principles are presented as the foundation in reason for this denial, and for the essential spirituality of all active power in the universe. 625. On the principle, “Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem.” 626. “external things,” i.e. things in the abstract. 627. That the unreflecting part of mankind should have a confused conception of what should be meant by the external reality of matter is not wonderful. It is the office of philosophy to improve their conception, making it deeper and truer, and this was Berkeley's preliminary task; as a mean for shewing the impotence of the things of sense, and conclusive evidence of omnipresent spiritual activity. 628. Cf. sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24. 629. i.e. their sense-ideas.—Though sense-ideas, i.e. the appearances presented to the senses, are independent of the will of the individual percipient, it does not follow that they are independent of all perception, so that they can be real in the absence of realising percipient experience. Cf. sect. 29-33. 630. By shewing that what we are percipient of in sense must be idea, or that it is immediately known by us only as sensuous appearance. 631. i.e. “imprinted” by unperceived Matter, which, on this dogma of a representative sense-perception, was assumed to exist behind the perceived ideas, and to be the cause of their appearance. Cf. Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. 632. Hence the difficulty men have in recognising that Divine Reason and Will, and Law in Nature, are coincident. But the advance of scientific discovery of the laws which express Divine Will in nature, instead of narrowing, extends our knowledge of God. And divine or absolutely reasonable “arbitrariness” is not caprice. 633. “ideas,” i.e. ideas of sense. This “experience” implied an association of sensuous ideas, according to the divine or reasonable order of nature. 634. Cf. sect. 25-33, and other passages in Berkeley's writings in which he insists upon the arbitrariness—divine or reasonable—of the natural laws and sense-symbolism. 635. Cf. sect. 3, 4, 6, 22-24, 26, in which he proceeds upon the intuitive certainty of his two leading Principles, concerning Reality and Causation. 636. In short, what is virtually the language of universal natural order is the divine way of revealing omnipresent Intelligence; nor can we conceive how this revelation could be made through a capricious or chaotic succession of changes. 637. He here touches on moral purpose in miraculous phenomena, but without discussing their relation to the divine, or perfectly reasonable, order of the universe. Relatively to a fine knowledge of nature, they seem anomalous—exceptions from general rules, which nevertheless express, immediately and constantly, perfect active Reason. 638. “ideas,” i.e. the phenomena presented to the senses. 639. “imaginable”—in first edition. 640. “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the presence of law or reasonable uniformity in the coexistence and succession of the phenomena of sense; which makes them interpretable signs. 641. According to Berkeley, it is by an abuse of language that the term “power” is applied to those ideas which are invariable antecedents of other ideas—the prior forms of their existence, as it were. 642. Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus implies Universal Natural Symbolism as the essential character of the sensible world, in its relation to man. 643. See Locke's Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 3, § 25-28, &c., in which he suggests that the secondary qualities of bodies may be the natural issue of the different relations and modifications of their primary qualities. 644. With Berkeley, material substance is merely the natural combination of sense-presented phenomena, which, under a divine or reasonable “arbitrariness,” constitute a concrete thing. Divine Will, or Active Reason, is the constantly sustaining cause of this combination or substantiation. 645. i.e. that it is not realised in a living percipient experience. 646. For “place” is realised only as perceived—percipient experience being its concrete existence. Living perception is, with Berkeley, the condition of the possibility of concrete locality. 647. So in the Cartesian theory of occasional causes. 648. So Geulinx and Malebranche. 649. As known in Divine intelligence, they are accordingly Divine Ideas. And, if this means that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which are its ultimate archetype—that the Ideas of God are symbolised to our senses, and then interpreted (or misinterpreted) by human minds, this allies itself with Platonic Idealism. 650. “It seems to me,” Hume says, “that this theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with it to a mind sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations.” But is it not virtually presupposed in the assumed trustworthiness of our experience of the universe? 651. Accordingly we are led to ask, what the deepest support of their reality must be. Is it found in living Spirit, i.e. Active Reason, or in blind Matter? 652. e.g. Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c. 653. In short, if we mean by Matter, something unrealised in percipient experience of sense, what is called its reality is something unintelligible. 654. And if sensible phenomena are sufficiently externalised, when regarded as regulated by Divine Reason. 655. Twenty years after the publication of the Principles, in a letter to his American friend Johnson, Berkeley says:—“I have no objection against calling the Ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours. But I object against those archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real things, and so to have an absolute rational existence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatsoever; it being the opinion of all materialists that an ideal existence in the Divine Mind is one thing, and the real existence of material things another.” 656. Berkeley's philosophy is not inconsistent with Divine Ideas which receive expression in the laws of nature, and of which human science is the imperfect interpretation. In this view, assertion of the existence of Matter is simply an expression of faith that the phenomenal universe into which we are born is a reasonable and interpretable universe; and that it would be fully interpreted, if our notions could be fully harmonised with the Divine Ideas which it expresses. 657. Cf. sect. 3-24. 658. So that superhuman persons, endowed with a million senses, would be no nearer this abstract Matter than man is, with his few senses. 659. Matter and physical science is relative, so far that we may suppose in other percipients than men, an indefinite number of additional senses, affording corresponding varieties of qualities in things, of course inconceivable by man. Or, we may suppose an intelligence destitute of all our senses, and so in a material world wholly different in its appearances from ours. 660. The authority of Holy Scripture, added to our natural tendency to believe in external reality, are grounds on which Malebranche and Norris infer a material world. Berkeley's material world claims no logical proof of its reality. His is not to prove the reality of the world, but to shew what we should mean when we affirm its reality, and the basis of its explicability in science. 661. i.e. existing unrealised in any intelligence—human or Divine. 662. “external things,” i.e. things existing really, yet out of all relation to active living spirit. 663.

Беркли не спрашивает, является ли превращение жезла в змея или воды в вино результатом божественного вмешательства и порядка, иначе, чем всякая естественная эволюция является божественно провиденциальной.

Ниже приводится Предисловие переводчика о целях «Диалогов» и в объяснение трех иллюстративных виньеток: —

664. Some of the Consequences of adoption of the New Principles, in their application to the physical sciences and mathematics, and then to psychology and theology, are unfolded in the remaining sections of the Principles. 665. Berkeley disclaims the supposed representative character of the ideas given in sensuous perception, and recognises as the real object only what is ideally presented in consciousness. 666. So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who all see in a wholly representative sense-perception, with its double object, the germ of total scepticism. Berkeley claims that, under his interpretation of what the reality of the material world means, immediate knowledge of mind-dependent matter is given in sense. 667. “scepticism”—“sceptical cant” in the first edition. 668. This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 669. Berkeley's argument against a finally representative perception so far resembles that afterwards employed by Reid and Hamilton. They differ as regards the dependence of the sensible object upon percipient spirit for its reality. 670. Omitted in second edition. 671. Omitted in second edition. 672. But whilst unthinking things depend on being perceived, do not our spirits depend on ideas of some sort for their percipient life? 673. The important passage within brackets was added in the second edition. 674. “reason,” i.e. reasoning. 675. “Notion,” in its stricter meaning, is thus confined by Berkeley to apprehension of the Ego, and intelligence of relations. The term “notion,” in this contrast with his “idea,” becomes important in his vocabulary, although he sometimes uses it vaguely. 676. Locke uses idea in this wider signification. 677. Inasmuch as they are real in and through living percipient mind. 678. i.e. unthinking archetypes. 679. In this section Berkeley explains what he means by externality. Men cannot act, cannot live, without assuming an external world—in some meaning of the term “external.” It is the business of the philosopher to explicate its true meaning. 680. i.e. they are not substances in the truest or deepest meaning of the word. 681. “Ideas of the corporeal substances.” Berkeley might perhaps say—Divine Ideas which are themselves our world of sensible things in its ultimate form. 682. On the scheme of ideal Realism, “creation” of matter is presenting to finite minds sense-ideas or phenomena, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet, in that language of natural order which God employs for the expression of His Ideas to us. 683. The independent eternity of Matter must be distinguished from an unbeginning and endless creation of sensible ideas or phenomena, in percipient spirits, according to divine natural law and order, with implied immanence of God. 684. Because the question at issue with Atheism is, whether the universe of things and persons is finally substantiated and evolved in unthinking Matter or in the perfect Reason of God. 685. Of which Berkeley does not predicate a numerical identity. Cf. Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous. 686. “matter,” i.e. matter abstracted from all percipient life and voluntary activity. 687. “external”—not in Berkeley's meaning of externality. Cf. sect. 90, note 2. 688. Si non rogas, intelligo. Berkeley writes long after this to Johnson thus:—“A succession of ideas (phenomena) I take to constitute time, and not to be only the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think. But in these matters every man is to think for himself, and speak as he finds. One of my earliest inquiries was about time; which led me into several paradoxes that I did not think it fit or necessary to publish, particularly into the notion that the resurrection follows the next moment after death. We are confounded and perplexed about time—supposing a succession in God; that we have an abstract idea of time; that time in one mind is to be measured by succession of ideas in another mind: not considering the true use of words, which as often terminate in the will as in the understanding, being employed to excite and direct action rather than to produce clear and distinct ideas.” Cf. Introduction, sect. 20. 689. As the esse of unthinking things is percipi, according to Berkeley, so the esse of persons is percipere. The real existence of individual Mind thus depends on having ideas of some sort: the real existence of matter depends on a percipient. 690. This sentence is omitted in the second edition. 691. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43. 692. “objects of sense,” i.e. sensible things, practically external to each person. Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of thing, as distinct from the distinguishable ideas or phenomena that are naturally aggregated in the form of concrete things. 693. Omitted in second edition. 694. Omitted in second edition. 695. Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With Berkeley, the real essence of sensible things is given in perception—so far as our perceptions carry us. 696. e.g. Locke's Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 3. 697. Berkeley advocates a Realism, which eliminates effective causation from the material world, concentrates it in Mind, and in physical research seeks among data of sense for their divinely maintained natural laws. 698. In interpreting the data of sense, we are obliged to assume that every new phenomenon must have previously existed in some equivalent form—but not necessarily in this or that particular form, for a knowledge of which we are indebted to inductive comparisons of experience. 699. The preceding forms of new phenomena, being finally determined by Will, are, in that sense, arbitrary; but not capricious, for the Will is perfect Reason. God is the immanent cause of the natural order. 700. He probably refers to Bacon. 701. Omitted in second edition. 702. What we are able to discover in the all-comprehensive order may be subordinate and provisional only. Nature in its deepest meaning explains itself in the Divine Omniscience. 703. i.e. inductively. 704. i.e. deductively. 705. “seem to consider signs,” i.e. to be grammarians rather than philosophers: physical sciences deal with the grammar of the divine language of nature. 706. “A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding the grammar of it, or being able to say,” &c.—in first edition. 707. “extend”—“stretch”—in first edition. 708. Omitted in second edition. 709. In the first edition, the section commences thus: “The best grammar of the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise of Mechanics, demonstrated and applied to Nature, by a philosopher of a neighbouring nation, whom all the world admire. I shall not take upon me to make remarks on the performance of that extraordinary person: only some things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid down, that we should be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great a man did we not take some notice of them.” He refers, of course, to Newton. The first edition of Berkeley's Principles was published in Ireland—hence “neighbouring nation.” Newton's Principia appeared in 1687. 710. “Motion,” in various aspects, is treated specially in the De Motu. An imagination of trinal space presupposes locomotive experience—unimpeded, in contrast with—impeded locomotion. Cf. sect. 116. 711. Omitted in second edition. 712. Added in second edition. 713. Omitted in second edition. 714. See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10. 715. “applied to”—“impressed on”—in first edition. 716. “applied to”—“impressed on”—in first edition. 717. “the force causing the change”—which “force,” according to Berkeley, can only be attributed metaphorically to the so-called impelling body; inasmuch as bodies, or the data of sense, can only be signs of their consequent events, not efficient causes of change. 718. Added in second edition. 719. What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition. 720. “seems impossible”—“is above my capacity”—in first edition. 721. In short, empty Space is the sensuous idea of unresisted motion. This is implied in the New Theory of Vision. He minimises Space, treating it as a datum of sense. 722. He probably refers to Samuel Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, which appeared in 1706, and a treatise De Spatio Reali, published in the same year. 723. Sect. 118-132 are accordingly concerned with the New Principles in their application to Mathematics. The foundation of the mathematical sciences engaged much of Berkeley's thought in early life and in his later years. See his Analyst. 724. Numerical relations are realised only in concrete experience. 725. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107, &c. 726. Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160. 727. An infinitely divided extension, being unperceived, must be unreal—if its existence is made real only in and through actual perception, or at least imagination. The only possible extension is, accordingly, sensible extension, which could not be infinitely divided without the supposed parts ceasing to be perceived or real. 728. “converted Gentile”—“pagan convert”—in first edition. 729. Cf. Locke's Essay, Bk. I, ch. 3, § 25. 730. “will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit,” &c.—“will not stick to affirm,” &c.—in first edition. 731. Omitted in second edition. See the Analyst. 732. “we must mean”—“we mean (if we mean anything)”—in first edition. 733. Omitted in the second edition. 734. Does this refer to the intended “Part II” of the Principles? 735. “men of great abilities and obstinate application,” &c.—“men of the greatest abilities and most obstinate application,” &c.—in first edition. 736. What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition. 737. “absolute,” i.e. abstract, independent, irrelative existence—as something of which there can be no sensuous perception or conception. 738. Matter unrealised in perception—not the material world that is realised in percipient experience of sense. 739. Omitted in second edition. 740. Sect. 135-156 treat of consequences of the New Principles, in their application to sciences concerned with our notions of Spirit or Mind; as distinguished from sciences of ideas in external Nature, and their mathematical relations. Individual mind, with Berkeley, needs data of sense in order to its realisation in consciousness; while it is dependent on God, in a relation which he does not define distinctly. 741. e.g. Locke suggests this. 742. Is this analogy applicable? 743. Omitted in second edition, as he had previously learned to distinguish notion from idea. Cf. sect. 89, 142. 744. Ibid. In the omitted passage it will be seen that he makes idea and notion synonymous. 745. Is the reality of mind as dependent on having ideas (of some sort) as ideas are on mind; although mind is more deeply and truly real than its ideas are? 746. Introduced in second edition. 747. We know other finite persons through sense-presented phenomena, but not as themselves phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It is a mediate knowledge that we have of other persons. The question about the individuality of finite egos, as distinguished from God, Berkeley has not touched. 748. These sentences are omitted in the second edition. 749. “the soul,” i.e. the individual Ego. 750. Cf. sect. 2; 25-27. 751. This is Berkeley's application of his new conception of the reality of matter, to the final human question of the self-conscious existence of the individual human Ego, after physical death. Philosophers and theologians were accustomed in his generation to ground their argument for a future life on the metaphysical assumption of the physical indivisibility of our self-conscious spirit, and on our contingent connexion with the body. “Our bodies,” says Bishop Butler, “are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other matter around us.” This train of thought is foreign to us at the present day, when men of science remind us that self-conscious life is found only in correlation with corporeal organisation, whatever may be the abstract possibility. Hope of continued life after physical death seems to depend on ethical considerations more than on metaphysical arguments, and on what is suggested by faith in the final outcome of personal life in a divinely constituted universe. 752. Mind and the ideas presented to the senses are at opposite poles of existence. But he does not say that, thus opposed, they are each independent of the other. 753. What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which notion is contrasted with idea. 754. Here is a germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity of mind which constitutes relation, nor systematically unfolded the relations involved in the rational constitution of experience. There is more disposition to this in Siris. 755. As with Locke, for example. 756. Note this condemnation of the tendency to substantiate “powers of mind.” 757. Omitted in second edition. Berkeley was after all reluctant to “depart from received modes of speech,” notwithstanding their often misleading associations. 758. Omitted in second edition. 759. This is one of the notable sections in the Principles, as it suggests the rationale of Berkeley's rejection of Panegoism or Solipsism. Is this consistent with his conception of the reality of the material world? It is objected (e.g. by Reid) that ideal realism dissolves our faith in the existence of other persons. The difficulty is to shew how appearances presented to my senses, which are sensuous and subjective, can be media of communication between persons. The question carries us back to the theistic presupposition in the trustworthiness of experience—which is adapted to deceive if I am the only person existing. With Berkeley a chief function of ideas of sense is to signify other persons to each person. See Alciphron, Dial. IV; New Theory of Vision Vindicated, and Siris. 760. “repugnant”—for it would involve thought in incoherence, by paralysis of its indispensable causal presupposition. 761. Is not God the indispensable presupposition of trustworthy experience, rather than an empirical inference? 762. This suggests an explanation of the objective reality and significance of ideas of sense; through which they become media of social intercourse in the fundamentally divine universe. God so regulates the sense-given ideas of which human beings are individually percipient, as that, while numerically different, as in each mind, those ideas are nevertheless a sufficient medium for social intercourse, if the Power universally at work is morally trustworthy. Unless our God-given experience is deceiving, Solipsism is not a necessary result of the fact that no one but myself can be percipient of my sensuous experience. 763. Omitted in second edition. 764. Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. See Recherche, Liv. III. p. ii. ch. 6, &c. 765. For all finite persons somehow live, and move, and have their being “in God.” The existence of eternal living Mind, and the present existence of other men, are both inferences, resting on the same foundation, according to Berkeley. 766. The theistic trust in which our experience is rooted remaining latent, or being unintelligent. 767. Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66. His conception of Divine causation in Nature, as the constant omnipresent agency in all natural law, is the deepest part of his philosophy. It is pursued in the De Motu. 768. Is not the unbeginning and unending natural evolution, an articulate revelation of Eternal Spirit or Active Reason at the heart of the whole? 769. Omitted in second edition. 770. So Pascal in the Pensées. 771. Divine reason ever active in Nature is the necessary correlate to reason in man; inasmuch as otherwise the changing universe in which we live would be unfit to be reasoned about or acted in. 772. The existence of moral evil, or what ought not to exist, is the difficulty which besets faith in the fundamental divinity or goodness of the universe. Yet that faith is presupposed in interpretation of nature, which proceeds on the postulate of universal order; and this implies the moral trustworthiness of the world which we begin to realise when we begin to be conscious. That we are living and having our being in omnipotent goodness is thus not an inference, but the implied basis of all real inferences. I have expanded this thought in my Philosophy of Theism. We cannot prove God, for we must assume God, as the basis of all proof. Faith even in the uniformity of nature is virtually faith in omnipotent goodness immanent in the universe. 773. So Leibniz in his Theodicée, which was published in the same year as Berkeley's Principles. 774. The divine presupposition, latent in all human reasoning and experience, is hid from the unreflecting, in whom the higher life is dormant, and the ideal in the universe is accordingly undiscerned. Unless the universe is assumed to be physically and morally trustworthy, i.e. unless God is presupposed, even natural science has no adequate foundation. 775. Our necessarily incomplete knowledge of the Universe in which we find ourselves is apt to disturb the fundamental faith, that the phenomena presented to us are significant of God. Yet we tacitly assume that they are thus significant when we interpret real experience, physical or moral. 776. Omitted in second edition. 777. For the following extracts from previously unpublished correspondence of Berkeley and Sir John Percival, I am indebted to the kindness of his descendant, the late Lord Egmont. 778. What Berkeley seeks to shew is, not that the world of the senses is unreal, but in what its reality consists. Is it inexplicable chaos, or explicable expression of ever active Intelligence, more or less interpreted in natural science? 779. Leibniz: De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis (1707). 780. For some information relative to Gua de Malves, see Querard's La France Littéraire, tom. iii. p. 494. 781.

«Автор излагает в первом Диалоге мнение вульгарного человека и мнение философов о вторичных и первичных качествах, природе и существовании тел; и он претендует доказать одновременно недостаточность того и другого. Виньетка, которую мы видим в начале Диалога, намекает на этот объект. Она представляет философа в его кабинете, который отвлечен от работы ребенком, которого он замечает видящим самого себя в зеркале, протягивающим руки, чтобы обнять свое собственное изображение. Философ смеется над ошибкой, в которую, как он полагает, впадает ребенок; в то время как к нему самому применяются эти слова, взятые из Горация:

Quid rides?....de te Fabula narratur.

«Второй Диалог посвящен изложению мнения Автора по тому же предмету, а именно, что телесные вещи имеют реальное существование в умах, которые их воспринимают; но что они не могут существовать вне всех умов одновременно, даже вне бесконечного ума Бога; и что, следовательно, Материя, взятая согласно обычному значению слова, не только не существует, но была бы даже абсолютно невозможной. Мы попытались представить глазам это мнение в Виньетке Диалога. Греческое слово νοῦς, которое означает душу, обозначает душу: лучи, исходящие из него, отмечают внимание, которое душа уделяет идеям или объектам; картины, помещенные только там, куда доходят лучи, и сюжеты которых взяты из описания красот природы, находящегося в книге, представляют идеи или объекты, которые душа рассматривает с помощью способностей, полученных ею от Бога; и действие Верховного Существа на душу изображено чертой, которая, исходя из треугольника, символа Божества, и пронзая облака, которыми окружен треугольник, простирается до души, чтобы оживить ее; наконец, мы постарались передать то же мнение этими словами:

Quæ noscere cumque Deus det, Esse puta.

«Цель третьего Диалога — ответить на трудности, которым может быть подвержено мнение, установленное в предыдущих Диалогах, прояснить его таким образом еще больше, развить все его счастливые следствия, наконец, показать, что, будучи хорошо понятым, оно возвращается к самым обычным понятиям. И так как Автор выражает в конце книги эту последнюю мысль, сравнивая то, что он только что сказал, с водой, которую два Собеседника, как предполагается, видят бьющей из фонтана, и замечает, что та же сила тяжести заставляет ее подниматься до определенной высоты и падать затем обратно в бассейн, откуда она сначала вышла; мы взяли эту эмблему за предмет Виньетки этого Диалога; мы представили, следовательно, в этой последней Виньетке двух Собеседников, прогуливающихся в месте, где Автор их предполагает, и беседующих об этом, и чтобы дать Читателю объяснение эмблемы, мы поместили внизу следующий стих:

Urget aquas vis sursum, eadem flectitque deorsum.»

ПОЛНАЯ ЛИЦЕНЗИЯ PROJECT GUTENBERG™

782. Collier never came fairly in sight of the philosophical public of last century. He is referred to in Germany by Bilfinger, in his Dilucidationes Philosophicæ (1746), and also in the Ada Eruditorum, Suppl. VI. 244, &c., and in England by Corry in his Reflections on Liberty and Necessity (1761), as well as in the Remarks on the Reflections, and Answers to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8 (1763), where he is described as “a weak reasoner, and a very dull writer also.” Collier was dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a subject of correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity to Dugald Stewart. A beautiful reprint of the Clavis (of the original edition of which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in Edinburgh in 1836; and in the following year it was included in a collection of Metaphysical Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, prepared for the press by Dr. Parr. 783. William, fourth Lord Berkeley of Stratton, born about 1663, succeeded his brother in 1697, and died in 1741 at Bruton in Somersetshire. The Berkeleys of Stratton were descended from a younger son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley of Berkeley Castle, who died in 1326. His descendant, Sir John Berkeley of Bruton, a zealous Royalist, was created first Lord Berkeley of Stratton in 1658, and in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which he held till 1672, when he was succeeded by the Earl of Essex (see Burke's Extinct Peerages). It is said that Bishop Berkeley's father was related to him. The Bishop himself was introduced by Dean Swift, in 1713, to the Lord Berkeley of Stratton, to whom the Dialogues are dedicated, as “a cousin of his Lordship.” The title of Berkeley of Stratton became extinct on the death of the fifth Lord in 1773. 784. This interesting Preface is omitted in his last edition of the Dialogues. 785. The Second Part of the Principles was never published, and only in part written. See Editor's Preface to the Principles. 786. Principles, Introduction, sect. 1. 787. Berkeley's philosophy is professedly a “revolt” from abstract ideas to an enlightened sense of concrete realities. In these Dialogues Philonous personates the revolt, and represents Berkeley. Hylas vindicates the uncritical conception of independent Matter. 788. Berkeley's zeal against Matter in the abstract, and all abstract ideas of concrete things, is therefore not necessarily directed against “universal intellectual notions”—“the principles and theorems of sciences.” 789. Here “reason” means reasoning or inference. Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 42, including the distinction between “suggestion” and “inference.” 790. “figure” as well as colour, is here included among the original data of sight. 791. “without the mind,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind. 792. Cf. Principles, sect. 14. 793. Cf. Principles, sect. 14, 15. 794. “Sensible qualities,” i.e. the significant appearances presented in sense. 795. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80-86. 796. Descartes and Locke for example. 797. On Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, and their mutual relations, cf. Principles, sect. 9-15. See also Descartes, Meditations, III, Principia, I. sect. 69; Malebranche, Recherche, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2; Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 8. 798. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80. 799. What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and second editions. 800. Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of all the qualities of sensible things. 801. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 122-126; Principles, sect. 123, &c.; Siris, sect. 270, &c. 802. Cf. Principles, Introduction, sect. 15. 803. Is “notion” here a synonym for idea? 804. Cf. Principles, Introduction, sect. 16. 805. “Size or figure, or sensible quality”—“size, color &c.,” in the first and second editions. 806. In Berkeley's later and more exact terminology, the data or implicates of pure intellect are called notions, in contrast to his ideas, which are concrete or individual sensuous presentations. 807. They need living percipient mind to make them real. 808. So Reid's Inquiry, ch. ii, sect. 8, 9; Essays on the Intellectual Powers, II. ch. 16. Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 8, &c. 809. i.e. figured or extended visible colour. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43, &c. 810. Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26. 811. After maintaining, in the preceding part of this Dialogue, the inevitable dependence of all the qualities of Matter upon percipient Spirit, the argument now proceeds to dispose of the supposition that Matter may still be an unmanifested or unqualified substratum, independent of living percipient Spirit. 812. [See the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, and its Vindication.] Note by the Author in the 1734 edition. 813. Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 2. 814. Cf. Ibid., sect. 43. 815. “an idea,” i.e. a phenomenon present to our senses. 816. This was Reid's fundamental question in his criticism of Berkeley. 817. Cf. Principles, sect. 8. 818. Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26. 819. In other words, the percipient activity of a living spirit is the necessary condition of the real existence of all ideas or phenomena immediately present to our senses. 820. An “explanation” afterwards elaborately developed by Hartley, in his Observations on Man (1749). Berkeley has probably Hobbes in view. 821. The brain with the human body in which it is included constitutes a part of the material world, and must equally with the rest of the material world depend for its realisation upon percipient Spirit as the realising factor. 822. Cf. Principles, sect. 23. 823. “in stones and minerals”—in first and second editions. 824. Cf. Principles, sect. 29-33; also sect. 90.—The permanence of a thing, during intervals in which it may be unperceived and unimagined by human beings, is here assumed, as a natural conviction. 825. In other words, men are apt to treat the omniscience of God as an inference from the dogmatic assumption that God exists, instead of seeing that our cosmic experience necessarily presupposes omnipotent and omniscient Intelligence at its root. 826. Cf. Principles, sect. 90. A permanent material world is grounded on Divine Mind, because it cannot but depend on Mind, while its reality is only partially and at intervals sustained by finite minds. 827. “necessarily inferred from”—rather necessarily presupposed in. 828. The present reality of Something implies the eternal existence of living Mind, if Something must exist eternally, and if real or concrete existence involves living Mind. Berkeley's conception of material nature presupposes a theistic basis. 829. He refers of course to Malebranche and his Divine Vision. 830. But Malebranche uses idea in a higher meaning than Berkeley does—akin to the Platonic, and in contrast to the sensuous phenomena which Berkeley calls ideas. 831. The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition. 832. Cf. Principles, sect. 25-33. 833. Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24. 834. I can represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving things; because I have an example of this my own conscious life. I cannot represent to myself sensible things existing totally unperceived and unimagined; because I cannot, without a contradiction, have an example of this in my own experience. 835. “reason,” i.e. by reasoning. 836. Berkeley's material substance is a natural or divinely ordered aggregate of sensible qualities or phenomena. 837. Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit, and it would be an abuse of language to call this Matter. 838. Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26. 839. It is here argued that as volition is the only originative cause implied in our experience, and which consequently alone puts true meaning into the term Cause, to apply that term to what is not volition is to make it meaningless, or at least to misapply it. 840. While thus arguing against the need for independent matter, as an instrument needed by God, Berkeley fails to explain how dependent matter can be a medium of intercourse between persons. It must be more than a subjective dream, however well ordered, if it is available for this purpose. Unless the visible and audible ideas or phenomena presented to me are actually seen and heard by other men, how can they be instrumental in intercommunication? 841. Cf. Principles, sect. 68-79. 842. Cf. Principles, sect. 20. 843. Cf. Principles, sect. 80, 81. 844. i.e. all Spirits and their dependent ideas or phenomena. 845. This, according to Hume (who takes for granted that Berkeley's reasonings can produce no conviction), is the natural effect of Berkeley's philosophy.—“Most of the writings of that very ingenious author (Berkeley) form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted.... That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appear from this—that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism.” (Hume's Essays, vol. II. Note N, p. 554.) 846. Omitted in last edition. 847. “Tell me, Hylas,”—“So Hylas”—in first and second editions. 848. Variously called noumena, “things-in-themselves,” absolute substances, &c.—which Berkeley's philosophy banishes, on the ground of their unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther questions concerning them. Questions about existence are thus confined within the concrete or realising experiences of living spirits. 849. Berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism, and excludes the possibility of fallacy in sense, in excluding an ultimately representative perception of Matter. He also assumes the reasonableness of faith in the reality and constancy of natural law. When we see an orange, the visual sense guarantees only colour. The other phenomena, which we associate with this colour—the other “qualities” of the orange—are, when we only see the orange, matter of faith. We believe them to be realisable. 850. He accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense symbols proceeds—that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational order, under laws that are independent of, and in that respect external to, the individual percipient. 851. Mediately as well as immediately. 852. We can hardly be said to have an immediate sense-perception of an individual “thing”—meaning by “thing” a congeries of sense-ideas or phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately perceive some of them, and believe in the others, which those suggest. See the last three notes. 853. He probably refers to Descartes, who argues for the trustworthiness of our faculties from the veracity of God; thus apparently arguing in a circle, seeing that the existence of God is manifested to us only through our suspected faculties. But is not confidence in the trustworthiness of the Universal Power at the heart of the universe, the fundamental presupposition of all human experience, and God thus the basis and end of philosophy and of experience? 854. As Locke does. See Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 11. 855. Cf. Principles of Human Knowledge, sect. 45-48. 856. And to be thus external to individual minds. 857. It is here that Berkeley differs, for example, from Hume and Comte and J.S. Mill; who accept sense-given phenomena, and assume the constancy of their orderly reappearances, as a matter of fact, while they confess total ignorance of the cause of natural order. (Thus ignorant, why do they assume reason or order in nature?) The ground of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine Power, Mill expresses by the term “permanent possibility of sensation.” (See his Examination of Hamilton, ch. 11.) Our belief in the continued existence of a sensible thing in our absence merely means, with him, our conviction, derived from custom, that we should perceive it under inexplicable conditions which determine its appearance. 858. Cf. Principles, sect. 25, 26. 859. Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142. 860. Inasmuch as I am conscious of myself, I can gather, through the sense symbolism, the real existence of other minds, external to my own. For I cannot, of course, enter into the very consciousness of another person. 861. “reason,” i.e. reasoning or necessary inference—founded here on our sense of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief in the existence of finite minds, external to our own, is, with Berkeley, an application of this faith. 862. “Matter,” i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. Principles, sect. 135-138. 863. Does this imply that with Berkeley, self, as distinguished from the phenomena of which the material world consists, is not a necessary presuppostion of experience? He says in many places—I am conscious of “my own being,” and that my mind is myself. Cf. Principles, sect, 2. 864. Cf. Principles, sect. 8. 865. Cf. Ibid., sect. 20 866. This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the first and second editions of the Dialogues. It is, by anticipation, Berkeley's answer to Hume's application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive states. 867. See note 4 on preceding page. 868. Cf. Principles, sect. 142. 869. Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume that he exists when he is not conscious of ideas—sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is ever unconscious? 870. That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind. Berkeley speaks here of a consciousness of matter. Does he mean consciousness of belief in abstract material Substance? 871. Cf. Principles, sect. 54-57. 872. Which he does not doubt. 873. This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his antagonists. 874. Cf. Principles, sect. 29-41. 875. The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition. 876. The index pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus the ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency of persons, as absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused causes. 877. That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be assented to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience implies more than the sensuous or empirical data. 878. Cf. Principles, sect. 49. 879. Cf. Principles, sect. 58. 880. “without the mind,” i.e. without the mind of each percipient person. 881. This is the gist of the whole question. According to the Materialists, sense-presented phenomena are due to unpresented, unperceived, abstract Matter; according to Berkeley, to living Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics, their origin is unknowable, yet (incoherently) they claim that we can interpret them—in physical science. 882. A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of Berkeley in the Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. 883. Cf. Principles, sect. 50; Siris, sect. 319. 884. Cf. Principles, sect. 58. 885. “order”—“series,” in first and second editions. 886. “Matter,” i.e. when the reality of “matter” is supposed to signify what Berkeley argues cannot be; because really meaningless. 887. “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the physical coexistences and sequences, maintained in constant order by Power external to the individual, and which are disclosed in the natural sciences. 888. Cf. Principles, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things subjective, but for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as objective. 889. They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things themselves making their appearance, as far as our limited senses allow them to be realised for us. 890. i.e. abstract Matter. 891. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 49; and New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 9, 10, 15, &c. 892. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 84-86. 893. “the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the order providentially maintained in nature. 894. Cf. Principles, Introduction, sect. 23-25. 895. Cf. Principles, sect. 8-10, 86, 87. 896. This difficulty is thus pressed by Reid:—“The ideas in my mind cannot be the same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if the objects I perceive be only ideas, it is impossible that two or more such minds can perceive the same thing. Thus there is one unconfutable consequence of Berkeley's system, which he seems not to have attended to, and from which it will be found difficult, if at all possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this—that, although it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it seems to take away all the evidence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves. What I call a father, or a brother, or a friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they cannot possibly have that relation to another mind which they have to mine, any more than the pain felt by me can be the individual pain felt by another. I am thus left alone as the only creature of God in the universe” (Hamilton's Reid, pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or Panegoism is thus charged against Berkeley, unless his conception of the material world is further guarded. 897. Reid and Hamilton argue in like manner against a fundamentally representative sense-perception. 898. Cf. Principles, sect. 6. 899. Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90. 900. Cf. Ibid., sect. 18. 901. Cf. Principles, sect. 24. 902. “unknown,” i.e. unrealised in percipient life. 903. Cf. Principles, sect. 28-33. 904.