«Политические доктрины Сунь Ятсена: Экспозиция «Сан мин чу и»»

Мариано Понсе, Сунь Ятсен, основатель Китайской Республики (Sun Yat Sen, El fundador de la Republica de China), Манила, 1912, с. 23.

«И также было невозможно заменить ее другой национальной династией. В настоящее время в Китае существуют лишь две семьи, откуда могли бы происходить суверены: одна — это потомство династии Мин, у которой маньчжуры узурпировали трон более двух с половиной веков назад, а другая — семья философа Конфуция, чьим признанным линейным потомком является нынешний герцог Кун. Ни в той, ни в другой нет отпрысков, подготовленных к тому, чтобы управлять государством в соответствии с требованиями нынешних времен. Следовательно, из платформы „Молодого Китая“ пришлось исключить мысль о воцарении на троне национальной династии. А без династии трон был излишлен».

«Мы не знаем, процветала ли бы монархическая программа даже в том случае, если бы в двух упомянутых семьях имелись члены с достаточными условиями для того, чтобы быть верховным главой современного государства».

«То, что я действительно могу сказать, так это то, что с первых же моментов идеи Сунь Ятсена эволюционировали в сторону республиканизма...»

Затем Понсе отмечает слова Сунь Ятсена о том, что децентрализованная система старого правительства и сравнительная автономия наместничеств представляли собой подоплеку «некоего рода аристократической республики» („une especie de república aristocrática“).

115. Ponce, cited, p. 24. “... la única garantía posible, el único medio por excelencia para obtener los mejores gobernantes....” 116. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 234. 117. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 235. 118. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 255. 119. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 266, note 1. Father d'Elia discusses the reasons which made it seem more probable that Sun was transliterating the name Millar into Chinese rather than (John Stuart) Mill. 120. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 256 and following. 121. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 271. 122. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 273. 123. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 242-243. 124. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 223 and following. Dr. Hsü (cited, p. 263 and following) translates these four epochs as following: hung fang, “the stage of the great wilderness”; shen ch'üan, “the state of theocracy”; chun ch'üan, “the stage of monarchy”; and min ch'üan, “the stage of democracy.” 125. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 241-242. 126. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, Book II, ch. 2. 127. It is of interest to note that the “New Life Movement” inaugurated by Chiang Chieh-shih is concerned with many such petty matters such as those enumerated above. Each of these small problems is in itself of little consequence; in the aggregate they loom large. 128. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 331. 129. Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. It is interesting to note that the translation by Father d'Elia gives a more literal translation of the names that Sun Yat-sen applied to these categories. He translates the Chinese terms as pre-seeing, post-seeing, and non-seeing. 130. Hsü translation, cited, p. 352. 131. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 348. 132. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 352. Sun Yat-sen defined democracy thus: “... under a republican government, the people is sovereign.” 133. Tai Chi-tao, cited, p. 25, refers to this distinction as being between force (Gewalt) and power (Macht). To the people belonged, and rightfully, the force which could sanction or refuse to sanction the existence of the government and the confirmation of its policies. The government had the power (Macht), which the people did not have, of formulating intelligent policies and carrying them out in an organized manner. 134. Liang Chi-ch'ao, cited, pp. 50-52. 135. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 279 and following. 136. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 368. 137. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 368-9. Dr. Wou Saofong, in his Sun Yat-sen (Paris, 1929), summarizes his thesis of Sun Yat-sen in somewhat different terms: “... Sun Yat-sen compare, le gouvernement à un appareil mécanique, dont le moteur est constitué par les lois ou les ministres, tandis que l'ingénieur que dirige la machine était autrefois le roi et aujourd'hui le peuple,” p. 124. (Italics mine.) This suggestion that the state-machine, in the theory of Sun Yat-sen, is composed of laws as well as men is quite interesting; Sun Yat-sen himself does not seem to have used this figure of speech and it may be Dr. Wou's applying the juristic interpretation on his own initiative. Sun Yat-sen, in his sixth lecture on democracy, says, “Statesmen and lawyers of Europe and America say that government is a machine of which law is a tool.” (d'Elia translation, cited, p. 368.) 138. It must always remain one of those conjectures upon which scholars may expend their fantasy what Sun Yat-sen would have thought of the necessity of the juristic state, which involved a quite radical change throughout the Chinese social organism, had he lived to see the ebb of juristic polity and, for all that, of voting democracy. It is not unlikely that his early impressions of the United States and his reading of Montesquieu would have led him to retain his belief in a juristic-democratic state in spite of the fact that such a state would no longer represent the acme of ultra-modernism. 139. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 378 and following. 140. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 369. 141. Reginald Johnston, Twilight in the Forbidden City, cited above, presents an apparently true account of the conspiracies of the various Northern generals which centered around the person of P'u Yi. According to Johnston Tsao Kun was defeated in his attempt to restore the Manchu Emperor only by the jealousies of his fellow-militarists. 142. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 406. 143. Father d'Elia devotes the whole second chapter of his introduction to the consideration of a suitable rendition of San Min Chu I, which he calls the Triple Demism. (Work cited, pp. 36-49.) Again on p. 402, he explains that, while he had translated min shêng as socialism in the first French edition of his work, he now renders it as the economic Demism or sociology. The most current translation, that of Frank Price, cited, gives the principle of livelihood. Paul Linebarger gave it as socialism as far back as 1917 (The Chinese Nationalist Monthly, December, 1917, Chicago) in Chicago, at the time when Lin Shen, Frank C. Lee and he were all working for Sun in that city. Dr. H. H. Kung, a high government official related by marriage to Mme. Sun Yat-sen, speaks of the three principles of liberty, democracy, and economic well-being (preface to Hsü, Sun, cited, p. xvi). Dr. V. K. Wellington Koo, one of China's most eminent diplomats, speaks of social organization (Memoranda Presented to the Lytton Commission, New York City, n. d.). Citations could be presented almost indefinitely. Min means “people,” and shêng means “life; vitality, the living, birth, means of living” according to the dictionary (S. Wells Williams, A Syllabic Dictionary of the Chinese Language, Tungchou, 1909). The mere terms are of very little help in solving the riddle of min shêng. Laborious examination is needed, and even this will not, perhaps, lead us to anything more than probability. Sun Yat-sen, in his lectures, called it by several different names, which seem at first sight to contradict each other. 144. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 91-92. 145. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, Bk. IV, p. 62: “I must confess that the idea of using the sacred cult of ancestor worship as a political machine is very abhorrent to me. In fact, I think that even the rashest fool would never attempt to use this intimate cult with its exclusively domestic privacy as a revolutionary instrument.” 146. Linebarger, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic, New York, 1925, pp. 68-9. 147. The same, pp. 135-139. 148. The same, pp. 104-105. 149. The same, pp. 122-123. 150. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472. 151. Karl A. Wittfogel, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Chinas, Leipzig, 1931. The author, the German Marxian who wrote the best Marxist critique of Sun Yat-sen, is the only scholar to seek a really complete picture of the old Chinese economy by the technique of modern Western economic analysis. Described by the author as an “attempt,” the first volume of this work runs to 737 pages. It is valuable for the large amount of statistical material which it contains, and for its systematic method; its Marxian bias narrows its interest considerably. 152. Both works of Wittfogel, cited above, are useful for the understanding of the transition from the old economy to the new. For a general view of the economic situation and potentialities of China, see George B. Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations, New York, 1934. The bibliography on Chinese economy to be found in Latourette, cited above, vol. II, pp. 116-119, is useful. 153. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 97. 154. See below, section on the national economic revolution. 155. Hsü translation, cited, pp. 186-187. The d'Elia translation gives a more exact rendering of Sun Yat-sen's words (p. 97), but, by following Sun Yat-sen in calling China a hypo-colony, is less immediately plain to the Western reader than is the translation of Dr. Hsü, who in this instance uses “sub” and “hypo” interchangeably. 156. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 443. 157. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 452. 158. His International Development of China, New York, 1922 (republished 1929), is a colossal plan which could only be compared with the Piatiletka or with the New Deal in the United States, since Sun Yat-sen suggested that—in order to avoid the consequences of a post-war depression—the nations of the world might cooperate in the equal exploitation of Chinese national resources with the Chinese. He proposed the modernization of China by a vast international loan which could permit the Western nations to maintain their war-time peak production, supplying China (1929 ed., p. 8). He concludes the work: “In a nutshell, it is my idea to make capitalism create socialism in China so that these two economic forces of human civilization will work side by side in future civilization” (p. 237). The work is, however, generally regarded as a transportation plan, since Sun Yat-sen sketched out a railway map of China which would require decades to realize, and which overshadowed, by its very magnitude, the other aspects of his proposals. 159. At the risk of digression, one might comment on an interesting element of the Euramerican ideology which is in sharp contrast to the Chinese. The West has, apparently, always been devoted to dichotomies of morality. The Greeks had reason and unenlightenment, and whole series of ideals that could be fought for and against, but the real division of good and bad in the West came, of course, with Christianity, which accustomed Westerners to think for centuries in terms of holiness versus evil—they being, geographically, holy, and the outsiders (heathen), evil. Now that the supernatural foundations of Christianity have been shaken by the progress of scientific and intellectual uncertainty, many Westerners find an emotional and an intellectual satisfaction in dividing the world into pure and unclean along lines of sometimes rather abstruse economic questions. This new morality seems to be based on distributive economics rather than on deity. It is employed, of course, by the Marxians, but their adversaries, in opposing them with equal passion, fall into the same habit. It is shocking and unbelievable to such persons to discover that there is a society whose ideology does not center around the all-meaningful point of the ownership of the means of production. Their only reaction is a negation of the possibility of such thought, or, at least, of its realism. The intellectual position of Sun Yat-sen in the modern world would be more clearly appreciated if the intellectuals of the West were not adjusting their ideological and emotional habits from religion to economics, and meanwhile judging all men and events in economic terms. The present discussion of Sun Yat-sen's economic ideology is a quite subordinate one in comparison to the examination of his ideology as a whole, but some persons will regard it as the only really important point that could be raised concerning him. 160. Tsui, cited, p. 345, quotes Nathaniel Peffer: “... Peffer said that Dr. Sun never ‘attained intellectual maturity, and he was completely devoid of the faculty of reason. He functioned mentally in sporadic hunches. It was typical of him that he met Joffe, read the Communist Manifesto, and turned Communist, and then read one book by an American of whom he knew nothing, and rejected communism all in a few months.’ ” Sun Yat-sen knew Marxism, years before the Russian Revolution. The Communist Manifesto was not new to him. He was extraordinarily well read in Western political and economic thought. Sun Yat-sen never turned Communist, nor did he subsequently reject communism any more than he had done for years. 161. The author hopes, at some future time, to be able to fill in the intellectual background of Sun Yat-sen much more thoroughly than he is able to at the present, for lack of materials. One interesting method would involve the listing of every Western book with which Sun Yat-sen can be shown to have been acquainted. It might be a fairly accurate gauge of the breadth of his information. 162. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 461-468. Father d'Elia's note on the relative positions of Henry George and Sun (p. 466) is interesting. For a discussion of the actual program proposed by Sun, see below, “The Program of Min Shêng” section on land policy. 163. Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, cited, p. 58. 164. The same, pp. 98-99. There is an inconsistency of wording here, which may or may not be the fault of the translator. The oath refers to the “equitable redistribution of the land” (p. 98); the platform speaks of “the nationalization of land” (p. 98); and one of the slogans is “Equalize land-ownership!” 165. See also the discussion in Tsui, Canton-Moscow Entente, cited, pp. 371-376; and in Li Ti-tsun, “The Sunyatsenian principle of Livelihood,” The Chinese Students' Monthly, XXIV (March 1929), pp. 230. Li declares that Sun envisioned immediate redistribution but ultimate socialization, but does not cite his source for this. Li's discussion of sources is good otherwise. 166. Sharman, p. 58; the same authority for the statement as to the 1905 manifesto. 167. Sharman, p. 94. 168. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, p. 61. 169. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, p. 66: “Dieses sehr unpräzise Programm, das die Frage der Klasseninteressen und des Klassenkampfes als des Mittels zur Brechung privilegierter Klasseninteressen nicht aufwirft, war objektiv gar nicht Sozialismus, sondern etwas durchaus anderes: Lenin hat die Formel ‘Subjektiver Sozialismus’ dafür geprägt.” 170. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, p. 67: “So bedeutete denn Suns ‘Sozialismus’ im Munde der Chinesischen Bourgeoisie nichts als ein Art Bekenntness zu einer ‘sozialen,’ d.h. massenfreundlichen Wirtschaftspolitik.” 171. T'ang, cited, p. 46. 172. T'ang, cited, p. 172. 173. T'ang, cited, p. 172. 174. T'ang, cited, pp. 171-172. 175. Wittfogel, cited, pp. 117-118. 176.

Виттфогель, цитируемая работа, с. 140: «...Его три принципа воплощают в своем развитии объективное изменение экономико-социальной ситуации Китая, в своих противоречиях — реальные противоречия китайской революции, в своих новейших тенденциях — смещение социального центра тяжести революции, которое приводит в действие классы, целью которых является уже не буржуазно-капиталистическая, а пролетарско-социалистическая и крестьянско-аграрно-революционная [цель].»

«Соответственно, Сунь Ятсен является не только самым могущественным на сегодняшний день представителем буржуазно-национальных, антиимпериалистических революций пробуждающегося Аза вообще, но в то же время он выходит за рамки буржуазных классовых ограничений этого первого этапа азиатского освободительного движения. Не признавать этого было бы губительно, как раз и для самого пролетарско-коммунистического движения Восточной Азии».

177. Statement of Judge Linebarger to the author. See also Linebarger, Conversations, references to Communism which occur throughout the whole book. 178. Tsui, cited, p. 144. It would involve a duplication of effort for the present author to repeat the material of Dr. Tsui's excellent monograph on Sun Yat-sen and the Bolsheviks. Since the purpose of the present work is to undertake an exposition of the Nationalist political ideology and programs against the background of the old Chinese ideology, such an emphasis upon one comparatively small point in Sun Yat-sen's doctrines would be entirely disproportionate as well as superfluous. The reader is referred to the work of Dr. Tsui for any details of these relations that he may wish to examine. 179. See Tsui, cited, and section below, on the class struggle of the nations. 180. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 450. See also Tsui, cited, pp. 353-354; and Li, cited, pp. 229 and following. 181. Sun, Development of China, cited, p. 237. 182. Maurice William, Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism, Baltimore, 1932, p. 4. 183. William, in his Sun Yat-sen Versus Communism, cited, proves beyond doubt that Sun Yat-sen was strongly indebted to him for many anti-Marxian arguments. 184. See above, Chapter One, second, third, and fourth sections. 185. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 423. 186. Tsui, cited, pp. 121-123, n. 72. 187. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 472. 188. Hsü translation, cited, p. 422. The Hsü version will be cited from time to time, whenever Father d'Elia's interesting neologisms might make the citation too disharmonious, in wording, with the comment. 189. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 294. 190. Francis W. Coker, Recent Political Thought, New York—London, 1934, pp. 545-562, Ch. XX, “Empirical Collectivism.” 191. Coker, cited, pp. 546-547. 192. Coker, cited, pp. 548-549. Throughout the discussion of empirical collectivism the present author will cite, by and large, the categories given by Coker. Any special exceptions will be noted, but otherwise the discussion will be based on Coker's chapter on “Empirical Collectivism,” cited above. 193. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, Book III, p. 31. 194. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, Book III, p. 30. 195. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 475. 196. See, however, the d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 298-301, for a reference to labor unions and a statement for their need of competent and honest leadership. 197. See Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, “Die Arbeiter,” pp. 97-99. T'ang, Hsü, and the various biographies of Sun almost all contain references from time to time to Sun's friendliness toward and approval of organized labor. 198. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, pp. 325-329. The next speech of Sun Yat-sen given in Wittfogel's work is Sun's indignant attack on “the so-called Labor Government” of England, which permitted the old methods of British Far Eastern imperialism to continue. 199. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, Book III, p. 18. This work, while it cannot be given the weight of direct quotations from Sun's own writings or speeches, does contain a good deal about the policies of min shêng which does not appear elsewhere. The author has sought to avoid citation of it where direct sources are available, since the nature of the material makes it by no means so authoritative as others might be. 200. Coker, cited, p. 551. 201. E. D. Harvey, The Mind of China, New Haven, 1933, deals extensively with these supernatural elements. The reader who turns to it should keep in mind the fact that the supernatural plays a rôle in China distinctly less important than that which it did, say, in medieval Europe, and that a strong agnostic, rather than a skeptical, spirit among the Chinese has preserved them from the grossest errors of superstition. 202. Latourette, cited, p. 129. Dr. Latourette's sketch of Chinese religious thought is especially good, as indeed it might be, since he is one of the most celebrated American scholars in the field of Western religion in China. 203. H. G. Creel, work cited, p. 127. 204. The author cannot give a documentary citation for this observation. It was communicated to him many times by his father, Judge Paul Linebarger, who stated that Sun Yat-sen was most apt to talk in terms of morality and morale by preference. The fact that Sun Yat-sen came from a Chinese Confucian background into a Western Christian one cannot be ignored. He did not permit his Christianity to sway him from what he considered his necessary lines of behavior in politics; it did not, for example, prevent him from being extremely cordial to the Soviet Union at the time that that state was still more or less outcaste. And yet, speaking of the Christian God, he is reputably reported to have said: “God sent me to China to free her from bondage and oppression, and I have not been disobedient to the Heavenly mission”; and, again, to have said on the day before his death: “I am a Christian; God sent me to fight evil for my people. Jesus was a revolutionist; so am I.” (Both quotations from appendix to the d'Elia translation, p. 718.) 205. Sun Yat-sen authorized the biography, cited, which Judge Linebarger wrote of him. It was a propaganda work, and neither he nor the author had any particular expectation that it would ever be regarded as a source, or as an academically prepared document. The last chapter of this authorized biography bears the title, “Conclusion: Sun the Moral Force.” This, perhaps, is significant as to Sun's own attitude. 206. Note the contrast between the thought of Sun in this respect and that of Tagore or Gandhi. This has been pointed out by many Western writers on China. 207. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, Book III, p. 20. 208. Sharman, cited, p. 282. 209. The reader must bear in mind the fact that what is presented here is Sun Yat-sen's political program for China. In many instances the course of affairs has deviated quite definitely from that program, and it can be only a matter of conjecture as to what Sun Yat-sen would do were he to return and observe the Nationalist movement as it now is. It is manifestly impossible to trace all the changes in this program. The actual developments have conformed only in part with Sun Yat-sen's plans, although the leaders seek to have it appear as though they are following as close to Sun Yat-sen's democratic politics as they can. Many persons who were close to Sun Yat-sen, such as Mme. Sun Yat-sen, believe that the National Government has betrayed the theory of Sun Yat-sen, and that Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih has made himself the autocrat of the National Government. It is, of course, impossible within the scope of this thesis to enter into this dispute. Who rules the Soviet—Stalin, or the Communist Party? Who rules China—Chiang Chieh-shih, or the Kuomintang? In each case there is the question of whether the leader could get along without the party, and whether the party could get along without the leader, as well as the question of the leader's sincerity. These issues, however burning they might be in real life, could not be adequately treated in a work such as this. The author has sought to present Sun Yat-sen's theory of applied politics. Where events which Sun Yat-sen foresaw have come to pass, the author has referred to them. He does not wish to be understood as presenting a description of the whole course of events in China. 210. Here, again, one must remember that Mme. Sun Yat-sen, Eugene Chen, and others charge that the Party no longer rules, that it has been prostituted by Chiang Chieh-shih, and now serves only to cloak a military despotism. It may be noted, so far as the other side of the question is concerned, that a greater number of the persons who were eminent in the Party before Sun Yat-sen died have remained in it than have left it. 211. See T'ang, work cited for an excellent description of the mutations of the revolutionary party. T'ang criticizes the present personnel of the Kuomintang severely, but the reader must keep in mind the fact that he has since become reconciled with the present leadership, and make allowances for the somewhat emphatic indignation voiced at the time of writing the book. The brilliance of the author guarantees that the story is well told, but it is not told for the last time. See also, Min-ch'ien T. Z. Tyau, Two Years of Nationalist China, Shanghai, 1930, for a summary that is as excellent as it is short. Various changes have occurred in party function, organization, and personnel since that time, but they have not—to the knowledge of the author—been completely and adequately covered by any one work. 212. For a history of this period, see T'ang, Sharman, or Tsui Shu-chin, all cited above. The Communist side of the story is told by Harold Isaacs (editor), Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction, Shanghai, 1932, and in the various works of the Stalinist and Trotskyist groups concerning the intervention of the Third Internationale in China. Two graphic personal accounts cast in semi-fictional form, are Oscar Erdberg, Tales of Modern China, Moscow, 1932, and Vincent Sheean, Personal History, New York, 1935; these present the Communist and the left-liberal viewpoints, respectively. The dramatic story of the Entente, the separation, and the ensuing conflict are not yet remote enough to have cooled into material ready for the historian. 213. The Kuomintang, in accepting the Communist administrative structure, was not violating traditional Chinese patterns altogether. It has been pointed out that the revised structure of the Kuomintang resembled older Chinese guild patterns as well as the new Russian style (Sharman, work cited, p. 262). 214. Here, again, one might refer to the disputes as to the orthodoxy and integrity of the present leadership. The preëminence of Generalissimo Chiang Chieh-shih, which cannot be doubted, is seen by persons friendly to him as a strong and beneficent influence upon the C. E. C. Persons hostile to him charge that he has packed the C. E. C. with his adherents, and controls it as he chooses. 215. An interesting piece of research could deal with the method of recruitment and registration in the Kuomintang before the coming of the Communist advisers. There was rarely any doubt as to who was, or was not, a member, but there was constant trouble as to the good standing of members. Recruitment seems to have been on a basis of oath-taking, initiation, etc.; what Party discipline there was seems to have been applied only in the most extreme cases, and then crudely. 216. It is interesting to note that the Kuomintang is to a certain degree democratic in representing the various occupational groups in China. Tyau, cited above, p. 25 and following, lists the percentages in the membership in the Kuomintang according to occupation, as they stood in 1930: Party work, 5.84%; government service, 6.61%; army and navy, 3.26%; police, 4.09%; labor (in general), 7.32%; agriculture, 10.43%; navigation, 1.20%; railway, 1.14%; commerce, 10.47%; students, 10.47%; teaching, 21.31%; independent professions, 1.66%; social work, 1.68%; unemployed, O.54%; unclassified, 3.13%; incomplete returns, 15.09%. 217. See above, pp. 59 and following. 218. Sun Yat-sen, Kidnapped in London, cited, passim. 219. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 122-123. 220. The present instances are all taken from the third lecture on nationalism, d'Elia translation, cited pp. 127-128. The Hsü translation, in spite of its many merits, is not strong on geography. Thus, in the translation referring to Poland which has just been cited, the Hsü reading runs: “Although Persia was partitioned by foreigners over a century ago, Persian nationalism was not lost; consequently the Persians have been able to restore their country to independence; and now Persia has the status of a second or third class power in Europe” (p. 208), this in spite of the fact that Persia is translated correctly further on (p. 327). Another misreading is: “After the war, two new Slavic states were born, namely Czechoslovakia and Jugoslovakia” (p. 217). These minor errors are, however, among the very few which can be discovered in the whole book, and do not mar the text to any appreciable extent. 221. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 132. 222. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 63. 223. T'ang, cited, pp. 168 and following, gives the various documents of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, which place the application of nationalism first in their programs. “The Manifesto On Going to Peking,” issued by Sun November 10, 1924, refers to various points to be achieved; the first is, “National freedom from external restriction will enable China to develop her national economy and to increase her productivity.” (Hsü translation, p. 148.) This might imply that the execution of min shêng was to be coincidental with or anterior to the fulfillment of nationalism; it probably does not. 224. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187. 225. Discussions of this are to be found in Sir Reginald Johnston's Twilight in the Forbidden City, cited. 226. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 244. 227. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 245-247. 228. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 187. Numerals have been written out by the present author. 229. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 365. Italics are omitted. 230. This is not due to any mystical veneration of numbers, or religious influence. In spreading doctrines which would have to be followed by the unlettered as well as by the scholars, Sun Yat-sen found it necessary to develop the general outline of his principles in such a way as to give them a considerable mnemonic appeal. Thus, the three principles—and the three French (liberty, equality, fraternity) and American (of, by, for the people) principles—and the triple foreign aggression, the four popular powers, the five governmental rights. The use of the number three permitted Sun Yat-sen to weave together the various strands of his teaching, and to attain a considerable degree of cross-reference. It cannot be shown to have induced any actual distortion of his theories. 231. Hsü translation, cited, p. 213. See also d'Elia translation, p. 134. 232. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 114. 233. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 101. 234. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. The whole present discussion of economic oppression is drawn from the latter part of the second lecture. Except in the case of direct quotation, no further reference will be given to this section, which occurs at pp. 97-115 of the d'Elia translation. 235. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 106. 236. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. 237. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 113. 238. In referring to a sub-principle, the author is following Sun Yat-sen's arrangement of his ideas, even though the exact term, “sub-principle,” is not to be found in Sun's works. Each of the three principles can be considered with respect to national unity, national autonomy, and national survival. The correlation of the three principles, each with itself and then the two others, logically leads to the appearance of nine sub-principles. The writer has not followed any artificial compulsion of numbers, merely for the sake of producing a pretty outline, but has followed Sun Yat-sen in seeking to make clear the specific relations of each of the three principles to the three cardinal points which they embody. 239. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 179-180. 240. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180. 241. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 180. 242. Tsui, cited, pp. 113-114. 243. Linebarger, Conversations, cited, pp. 21 and following, Book I. 244. Among the persons whom he entrusted with the task of seeking foreign capital for the just and honorable national development of China through international means were George Bronson Rea and Paul Linebarger. Mr. Rea was given a power of attorney by Sun to secure loans for railway purposes to an unlimited amount. Mr. Rea never used the document, but kept it among his papers. (Statement of Mr. Rea to the author in Washington, spring of 1934, at the time that the former was “Special Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Manchoukuo,” despite his former Chinese connections.) Judge Linebarger was also unsuccessful. Sun Yat-sen was more interested in having Judge Linebarger stop any assistance offered by the Consortium to the Northern “Republic of China” than in having him procure any actual funds. 245. It is obvious that a strong China would be a horrid nightmare to Japan. Not only would the Chinese thwart the use of their man-power and natural resources, as stepping stones to Asiatic or world hegemony; they might even equal the Japanese in audacity, and think of restoring the Japanese to the position of Chinese vassals which they had enjoyed in the time of Yoshemitsu, the third Ashikaga Shogun. 246. Tsui, cited, pp. 115-116. 247. Hu Han-min, cited in Tsui, work cited, p. 118, n. 63. 248. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 152. For a full discussion of this curious relationship between China and her vassal states, see Djang Chu (Chang Tso), The Chinese Suzerainty, Johns Hopkins University doctoral dissertation, 1935. The submission to China was, among other things, a means by which the rulers of the peripheral states could get themselves recognized by an authority higher than themselves, thus legitimizing their position. 249. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 153. Sun Yat-sen seems to have had a high opinion of the American administration of the Philippines, saying: The United States “... even allows the Filipinos to send delegations to Congress in Washington.

Not only does the United States require no annual tribute in money from them, but, on the contrary, she gives the Filipinos considerable subsidies to build and maintain their roads and to promote education. It seems as though so humanitarian a treatment would be regarded as the utmost benevolence. Still, until the present day, the Filipinos do not boast of being ‘Americanized’; they are daily clamoring for independence” (d'Elia translation, p. 153). This statement is interesting in two connections. In the first place, although Sun Yat-sen had once thought of sending men, money, or munitions to help the Filipino nationalists in their struggles against the Americans, he seems to have conceived a warm admiration for the American administration in those islands. Secondly, the reader may consider that Sun Yat-sen, at the time that he made this comment, was in the course of attacking imperialism. If Sun Yat-sen could offer so enthusiastic an apology for the Americans in the Philippines, it shows that he must have let the abstract principle ride, and judged only on the basis of his own observation. To the orthodox Communist the American rule of the Philippines is peculiarly wicked because of the American denial of imperialist practises. 250. Some of the older books on China give interesting maps of that country divided up into spheres of influence between the various powers. It was quite fashionable among journalists to sketch the various Chinese possessions of the great powers; the powers never got around to the partition. The American declaration of the “Open Door” may have had something to do with this, and the British enunciation of the same doctrine probably carried weight. For a time, however, the Europeans seemed quite convinced of the almost immediate break-up of China into three or four big colonies. Lord Charles Beresford, a prominent English peer, wrote a work which was extremely popular; its title was The Break-Up of China (London, 1899). 251. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 93. 252. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 165. 253. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 165-170. 254. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 170. 255. The Communists envision three types of conflict to be produced by the contradictions of imperialism: intra-national class war, international class war, and inter-imperialist war. The first is the struggle of the proletariat of the whole world against the various national bourgeois governments; the second, the struggle of the oppressed peoples, under revolutionary bourgeois or proletarian leadership, against the oppressions of Western imperialism; and the last, the conflict of the various imperialist powers with one another. Sun Yat-sen's theory agreed definitely with the second point, the international class war; he seems to have admitted the probability of class war within the nations of the West, and of inter-imperialist war, but he did not draw the three types of conflict together and because of them predicate an Armageddon and a millenium. His flexible, pragmatic thought never ran to extremes; although he agreed, more or less distinctly, with the Bolshevik premises of the three conflicts of the imperialist epoch, he did not follow them to their conclusion. 256. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 75. 257. d'Elia translation, cited, pp. 148-149. 258. Such works as Lea's The Valor of Ignorance, New York, 1909, and Stoddard's The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy, New York, 1920, make precisely the same sort of statements, although, of course, they regard the “Saxon” or “Teutonic” race as the logical master-race of the world. Since Lea was associated for some time with Sun Yat-sen, accompanying him from Europe to Nanking in 1911, and undoubtedly had plenty of time to talk with him, it may be that some of the particular terms used by Sun in this discussion are those which he may have developed in his probable conversations with Lea. Nothing more definite than this can be stated. 259. Quoted by Sun in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 138. The remark does not sound like Lenin. A Communist would not invoke nature, nor would he count the whole membership of an imperialist nation as imperialist. The world, to him, is misguided by a tiny handful of capitalists and traditional ideologues and their hangers-on, not by the masses of any nation. 260. Note, however, the reference in d'Elia translation, cited, p. 76, or the Price translation, p. 18. Sun Yat-sen speaks of international wars, within races, on the lines of social classes. He may have meant international wars within the races and across race lines on the basis of the oppressed nations of the world fighting the oppressing nations. He may, however, have meant intra-national class wars. Since he recognized the presence of the class conflict in the developed capitalistic states of the West, this would not necessarily imply his expectation of an intra-national class war in China. 261. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, pp. 331-337, gives the whole text of the speech. Sharman, Sun Yat-sen, p. 304, refers to it. 262. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, p. 335. “Es ist gegen Gerechtigkeit und Menschlichkeit, dass eine Minderheit von vierhundert Millionen eine Mehrheit von neunhundert Millionen unterdrückt....” 263. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, p. 333. “Die Europäer halten uns Asiaten durch die Macht ihrer materiellen Errungenschaften zu Boden.” 264. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, p. 333. “Wenn wir zweitausendfünf-hundert Jahre zurückdenken, so war China damals das mächtigste Volk der Welt. Es nahm damals eine Stellung ein wie heute Grossbritannien und Amerika. Doch während Grossbritannien und die Vereinigten Staaten heute zur zwei unter einer Reihe von Weltmächten sind, war China damals die einzige grosse Macht.” 265. Ponce, work cited, p. xiv: “Conozcámonos y nos amaremos más—decía el gran Sun Yat-sen á sus amigos orientales.” This work is, by the way, the most extensive for its account of Sun's associations with Koreans, Filipinos, and Japanese. It has been completely overlooked by the various biographers of and commentators on Sun, with the exception of Judge Linebarger, to whom Sun Yat-sen presented a copy of the work. 266. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, p. 337: “In England und Amerika gibt es immerhin eine kleine Zahl von Menschen, die diese unsere Ideale im Einklang mit einer allgemeinen Weltbewegung verteidigen. Was die anderen Barbarennationen anbelangt, so dürfte es auch in ihren Reihen Menschen geben, die von der gleichen Überzeugung beseelt sind.” 267. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, p. 335: “Wenn wir Asiaten nach der Herstellung einer panasiatischen Einheitsfront streben, müssen wir selbst in unserer Zeit daran denken, auf welcher grundlegenden Auffassung wir diese Einheitsfront errichten wollen. Wir sollen dasjenige zugrunde legen, was die besondere Eigentümlichkeit unserer östlichen Kultur gewesen ist, wir sollten unseren Nachdruck legen auf die moralischen Werte, auf Güte und Gerechtigkeit. Sie sollen das Fundament der Einheit ganz Asiens werden.” 268. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 207. Italics omitted. 269. The article by Tsui, cited, p. 177 and following, goes into a quite detailed comparison of the Chinese Nationalist and the Marxian Communist theories of the three stages of revolution. He draws attention to the fact that, while the Communists do not speak of "three stages" and prefer to emphasize the transitional stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the two theories are similar almost to the point of being identical. 270. Tsui, cited, p. 181. 271. Tyau, cited, p. 439 and following. It is also available in Hsü, Sun Yat-sen, cited above, p. 85 and following. The Tyau translation was preferred since it was written by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and may be regarded as the work of a Government spokesman. It is interesting, by way of contrast, to quote a passage from the Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic, so-called: “The Chinese Soviet Government is building up a state of the democratic dictatorship [sic!] of the workers and peasants. All power shall be vested in the Soviets of Workers, Peasants, and Red Army men.” Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, New York, 1934, p. 18. The absence of an acknowledged period of tutelage, in view of the unfamiliarity of the Chinese people with democratic forms, is significant. The constitutional jurisprudence of the Chinese Communists is, however, primarily a matter of academic interest, since the Soviets, where they have existed, have existed in a state of perpetual emergency, shielded by the Red Terror and other devices of revolutionary control. The contrast between a pronouncement of Sun Yat-sen and a constitution is a fair one, since the writings of Sun Yat-sen form the final authority in the Nationalist movement and government; in a dispute as to the higher validity of a governmental provision or a flat contrary statement of Sun Yat-sen, there can be little question as to which would—or, in the eyes of the Nationalists, should—prevail. 272. It is interesting to note that the institution which most Western writers would incline to regard as the very key-stone of democracy, parliament, has a quite inferior place in the Sun Yat-sen system. In the National Government of China, the Legislative Yuan is more like a department than like a chamber. This question, however, will be discussed under the heading of the Five Rights. 273. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 341. 274. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 342. 275. A discussion of the four powers and the five rights is to be found in Li Chao-wei, La Souveraineté Nationale d'après la Doctrine Politique de Sun-Yet-Sin, Dijon, 1934. This work, a doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Dijon, treats the Western theory of democracy and Sun's theory comparatively. It is excellent in portraying the legal outline of the Chinese governmental structure, and points out many significant analogies between the two theories. 276. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 391. 277. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 395. 278.

Неблагоприятный взгляд на Пять властей выражен д-ром Джермейном Чи-хун Линном в его прекрасной небольшой книге «Политические партии в Китае» (Political Parties in China, Пейпин, 1930). Поскольку д-р Линн отзывается с благосклонностью и надеждой о планах У Пэй-фу, одного из милитаристов, враждебных Сунь Ятсену и всему националистическому движению, его критику Сунь Ятсена не следует воспринимать как полностью беспристрастную. Она представляет собой аргумент, который раз за разом приводился лицами, враждебными Сан мин чу и.

«Конституция о пяти властях (У цюань сянь фа) также не является открытием д-ра Суня. Как известно, трехвластная конституция, состоящая из законодательной, судебной [sic!] и исполнительной функций, изначально была разработана — более или менее неосознанно — англичанами, чья конституция была критически изучена Монтескьё и чье функционирование было им подробно описано на благо своих соотечественников. А неписаная конституция Старого Китая содержала систему гражданских экзаменов и независимую палату цензоров. Теперь же столь широко рекламируемая конституция о пяти властях, или У цюань сянь фа, лишь добавила системы государственных экзаменов и общественного цензора к традиционной форме конституции, впервые отстаиваемой французским юристом». С. 66 цитируемой работы.

279. Hsü translation, cited, p. 104. 280. For an intensively vivid description of this government, which Sun Yat-sen's planned democracy was to relegate to limbo, see B. L. Putnam Weale, The Vanished Empire, London, 1926. Putnam Weale was the pseudonym of Bertram Lennox Simpson, an Englishman born and reared in China, who understood and participated in Chinese life and policies as have few since the days of Marco Polo; he was an advisor to the insurrectionary Peking “Nationalist” Government of 1931 when he was shot to death in his home at Tientsin. Few other Westerners have left such a wealth of accurate and sympathetic material about modern China. 281. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 399. 282. Harold Monk Vinacke, Modern Constitutional Development in China, Princeton, 1920, p. 100. 283. Vinacke, cited, p. 141 and following. While Dr. Vinacke's book is now out of date, it contains excellent material for the period covered, roughly 1898 to 1919. He quotes Morse's comment on the provinces with approval: “The Provinces are satrapies to the extent that so long as the tribute and matriculations are duly paid, and the general policy of the central administration followed, they are free to administer their own affairs in detail as may seem best to their own provincial authorities.” (Hosea Ballou Morse, The Trade and Administration of China, London, 1913, p. 46, quoted in Vinacke, work cited, p. 5.) 284. Paul M. W. Linebarger, Conversations with Sun Yat-sen, mss., 1934; Book two, Chapter Five, “Democratic Provincial Home Rule.” 285. Hsü, cited, p. 124. 286. Tyau, cited, p. 441. From “The Outline of National Reconstruction.” 287. Tyau, cited, p. 450. 288. V. I. Lenin, State and Revolution, New York, 1932. Lenin's discussion of Marx's point, p. 39 and following, is stimulating although inclining to the ingenious. 289. The number of the villages is taken from Tawney, Richard Henry, Land and Labor in China, London, 1932; and the number of hsien from Tyau, cited, p. 85. 290. Linebarger, Conversations, cited above; throughout this volume, Judge Linebarger recalls references made by Sun Yat-sen to him concerning the hsien. 291. It is but fair to state, at the beginning, that this point of the family system as one of the institutions of the democratic nation has been very largely neglected by the Kuomintang and the National Government. To the knowledge of the author, no plan has ever been drafted either by Party or by Government which would erect the system that Sun Yat-sen proposed. It is not beyond all conjecture that Sun's suggestion may at a later date seem more practicable to the leaders than now appears, and be put into operation in some manner. 292. Hsü, cited, p. 164. 293. Hsü, cited, p. 243. 294. The material concerning the clans has been taken from the fifth lecture on Nationalism (Hsü, cited, p. 240 and following; d'Elia, cited, p. 174 and following). Judge Linebarger recorded Sun Yat-sen's mention of a convention of the clans in Conversations, cited above, Book One, Chapter Eight, “The Clans in the Nation.” 295. There are three excellent discussions of the min shêng programs. Wou, cited, gives a clear precis of the doctrine. Hung Jair, Les idées économiques de Sun Yat Sen, Toulouse, 1934, and Tsiang Kuen, Les origines économiques et politiques du socialisme de Sun Yat Sen, Paris, 1933, cover essentially the same ground, although they are both doctoral dissertations submitted to French universities. The former deals primarily with the theory of Sun's economic ideas, contrasting them with the economic thought of Adam Smith and of the Marxians. The latter gives a rather extensive historical and statistical background to Sun's min shêng, and traces the Chinese economic system, whence min shêng was derived in part, quite fully. These authors have covered the field so widely that the present work need not enter into the discussion of the precise immediate policies to be advocated under min shêng. Enough will be given to describe the relations of min shêng with the more formally political principles of nationalism and democracy, and to afford the reader an opportunity to assess its scope and significance for himself. The works of Hung Jair, Tsiang Kuen, Wou Saofong, and Li Ti-tsun all measure min shêng in terms of classical Western laissez-faire economics and then in terms of Marxism; they all proceed in considerable detail to recapitulate the various concrete plans that Sun projected. The present author will not enter into the minutiae of the problems of clothing, of transport, of communications, etc., inasmuch as they have already been dealt with and because they are not directly relevant to the political or ideological features of Sun's thought. 296. Tsui, cited, p. 378, n. 125. 297. The International Development of China was welcomed as an interesting fantasy in a world which had not yet heard of the Five Year Plans and the programs of the New Deal. The fact that Sun Yat-sen was a few years ahead of his contemporaries gave him the air of a dreamer, which was scarcely deserved. 298. Hsü translation, “The Outline of National Reconstruction,” p. 85. Two points of detail may be noted here. In the first place, min shêng has been emphasized by being placed first, although Sun Yat-sen generally arranged his principles in their logical order: nationalism, democracy, min shêng. Secondly, min shêng, although emphasized, is dealt with in one single paragraph in this vitally important document. The question of the hsien is given eight paragraphs to the one on min shêng. This is indicative of the point stressed above, namely, that Sun Yat-sen, while he was sure of the importance of min shêng, did not believe in hard and fast rules concerning its development. 299. Work cited, p. 232. 300. See above, p. 180 ff. 301. The author uses the term “national economic revolution” to distinguish those parts of the ming shêng chu i which treat the transformation of the Chinese economy in relation to the development of a nation-state. Obviously, there is a great difference between the economy of a society regarding itself as ecumenical, and one faced with the problem of dealing with other equal societies. The presence of a state implies a certain minimum of state interference with economic matters; the national economic revolution of Sun Yat-sen was to give the Chinese economy a national character, coordinating the economic with the other programs of nationalism. Hence, the significant stress in the phrase “national economic revolution” should rest upon the word “national.” 302. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, cited, p. 329. “Genossen, die hier Versammelten sind alle Arbeiter und stellen eine Teil der Nation dar. Auf den chinesischen Arbeitern lastet eine grosse Verantwortung und wenn ihr dieser Aufgabe entsprechen werdet, so wird China eine grosse Nation und ihr eine mächtige Arbeiterklasse.” 303. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, p. 329. “Ausser dem wirtschaftlichen Kampf für die Kürzung des Arbeitstages und die Erhöhung der Löhne stehen vor Euch noch viel wichtigere Fragen von politischem Charakter. Für die politischen Ziele müsst ihr meine Drei Prinzipien befolgen und die Revolution unterstützen.” 304. Putnam Weale, The Vanished Empire, London, 1926, pp. 145-147. The same observation had been made to the Russian ambassador, Vladislavich, sent by Catherine I to Peking in 1727. The Chinese said at that time, “ ... that foreign trade had no attraction for the people, who were amply supplied with all the necessaries of life from the products of their own country.” Sir Robert K. Douglas, Europe and the Far East 1506-1912, New York, 1913, pp. 28-29. 305. See above, p. 47 ff. 306. International Development, cited, p. 237. 307. International Development, p. 12. 308. International Development, p. 21. 309. Wou Saofong, cited, gives an excellent summary of the plan, pp. 184-202. There is no particular reason, however, why the work by Sun, which he wrote in fluent and simple English, should not be consulted. The American edition is so well put together with maps and outlines that a layman will find it comprehensible and stimulating. 310. International Development, pp. 220-221. 311. International Development, pp. 6-8. 312. International Development, p. 198. 313. International Development, p. 199. Sun Yat-sen discussed only two of these essentials (food, clothing) in his lectures on the San Min Chu I. According to Tai Chi-tao, he was to have continued to speak on the topics of “Housing,” “Health,” “Death,” “Conclusions on Livelihood,” and “Conclusions on the San Min Doctrine,” but the only person who may know what he intended to say on these subjects is Mme. Sun Yat-sen. (See Hsü translation, “The Basic Literature of Sunyatsenism,” pp. 39-40.) 314. This is based upon statements made by Judge Linebarger to the author. According to him, Sun Yat-sen had few of the prejudices of class, one way or the other, that affect the outlook of so many Western leaders. He did not believe that the only possible solution to the problem of livelihood was the Marxian one, and was confident that the Chinese Nationalists would be able to solve the problem. This question was to him paramount above all others; the life of the masses of Chinese citizens was the life of China itself. 315. International Development, p. 11. 316. The same, p. 11. 317. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 326. The discussion of Bismarck runs from p. 322 to 326; the length of the discussion shows what Sun thinks of Bismarck's acuteness, although he disapproved of Bismarck's anti-democratic stand. 318. International Development, p. 4. 319. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 426. 320. Price translation, pp. 434-435. In the d'Elia translation, pp. 465-466. The Price translation has been quoted in this instance because Father d'Elia translates min shêng as “the economic Demism,” which—although interesting when used consistently—might not be clear in its present context. Sun Yat-sen's courteous use of the word “communism,” in view of the Canton-Moscow entente then existing, has caused a great deal of confusion. The reader may judge for himself how much Sun's policy constitutes communism. 321. One or two further points concerning the land policy may be mentioned. In the first place, it is the land which is to be taxed. A tax will be applied, according to this theory, on the land, and the increment will also be confiscated. These are two separate forms of revenue. Furthermore, lest all land-holders simply surrender their land to the government, Sun makes clear that his taxation program applies only to land. It would consequently be quite advantageous for the owner to keep the land; the buildings on it would not be affected by the increment-seizure program, and the land would be worth keeping. “The value of the land as declared at present by the landowner will still remain the property of each individual landowner.” (d'Elia translation, p. 466; Father d'Elia's note on this page is informing.) The landowner might conceivably put a mortgage on the land to pay the government the amount of the unearned increment, and still make a handsome enough profit from the use of the land to amortize the mortgage. 322. Linebarger, Conversations, Book III, p. 25. 323. Wittfogel, Sun Yat-sen, p. 328. “Die chinesischen Kapitalisten sind nicht so stark, dass sie die chinesischen Arbeiter unterdrücken könnten.” 324. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 469. Italics omitted. For the discussion of the relation of the program of min shêng to capitalism, see d'Elia's various footnotes and appendices dealing with the subject. Father d'Elia, as a devout Catholic, does a thorough piece of work in demonstrating that Sun Yat-sen was not a Bolshevik and not hostile to the Roman Catholic Church, and had a warm although infrequently expressed admiration for that organization. Li Ti-tsun, in “The Sunyatsenian Principle of Livelihood,” cited, tries to find the exact shade of left orientation in min shêng, and digests the main policies. Wou and Tsui, both cited, also discuss this point. 325. International Development, pp. 36-39. 326. By an irony of fate, the most conspicuous example of the realization of any one of these plans was the beginning of the port of Hulutao, which was to be “The Great Northern Port” of Sun's vision. The National Government had already started work on this port when the Japanese, invading Manchuria, took it. There is so much pathos in Sun's own life that this frustation of his plans after his death seems disappointing beyond words to his followers. In his own trust in mankind, in the eagerness and the sincerity of his enthusiasms, in the grandeur of his vision—here are to be found the most vital clues to the tragedy of Sun Yat-sen. Like the other great founders of the earth's ideals, he charted worlds within the vision but, perhaps, beyond the accomplishment of ordinary men. 327. Hsü translation, cited, p. 440; Price translation, p. 444; d'Elia translation, cited, p. 476. The first has been preferred purely as a matter of style. The Chinese words min shêng and San Min Chu I have been used instead of the English renderings which Hsü gives, again as a pure matter of form and consistency with the text. 328. The author is indebted to Mr. Jên Tai for the clarification of this ideal of dual continuity—of the family system, preserving the flesh, and the intellectual tradition, preserving the cultural heritages. 329. d'Elia translation, cited, p. 538.